

**SUNSET IN THE
GARDENS OF AL-
ANDALUS**

M. Ikraam Abdu-Noor (1-11)

**23 MAXIMS FOR
ANATOMY**

Nicholas Packwood (60-64)

**THE LAND AND
NIGHTFALL...**

Bruce Isaacs P.65

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VEGETABLES

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Note on contributors

Ikram Abdu-Noor

M. Ikraam Abdu-Noor is currently completing his Ph.D. in Arabic Studies and Anthropology at Yale University. His research deals with Moroccan Andalusian music in its historical and poetic dimensions. His other interests include the sociolinguistics of Arabic, literacy and orality, and theories of value. His paper, "Andalusian Strophic Poetry Between the Spoken and the Written: The Case of the Moroccan Andalusian Music," is in press. His *Sunset in the Garden of al-Andalus* published here, provides a brief contextual introduction to Andalusian poetry, which is followed by punctilious translations of selected poems that remarkably feature the sun as their concentricity. The poems in their original Arabic form are provided with the translations for the benefit of those of us who are able to read them.

Katerina Baitinger

Katerina Baitinger is currently acting as the Coordinator of Academic Advising at Middlesex Community College. She is also standing as a Yale Fellow (2005-2006). She has published various academic essays and participated in several national and international conferences and seminars. She has been working on a book-length manuscript exploring the concept of a unified Feminist Theory, beginning with Plato. She has participated in several conferences regarding the enhancement of teaching and learning environments including conferences held at The City University of London and Capital Community College in Towson University. In her contribution to *Nebula* Baitinger casts a refreshing and controversial light on Plato's Theory of Forms, providing a challenging feminist reading which asserts that

Plato did not exclude women from either worldly wisdom or "cave" dwelling. She pursues this convincingly by consulting the text of *The Republic* in its original language.

Wendy Galgan

Wendy Galgan is a doctoral candidate at the City University of New York Graduate Center, and is an adjunct in both Philosophy and English at St. Francis College in Brooklyn, New York. In addition to poetry, she has published essays on Philip K. Dick, and science fiction and religion. In her contribution to this issue of *Nebula* Wendy grounds Samuel Delany's renowned fantasy novel *Return to Nevèrjón* in a world indelible from our own, whilst also moving within a larger, theoretically deconstructive, framework.

Bruce Isaacs

Bruce Isaacs is currently enrolled in his fourth year as a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney (Australia), hoping to complete a thesis on American film and pop culture aesthetics. He has contributed articles to popular culture collections such as *Jacking into the Matrix Franchise: Cultural Reception and Interpretation* (New York and London: Continuum Press, 2004) and *New Punk Cinema* due out in July from Edinburgh University Press. His short story "The Sound of the Fury of Walter Wishwell" is forthcoming in *New Writing: The International Journal for the Practice and Theory of Creative Writing*. In his poem *The Land and Nightfall* Bruce discreetly evokes millennia of transformations of a very particular geographical space which is laden with

conflict, strife and renaissance.

Karen Kachra

Karen Kachra is currently completing her PhD in Philosophy at Northwestern University in Chicago on “The problem of agency: Foucault, feminism and the socially constructed subject.” She has received a SSHRC fellowship for doctoral study and she has participated in Northwestern’s Paris Program in Critical Theory. Recently she has written about French Theory for the *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie de Langue Française* and pontificated on how “Feminism Wrecked My Yoga Class” for *Philosophy Now*. In the past she has presented work on race theory, epistemic pluralism and human rights. Her contribution to *Nebula* comes in the form of *Dwelling as a Border*, an article which is at once imaginative in the theoretical constructs it asserts and highly empathetic, illustrating a reality lived and suffered by human beings who are dispossessed of agency, representation and their basic rights to exist despite dubious corporate and “national” interests. Karen interrogates the ethical vacuum created by the building of dams throughout India which displace villagers and their villages, recalling Arundhati Roy’s passionate work on the subject.

Nejmeh Khalil-Habib

Nejmeh Khalil-Habib was born in Haifa, Palestine in 1946 and was raised in Beirut, Lebanon. She graduated with a BA from the Arab University (Beirut, Lebanon) in 1970 and received an MA in Arabic literature from the Lebanese University in 1991. In the same year, Khalil-Habib immigrated

to Australia with her husband and four children. She has been teaching in the Arab and Islamic Studies Department at the University of Sydney since March 2002. She has acted as editor for the Australian-Arabic literary magazine, *Joussour* and has published innumerable essays, translations, reviews and columns in both English and Arabic journals and newspapers worldwide. Her Masters thesis, *AlNamouthaj Al-Insani Fi Adab Ghassan Kanafani* was published by Bissan Inc. in Beirut in 1999. Bissan also published her first collection of short stories entitled *Wal Abna’ Yaddrusson* in Beirut (2001). Her latest collection of short stories, *Rabiun Lam Yuzhir* was published in Beirut by Al-Markiz Al-Arabee Lil-Abhath Wal-Tawtheek (2003). She is currently completing a unique reader of Australian Literature in Arabic, a project for which she received a literary grant in 2003 from the Australia Council of Arts. In her contribution to *Nebula*, Khalil-Habib provides a bilingual issue of her short story *Neehal* (original written in Arabic and follows English translation here) in which she combines the eloquent innocence and preoccupation of youth, with the devastation of a political and social reality suffered by the dislocated Palestinian refugees, who made Lebanon their home as a result of the 1948 Diaspora.

Caroline Law

Caroline Law accepted a scholarship from the University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina where she received her Masters in Human Rights and Democracy (2003). She received her Bachelor of Economics and Political Science from McGill University in Montreal, Canada in 2000. Caroline is currently working as an independent scholar and has accumulated work experience from a variety

of fields and organizations including working as an election campaign canvasser for Toronto City Council and as an Intern for the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In her article *Development and Nationalism...* Law posits that an indelible link between economic inequity and national instability exists, although she shuns dichotomous simplifications. She provides a unique theory of intra-governmental factors + census demographics and the relationship that these have with the resultant form of government.

Corinne Lhermitte

Corinne Lhermitte is a free-lance translator and a lecturer at the University of Miami, Florida, USA. She was born in Paris, France, and received her Ph.D. in Romance Studies from the University of Miami, in December 2003. She holds a *Licence de Langues Vivantes Etrangères: Anglais, Option traduction*, and a *Maîtrise de Langues Vivantes Etrangères: Anglais, Histoire Contemporaine des États-Unis* from the University of Paris III - Sorbonne Nouvelle. She specializes in 19th- and 20th-century French literature and film studies. In her dissertation titled: "Toward an Aesthetics of Adaptation: From Text to Film in Proust and Duras," she studies film adaptation through translation and film semiotic theories, and highlights cogent correlations between adaptation and translation processes. The University of Caen published her essay titled *Adaptation as Rewriting: Evolution of a Concept*, in 2004. Corinne's contribution to this issue of *Nebula* comes in the form of *A Jakobsonian Approach to Film Adaptations of Hugo's Les Misérables*, in which she discusses the theoretical advantages of using the concept of "intersemiotic translation" as an analytical tool for

broadening theories of film adaptation.

Terri Beth Miller

Terri Beth Miller is a graduate student in English Language and Literature at the University of Virginia (U.S.), where she will be earning her Master's degree in May, 2005. Her areas of specialization include post-colonial and disability studies and narrative and feminist theory. In addition to her research in post-colonial and cultural studies, she has also written extensively on the works of late nineteenth and early twentieth century British authors, focusing in particular on the writings of Virginia Woolf. Other recent publications include "Behind the Veil," an article exploring the deconstruction of Western feminist concepts of "woman" in Ahdaf Soueif's *The Map of Love*. Currently, she is engaged in the writing of her Master's thesis, in which she examines the program of linguistic/imaginative r/evolution in the Rushdie corpus. Her contribution to *Nebula* gives us a refreshing glimpse of her work in progress, as well as a glimpse of her approach to the dense allusions of *The Satanic Verses*, quite aptly implicating postmodern theories of text, signification, fracture and disjunction, in a well argued and convincing semiological approach.

Andrew Ockrim

Andrew received his Bachelor of Business Administration from Canterbury University, UK, in 1995. He has worked in information technology for over 14 years with some of Australia's biggest corporations including IBM Global Services (Australia), IBM Olympic, Caltex/Ampol

Petroleum (Chevron-Texaco), NCR Asia Pacific and the NSW Dept of Education & Training, only to name a few. He is currently working for the NSW (Australia) Dept. of Juvenile Justice in information security compliance. In his Article *Information Security: What You Need to Know*, Andrew frightens us all out of liberally volunteering personal information on the web in a highly informative and concise article encompassing I.T lingo that has emerged in recent years. He leaves us feeling more informed of what is at stake during our increased dependence on the internet, and a little paranoid too.

Nicholas Packwood

Nicholas Packwood is a social anthropologist who is currently acting as Assistant

Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University

(Ontario, Canada). His recent publications include “Geography of the Blogosphere” in *Into the Blogosphere* (University of Minnesota) and “At the Wall of Darkness” in a special issue of *Space and Culture*, a journal for which he has acted as guest editor. His two art pieces featured in this issue are strangely neither poetry nor prose, neither biography nor fiction, neither narrative nor scholarship, but somehow act as evidence of the culmination of all of these in the intellect of their author. *23 Maxims of Anatomy* and *Postcard to Gilles Deleuze* are delightful experimental writings which conjure up the feelings of disjunction between signifiers and the instability of genre that is reminiscent of postmodern American poetry.

Laura Madeline Wiseman

With research interests focusing primarily in women’s studies and creative writing, Laura Madeline Wiseman received her B.S. from Iowa State University in women’s studies and English literature (in 2002 with Honours) and her M.A. from the University of Arizona in women’s studies with a certificate in teaching (2004). She currently teaches at the University of Arizona and at The Learning Curve. Her works have appeared in *Fiction*

International, Familiar, Poetry Motel, Spire Magazine, Colere, Clare, 42opus, 13th Moon, Vs, Altar Magazine, Driftwood, Dicey Brown, Flyway Literature Review, and other publications. She is also the imagine editor for the magazine *In the Fray* and a columnist for *Empowerment4women* and *The F-WORD*. In her contribution to *Nebula* Madeline asserts that though hegemonic ideologies of womanhood work to contain women within narrow definitions of subjectivity, occasionally media are produced which disrupt these narratives. She explores *Freeway* where the central character is neither a victim nor a survivor; the two categories assigned to women who have been sexually assaulted. This paper also discusses how Madonna in *What It Feels like for a Girl* embodies the grotesque and unruly, which catapults her behavior beyond a simple inversion of the gender hierarchy. For more information on Laura’s work visit www.u.arizona.edu/~madelily

Sunset in the Gardens of al-Andalus.*

By M. Ikraam Abdu-Noor

The era of Muslim rule in Spain (early 8th century to 1492), the historical moment known in Arabic as al-Andalus, was an age of great poets and great patrons, when princes in cities like Seville and Cordova and Granada competed to attract the best writers of the day. The result was an era when poetry in Arabic was liberated from many of the constraints it had previously known, producing a timeless poetic legacy. Alongside the *qaṣīda*, the classical Arabic ode written in a single meter and a single rhyme, new genres of stanzaic poetry having multiple rhymes and complex meters appeared in the late 10th century: the *muwashshah* in formal Arabic and the *zajal* in colloquial Arabic. Scholars are divided on the origin of these poetic forms. Some have argued that they developed from earlier Arabic stanzaic forms known in the Middle East¹, while others² maintain that these forms were unique to al-Andalus and probably evolved from contact with non-Arabic forms native to the Iberian peninsula. Whichever view one takes on their origin, there can be no doubt that these new styles of poetry allowed the poet to experiment with rhyme and meter in unprecedented ways, to write in non-formal Arabic, and even to include non-Arabic phrases in their poems.

The expansion in the range of poetic forms in al-Andalus was accompanied by an extension of their themes, as well. Many of the ancient motifs and imagery found in the *qaṣīda* — praise (*rithā'*), wine drinking (*khamriyya*), love (*ghazal*) — persisted in the new poems, but were used in fresh ways. In one area, at least, the Andalusian poets outdid their forebears: one of the most widely used themes in the new poetry was description of nature. Certainly natural scenes may be found in older Arabic poetry, but rarely executed with the vividness and enthusiasm we find in many *muwashshah* and *zajal* poems. Perhaps it was due to the richness of the natural environment in Spain, perhaps simply to an animated love of versifying, fueled by the passions of wealthy patrons and princes. In any case, we find among the stanzas of al-Andalus passages of sublime feeling recalling natural scenes of striking beauty. The *muwashshah* and *zajal* reached the pinnacle of their glory in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries with poets like Ibn Baqī (d. 1150), Ibn Quzmān (d. 1160), Ibn Sahl (d. 1251) and al-Shushtarī (d. 1269).

We cannot be certain about it today, but these new forms of poetry probably were born to be sung. Ibn Sanā' al-Mulk (d. 1211), observing the poems of al-Andalus from his vantage point in Egypt, attempted to create a way of analyzing their structure. He found, however, that he could not derive a single set of rules that governed the meters of all these poems. Indeed, he noted that many of these poems apparently “have

no prosody but the melody, no meter but that of the beat...”³ In any case, we know that eventually many of these poems did find their way into songs, and this literary-musical tradition echoes today across North Africa in musical genres collectively known as Andalusian music.

The translations presented here are drawn from the Moroccan version of this musical heritage, from two songbooks: *At-turāth al-‘arabī al-maghribī fī al-mūsīqī* (Idriss Benjallun, 1979) and *Min waḥy ar-rabāb* (cAbd al-Karīm ar-Rāyis, 1982). The Moroccan Andalusian music is divided into eleven large suites, each suite (or *nūba*) being centered upon one primary musical mode. The modes, in turn, are associated with cosmological phenomena such as the rising of the full moon or the time just before sunrise. The poems here are drawn from the *nūba* called al-Māya, which is associated with the time of sunset. We see here the setting sun used to describe lost love, moments of reverie and even the thanatopsis theme. In some cases we know the name of the poet, in most we do not. But we do know that in spirit and form these songs recall the glory that was al-Andalus.

A *muwashshaḥ* stanza in the meter *ar-rajaz* [al-Rāyis, p. 83]

شمس العاشيا رَوْنَقَتْ جَمَعَ الكَتَائِبِ وَالْبِطَاحُ
على الغُصُونِ أَشْرَقَتْ وَزَيَّنَتْ بِهَا اللِّقَاحُ
وبالغَلَسِ بَشَّرَتْ آهٍ على قَلْبِي الجِرَاحُ
توشحتُ بِالْأَصْفَرِارِ حِينَ غُيِّبَتْ عَن مَّقْلَتِي
وَمَنْ هَوَيْتَ ظَبِي الْقِفَارِ عَوْنٌ يَا صَاحَ عَن فُرْقَةٍ

The evening sun slowly shrouds

the horsemen gathering and the plains

On the tree branches she* shines

and the leaves are adorned by her rays

And thus she announces the arrival of night ...

Ah, my heart's wound is grave!

She decorates herself in pale yellow

when she is hidden from my eye

You whom the desert gazelle enchants

grieve, friend, for she is not nigh

* In Arabic, the sun is grammatically feminine.

A *zajal* stanza in the meter *manhūk ar-ramal* [al-Rāyis, p. 84]

يا عَشِيًّا ذَكَرْتَنِي شَوْقِي وَزَمَانَ النُّحُورِ
رَوْنَقُ الشَّمْسِ صَارَ فِي الْأَفْقِ مَائِلًا لِلْخُمُورِ
أَيُّهَا السَّاقِي جُدْ لَنَا وَاسْقِ عَلَى غَيْظِ الْعَدُونِ
أَنْظُرِ الشَّمْسَ كَيْفَ بَدَتْ تَصْفَرُ جَنَحَتْ لِلْأُفُورِ
جَلَنَارٌ قَدْ حَفَّ بِالْعَنْبَرِ فَتِنَةٌ لِلْعُقُورِ

O evening, you recall to me my longing

and hours of withering torpor

The sun's glory becomes, at the horizon,

a slope toward dark languor

O wine-pourer, pour lavishly for us, and drink

in spite of anyone's anger

See the sun, how it begins to yellow

leaning toward night

A pomegranate blossom has enveloped in amber

a temptation for the mind

A *zajal* stanza in the meter *makhlac al-basīt* [Benjallun, pp. 84-85]

فَمُ وَاعْتَنَمَ سَطْوَةَ الْبَنْفَسَجِ	إِنَّ الرِّيَاضَ حُسْنَهُ عَجِيبُ
عَلَى حُضِيرَةٍ بَيْنَ صَهِيرَجِ	الشَّمْسُ مَالَتْ إِلَى الْمَغِيبِ
الشَّمْسُ مَالَتْ إِلَى الصَّفْوَرَةِ	وَذَهَبَتْ أَوْرَاقَ الْغُرُوسِ
تَطَهَّرَ غُصُونُ فِي أَبْدَعِ صُورَةٍ	وَقَدْ كَسَتْ بِهَجَّةِ النُّفُوسِ
وَالرُّوْضُ فَرَّشَ مِنَ الْخُضُورَةِ	فِي حَلَّةٍ تُشْبِهُ الْعُرُوسِ
وَالطَّيْرُ فَوْقَ الْغُصُونِ يَحْرَجُ	فِي مَنْبَرِهِ كَأَنَّهُ خَطِيبُ
عَلَى حُضِيرَةٍ بَيْنَ صَهِيرَجِ	الشَّمْسُ مَالَتْ إِلَى الْمَغِيبِ

Stop, and snatch the violet's audacious pride

how wondrous is the beauty of the garden-bed

Over a courtyard, in the little pool of water

the sun declines toward darkening sunset

The sun declines toward the yellow twilight

and gilds the leaves of climbing vines with gold

Branches appear in unexpected forms

and dress up the happiness of souls

While the garden spreads forth its verdure

in raiment which rivals a bride's clothes

A bird, ensconced in the branches,

he is like a Friday preacher on his pulpit

Over a courtyard, in the little pool of water

the sun declines toward darkening sunset

A stanza in the meter *manhūk as-sarīc* [ar-Rāyis, p. 93]

مَهْلًا عَلَى غَرَضِي	شَمْسُ الْعَشِيِّ بِاللَّهِ
وَاللَّيْلُ فِي غَمَضِي	ضَوْءُ النَّهَارِ كَسَاهُ
قَدْ غَابَ عَن لِحْظِي	يَا حَسْرَتِي يَا أَوَاهُ
قَدْ حَلَّتْ الضُّرْقَا	وَمَنْ هَوَيْتُ قَالَ لِي
وَاشْتَدَّتْ الْعِشْقَا	سَكَبْتُ دُمُوعَ نَجْلِي

The evening sun, by Allāh

irresistibly bending down

The bright of the day clothing it

but the night, darkening down

What a shame! O alas!

from my sight it has withdrawn

One who loves said to me,

“The separation has us unbound.”

Tears poured from my wide-open eye

and love became grief without bounds

Six lines in the meter *al-kāmil* by Ibn Maraj al-Kahl al-Andalusī [ar-Rāyis p. 97]

وَعَشِيَّةٌ لَا زِلْتَ أَرْقُبُ وَقْتَهَا	سَمَحَتْ بِهَا الْأَيَّامُ بَعْدَ تَعَدُّرِ
نَلْنَا بِهَا كُلَّ الْمُنَى فِي رَوْضَةٍ	تُهْدِي لِنَاشِقِهَا شَمِيمَ الْعَنْبَرِ
وَالطَّيْرُ يَشْدُو وَالْأَرَائِكُ تَنْشِي	وَالشَّمْسُ تَرْقُصُ فِي قَمِيصِ أَصْفَرِ
وَالرَّوْضُ بَيْنَ مَفْضُضٍ وَمَذْهَبٍ	وَالزَّهْرُ بَيْنَ مَدْرَهَمٍ وَمَدْنَرِ
مَا أَصْفَرَّ وَجْهَ الشَّمْسِ عِنْدَ غُرُوبِهَا	إِلَّا لِفُرْقَةٍ حَسَنِ ذَاكَ الْمَنْظَرِ

Many an evening have I remained, watching closely the moment

The days grant them generously after much difficulty

In a garden, we obtain from them every desire

when you breathe it, it gives the scent of ambergris

The birds sing, and the lawn-seats are folded up

while the sun dances on in a yellow chemise

The gardens float between adornment in silver and gold

and the flowers, becoming dirhams and dinars

The face of the sun yellows as it westers

only because it departs from the beauty of that scene

A stanza in the meter *majzū' ar-ramal* by the poet Muhammad b. Alī al-Awsī, better known as al-°Aqrab (“The Scorpion”) [Benjallun pp. 83-84]

كَالذَّهَبِ فَوْقَ الرِّيحَيْنِ	قُمْ تَرَى شَمْسَ الْعَشِيِّ
وَوَشَحْتَ كُلِّ الْبَسَاتِينِ	أَكْسَتْ بِحُلَّةٍ يَهِيَّةٍ
قُمْ اغْتَنِمِ هَذِهِ الْمَحَاسِنِ	يَا مُدِيرَ كَأْسِ الْحُمِيِّ
زَاهِرٌ ذُو نَفْحَاتِ	يَوْمَنَا يَوْمٍ عَجِيبٍ
وَالزَّمَانَ أَقْبَلَ مُوَاتِي	وَالْحَبِيبَ مَعَ حَبِيبِهِ

Wait a moment, you will see the evening sun

like gold above the foliage fragrant

Adorning the whole garden

and dressing it in splendid raiment

O master of the wine-glass

stop and seize these charming moments

This day of ours is a wonderful time

a shining time, full of fragrance

And the lover is with his beloved

as the time draws closer to my end

A *zajal* stanza [Benjallun, p. 100]

شَمْسُ الْعِشِيِّ لَبَسَتْ نُحُورُ	قَبْلَ الْأَفُورِ	أَنْبَاتٌ بِالسَّلْوَانِ
الدَّهْرُ بِهَا يَصُونُ	وَهُوَ يَقُولُ	ذَهَبَتْ جَمِيعُ الْأَحْزَانِ
أَهْلُ الْجَمَالِ لَا تَزُونُ	تَسْبِي الْعُقُورِ	كَأَنَّهُمْ غَزَلَانُ
مَا بَيْنَ مَحَافِلِ ظُرَافِ	وَنُضْسِ لَطَافِ	فِي وَادِي فَاسِ جِلَاسِ
وَلَيْسَ فِيهِمْ خِلَافُ	سِوَى الْعَفَافِ	زَهُوِ الْغِنَاءِ وَالْكَاسِ

The evening sun wears wasting

before it sets

it announces glad forgetfulness

The moment rules over it,

and now it says

“All the sadness has fled.”

Beautiful people carry on

stealing my sense

like gazelles of the desert

We find in parties elegant

genial friends

sitting by the River Fez

There is no discord among them

except abstinence:

the pleasure of song and goblet

A *muwashshah* stanza [Benjallun p. 101]

شمس العشي قد غربت واستعبرت عيني من الفرقا
 على الشفق سظرت حين غيبت زاد العشي شوقا
 حتى الطيور قد غردت وترنمت ترتي على الورقا
 جاوبتها باشتهار قف نعتبر بالله عليك مهلا
 قال المليح زين الصغار فز بالنظر كب المدام واملا

The evening sun has gone to the west

and tears my eyes shed

from our separating

They trace lines, out of fear;

when she is made to disappear

the lover still longs in waiting

Until the birds have chattered,

chirped and twittered

among the leaves, lamenting

I replied to her, all openly:

Stop! I warn plainly —

go slow, by Allāh's will!

Said the little ornament, the beauty:

This view you now enjoy,

pour the wine and have your fill!

Notes

* Some of these translations have appeared in the magazine *Palimpsest 2* (2005); used by permission.

¹ E.g. Hartmann, M.: *Das arabische Strophengedicht. I. Das Muwaššah* (Weimar: Emil Feber, 1897); Schoeler, G.: “Muwaššah und Zağal” (in *Neues Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft. 5. Orientalisches Mittelalter*. W. Heinrichs, ed. Wiesbaden, 1990, pp. 440-464).

² E.g. Monroe, J.T.: “Which Came First, the *Zajal* or the *Muwashshaha*? Some Evidence for the Oral Origins of Hispano-Arabic Strophic Poetry.” *Oral Tradition*. 4.1-2. January-May, 1989, pp. 38-74.

Neehal.

By NejmeH Khalil-Habib

She woke up, almost late, dressed quickly, threw a glance at the mirror, and admiringly said: “You deserve a prince Neehal.”

Abu Mohamed blew the horn of his car, intending to hurry her up. She ran out sporting an apple in one hand and carrying a school bag in the other. The echo of her steps on the stairs reminded the neighbours that it was time to come out of their laziness and start a new day full of many unexpected events.

“Good morning Uncle Abu Mohamed, how are you?”

“God bless you daughter, God protect you from evil rumours.”

“Protect you from evil rumours! ...” A plea that she had never paid attention to previously. If the plea were to work for her neighbour Amira, she would not be the hot topic of shame currently on the tip of every tongue. She took a seat close to the window, set her eyes to the outside and let her thoughts lead her aimlessly. She relived the taste of that kiss that Ali snatched from her lips when they found themselves alone in the lift. She blamed herself for letting it happen. *You acted silly Neehal...he will think that you're a cheap girl. What if he told his friends? What if the subject reached your brother or father? God! Please! Listen to Abu Mohamed's plea ...*

.....

Abu Mohamed sweeps through the narrow streets of West Beirut's suburbs: Burj Elbarajneh, Haret Hreik, and Haih Essillum with his bus. On each stop few boys and girls in their late teens rush on. Within half an hour of starting his route, the school bus becomes fully loaded and begins to make its way with peace to the vocational institute in Sibleen...Few months and Neehal will get a diploma in education. A career she never dreamt of, it was the best available. If her father was wealthy, she would now be at the American University of Beirut, on her way to be a doctor or an engineer ...if her father hadn't stuck all his life to his people, the conservative closeminded villagers, she might be a movie star by now. Her beauty supercedes the best of them. This is what her mother and aunt Rabab and all the loving neighbours say. This is what she sees in the staring eyes of the elderly males, not to mention the younger ones. Any way, teaching is not a bad job, who knows! God might bring a doctor or an engineer in her way, who would make a good husband, and that would compensate for her *bourgeois* dreams.

The last one to come up into the bus was Ahmad. He greeted the passengers, most of whom were girls.

Soon he started picking on them.

“I wonder why girls, these days, like it the hard way. I swear, if I was a girl, I wouldn’t bother waking up early, running mad after a school bus, imprisoning myself in a classroom for years for the sake of a degree...Girls! What makes you run after a degree? Tomorrow, a sweetheart will come, carry you to his nest and all your degrees will fade in cooking and cleaning and breeding kids.”

“Save us from your silly advice,” said Neehal.

“Especially you, your golden yellow hair is enough to make hundreds of men die to marry you.”

“Hey...Shut up!”

“...”

“Suppose, you idiot, that I married you, and after a few years, a blind bomb or an Israeli raid or a silly skirmish between two local parties, took you from me...what will happen to my kids and me? Should we go beg around the doors of the mosques? Or should I send my kids roving the streets selling combs and chewing gum to make their living?”

“You are arrogant and illogical. You inherited this sophisticated mind with your sophisticated name. Neehal! For God’s sake, where did they get this bizarre name from anyway?”

“Bizarre Eh! You, *Mr Ignorant*, should know that it’s an original, artistic name, it’s musical, leaves an impression in the heart and the ears. Not like yours! ... half the men of the continent named by it.”

“.....”

She fell again into her dreams. This quiet sleepy face of the sea and its lazy waves reminded her of one of the American movies she had seen on TV several days ago. She envied the heroine, who was about her age.

“Why is it that what is permitted to her is not permitted to me? Why am I not allowed to be with a man, just to be, unless he is agreed upon as a future husband from a long chain of brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, the immediate and the extended family? Why do I have to feign anger when a boy steals a kiss from my lips, while deep inside I wished it and even planned for it? . Why can’t I be proud of this beauty that God granted me? Why is it my fault if this beauty aroused some idiot? Why is it that every time I admire my naked body I feel sinful? Why do I have to blind the window, which is far from any other one by tens of meters, because a sick person just might peep into my room with binoculars? Why....why...why....”

On the opposite seat, sat Randa complaining about her mother who is obsessed with cleaning. She forces her, every weekend, to wash the windows, the floor, the tiles, and even the walls. She owned a unit, with

real walls and tiles, after a long long life of living in a tent, like a room, in the camp. She adored it. *She loves it more than she loves us.*

“Oh God! Protect us from spoiled girls,” Ahmad said. “Suppose you weren’t kicked away from your country village “Sasa”, then you have to wake up before dawn, to pick up the figs, or to feed the cows, or to collect the wheat from the field, early before the sunrise.”

You, curious creature! Hold your peace, no one is interested in your advice.”

Layla was complaining about her fiancée who postponed his return from Abu Dhabi for the third time.

“He backed off! He fled your hell, smart guy.” Ahmad said. The crowd burst into laughter.

“Don’t worry dear! I have a better suitor for you.”

“Mind your own business you smart ass.”

Sukayna mocked Mr Malouf and the enthusiastic way with which he introduced the latest modern theory in class teaching.

“His majesty thinks we live in Paris. He wants us to apply theories put to students who are thousands of developing steps ahead. Put for students who go to airconditioned classrooms; have movies and theatres in their backyards; where classes count no more than 15 students; where teachers earn in a week what we earn in a year. What a dreamer!”

Sukayna continued, wiring her mouth, imitating the way her teacher talked:

“Delete the teacher’s roll. Delete punishment and awards. Let the students decide when and what to learn’ ...I swear by God, people will stone us for that.”

Fadi commented without moving his eyes away from his cards.

“Jesus said, listen to their sayings and don’t do their deeds. Take the degree first, don’t put the cart before the horse.”

“Please kids! Be quiet, I want to hear the news,” said Abu Mohamed.

“Uncle Abu Mohamed, don’t bother yourself, today’s news are the same as yesterday’s, as tomorrow’s.”

Bilal and Fadi were sitting on the back seat, playing cards. A breeze blew up carrying a refreshing fragrance from the sea, Fadi lifted his head off the cards, scrunched his face, took a deep breath. He was

enchanted by the smell. He said: “If it weren’t a sin, I will ask to be buried naked within the folds of the sparkling waves, with the pearls and the fish, not under the dull dark soil with the worms and rotten roots!”

On the checkpoint at Khaldeh, all went silent. Few meters away, Azza, affected by the autumn atmosphere, started to sing one of Fairuz’ songs:

“The golden yellow leaves of September
Under the windows
Reminded me
Of your love
Oh! ... Golden leaves of September...”

The Girls looked into each other’s eyes and smiled maliciously. Everyone knows what Azza thinks is a secret. All of them whispered about the silent passion, which was growing up between her and Hassan, (the student from the health department).

All of a sudden Abu Mohamed shouted: “The bastard! He was about to throw us into the sea!” A car overtook them sharply.

Neehal looked at her watch: “Please Uncle Abu Mohamed, hurry up a little bit.”

“At your command my precious beauty.”

A car overtook another, the two drivers started shouting at each other. Abu Mohamed shook his head left and right, wondering why people put their lives at risk for sake of silly demonstrations. He turned towards Neehal and said:

“Don’t worry beauty, we will be there on time.”

The bus turned off the main road and into the side street that leads to the institution of Sibleen. There were only few minutes left of the journey. Suddenly, an aeroplane thundered in the sky.

Did they find the time to guess its identity or kind?!....

.....

We were about to end our morning coffee, when the radio broadcasted: “Several minutes ago, an Israeli air raid hit the coastal line, East of Saida, one of the aeroplanes targeted a school bus carrying students to the vocational institute in Sibleen. Witnesses said that pieces of the bus were seen, hundreds of meters away from the site.”

We escorted what remained of Neehal. Her golden yellow hair was scattered over the rocks and the wild flowers, on both sides of the road to Sibleen.

Sydney Australia

20 / 11 / 2002

نهال

استفافت متأخرة بعض الشيء, سوت هندامها على عجل, نظرة عاجلة في المرأة

- تستحقين اميرا يا نهال

نفخ ابو محمد بوق سيارته يستعجلها. ركضت مسرعة تقضم تفاحة بيد وترفع محفظة كتبها باليد الاخرى.

طرقات حدائها فوق درجات السلم تذكر الممتلكين من الجيران ان الساعة قاربت السابعة وأن يوما آخر من هذه الايام الحبلى بكل ما لا يسر قد غدّ خطاه.

- كيف الحال عمي ابو محمد

- يستر عليك ويحمي شبابك يا ابنتي

لاول مرة تفكر كم من المعاني تحمل هاتين الكلمتين √ يستر عليك √! لو ان دعاء كهذا أحاط جارتهم أميرة لما جرحتها الاشاعات كم جرحت. . . انتحت مقعدا وغاصت باحلام وتأملات. استرجعت طعم تلك القبلة التي خطفها منها عليّ عندما خلا لهما الجو في المصعد لبعض لحظات.

- كم كنت متهورة يا نهال! ماذا سيقول فيك الفتى؟ ماذا سيخبر أصحابه؟ ماذا لو وصل الامر لابيك او اخيك؟! . . . !

! . . . رب! استجب لدعاء ابو محمد!

أبو محمد يجوب أزقة حارة حريك وبرج البراجنة وحي السلم, وعند كل وقفة له, يندفع الى قلب الباص بعض

صبايا او فتيان في اعمار متشابهة . . . عند الرمل العالي كانت السيارة √ الاوتوكار √ قد لملت حمولتها

واتجهت هانئة الى معهد سبلين . . . أشهر قليلة وتخرج نهال معلمة من دار معلماتها . . . لم تكن هذه المهنة مما يستهويها بل كانت من أفضل ما تيسر. لو كان والدها أيسر حالا لكانت الان على مقاعد الجامعة الامريكية على عتبة ان تمسي مهندسة او طبيبة. لو لم يكن أبوها من قرية جبلية وعاش عمره كله بين عشيرته في مخيم البرج لكانت دخلت معهد الفنون ودرست الاخراج والتمثيل. فجمالها: √ ولا ممثلات السينما! . . . هذا ما تقول به امها وعمتها وعشرة من جيرتها. بل هذا ما تراه في العيون المبجلة, عيون الكهول قبل الشبان

- أشكري ربك يا نهال فأنت افضل حالا من الكثيرات. غدا تتخرجين والوظيفة مؤمنة لن تدوري على الابواب

والاعتاب خلف الوظيفة. من يعلم؟ ربما أرسل الله ابن الحلال مهندسا او طبيبا يعوضك هذا الوضع البرجوازي الذي يدغدغ أحلامك

كان أحمد آخر من صعد الى الباص. حيا الحمولة. أغلبها من الفتيات

- والله لا اعرف لماذا تحب بنات هذه الايام وجع القلب, والله لو كنت بنتا لكنت لا ازال ارقد هانئا أغرق بالاحلام الوردية.

صبايا! . . . لماذا الهم والغم والركض وراء الشهادات؟ غدا يحمل واحدتك ابن الحلال وتذهب كل اتعابها في

الجلي والغسيل وتربية الاولاد

- خلينا من نصائحك الله يخليك

- كله إلا انت! شعرك الاصفر وحده يجلب لك احسن عريس

- قلت لك انكم

...

- إفرض يا منظوم انني تزوجتك وبعد كم سنة خطفتك سيارة مفخخة او غارة اسرائيلية او اشتباك اخوي او

خطفوك على الحاجز, ماذا يحل بي وباولادي؟ أشحذ على باب الجامع؟!

- والله انت اكبر مغرورة وعقلك اعوج! أنت فيلسوفة زمانك! أورثوك الفلسفة عندما سموك نهال. من اين

جاءوك بهذا الاسم الغريب العجيب؟!

- اسم فيه فن!.. فيه موسيقى!.. اسم مختلف. يترك اثرا في الاذن والقلب. ليس مثل اسمك نصف رجال

العالم يتسمون به.

- اسم قديم وله دلالة.. نهال قال!..!! هه!

- ليس اقدم من عقلتك, والله انك ما تزال تعيش بسرورال جدك, وتفكر ان آخر الدنيا حي كويكات في المخيم

انطلقت الفتات مقهقات, قفشتك يا حموده

...

تغرق ثانية في تأملاتها. هذا البحر الناعس وموجه الكسول يذكرها باحد البرامج الامريكية التي شاهدها البارحة

على شاشة التلفزيون

لماذا يجوز لهن ما لا يجوز لنا؟ لماذا لا يمكنني ان أجالس شابا ما ولو مجالسة بريئة إلا بعد كتب الكتاب؟ لماذا

علي ان أتصنع الممانعة والغضب عندما يختطف قبلة مني ابن الجيران في غفلة من العيون في حين انني انا التي

أكون قد خططت لهذه الخلوة ولهذه القبلة؟!.. لماذا لا يحق لي ان أزهو بهذا الجمال الذي وهبني اياه خالقي؟

لماذا يكون الذنب ذنبي عندما يثير هذا الجمال وغدا.. لماذا لا يحق لي ان ادخن سيجارة إلا في الحمام؟ لماذا

يجب ان اقل نافلة غرفتي التي تبعد مئات الامتار عن النافذة الاخرى إذ انه قد يعن لأخرق ان يبصص علي

بالناصور؟!..

في زاوية اخرى راحت رنده تشكو كم هي تعب. .. أمها مهووسة بالنظافة, تجربها على غسل النوافذ والحيطان

والبلاط وحتى ما تحت البلاط, كل اسبوع, كل اسبوع. أصبح لها شقة, بعدة غرف, بعد طول عمر فعشقتها.

أحببتها اكثر ما أحببتنا

- يا عيني على دلح البنات!..! ماذا تقولين لو انكم ما زلتم في سعسع وعلبك القيام قبل طلوع الفجر لقطف

الدخان وشكه قبل حموة الشمس

- انت أسكت دعنا من تعليقاتك!؟

...

دعد تشكو خطيبها الذي أجل رجوعه من السفر للمرة الثالثة

- غير رأيه أخينا! هرب بجلده. ها.. ها.. ها

- مهضوم والله! ايه طبق على الباقي

- ولا يهكم دعوته, أنا عندي عريس أحسن منه

تتهكم سكينه على أستاذ معروف وحماسه للنظرية التعليمية الجديدة . يظن صاحبنا اننا في باريس. مشاركة الطلاب قال! ! ! إلغاء دور الاستاذ! ! ! إلغاء العقاب والثواب . . . هه مدارس آخر زمان! ! ! . . . ونطبقها في صبرا وشاتيلا ومار الياس! ! والله لو طبقناها لعلقوا لنا الحجر المقدوح! !
من الجهة المقابلة التفت فادي معلقا, إسمعوا اقوالهم ولا تفعلوا افعالهم, خذي الشهادة اولاً ثم لكل حادث حديث
- رجاء يا حلوات اريد ان اسمع اخبار
- عمي ابو محمد لا تتعب قلبك. اخبار اليوم مثل اخبار الامس

على المقعد الخلفي توقع وائل وحسان يلهوان بلعب الورق. قبالة شاطئ خلد هبت رائحة البحر قوية منبهة للحواس. تنشق وائل نفسا عميقا فيما هو يتفحص ورقه: انتشي برائحة البحر, لو ان الدين يسمح لوصيت ان يدفوني في البحر لا تحت التراب

عند حاجز خلدة صمت الجميع. وما ان تخطت السيارة الحاجز حتى عز على عزة الهدوء فانطلقت متأثرة بالجو التشريني المسيطر ورقو الاصفر ذهب ايلول تحت الشبايبك ذكرني فيك
تغامزت الفتيات, الكل يعرف ما تظنه سرا. الكل يهمس بتلك العاطفة الناشبة بينها وبين عدنان من معهد الصحة.

ز عق بوق ابو محمد مولولا : ابن الحرام كان رمانا في البحر

فترة صمت, على قصرها, ثقيلة.

التفتت نهال الى ساعتها

- قاربت الساعة على الثامنة. اسرع قليلا عمي ابو محمد من فضلك

- بأمرك يا ست الحلوات. . . وانعطفت السيارة ذات اليمين. كادت تصطدم بأخرى

- يخزيك يا شيطان! على كل لا تحملي هم عمي خمس دقائق ونصل

في وادي الزينة عند منعطف يتفرع عن طريق صيدا, تعارفوا على تسميته مفرق سيلين, انعطفت السيارة شمالا.

. . فجأة هدير طائرة رابعة يملأ الفضاء:

- خرق جدار الصوت! ! ! . . .

اسرائلي؟

سوري؟

مدني! ! !

.....

كنا نقلب فناجين قهوتنا لنقرأ لنا ام عدنان بختنا عندما انطلق صوت المذيعة ليعلن : جاءنا من مكتب التحرير ان غارة اسرائلية قصفت الشريط الساحلي لاقليم الخروب وقد تعقبت إحدى الطائرات باصا يحمل طلابا الى معهد سبلين. شوهدت بقايا الباص موزعة في المحيط ويقدر ان جميع الركاب مع سائقهم قد لاقوا حتفهم

شبعنا ما تبقى منها و كان شعرها الاصفر متناثرا فوق أشواك القندول والصخور على جانبي الطريق من وادي الزينة الى سبلين

“It was so it was not so:” The Clash of Language in Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*.

By Terri Beth Miller

In *The Dialogic Imagination*, M.M. Bakhtin characterizes the novel thus: “It is precisely this that defines the utterly distinctive orientation of discourse in the novel—an orientation that is contested, contestable, and contesting—for this discourse cannot forget or ignore...the heteroglossia that surrounds it” (qtd. Kalliney 72). Salman Rushdie’s masterpiece, *The Satanic Verses*, seems to exemplify what Bakhtin had in mind when he created his theory of the novel. In it, multiple discourses are problematized, their effects on the consciousness of the individuals by whom they are used and against whom they are leveled metaphorized, most explicitly, by the physical and psychological transformations endured by the novel’s two protagonists. *The Satanic Verses* examines the repercussions of linguistic appropriation for the individual and the society in which he or she lives. Above all, it is a novel about discursive authority, about what may be said, how, and by whom. As each character’s discourse competes against other, antagonistic discourses, Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia is actualized and, in the carnivalesque atmosphere that ensues, it is impossible to differentiate man from animal, angel from demon, God from Shaitan. What emerges from this cacophony of cultural discourses—theological, nationalistic, sociological—is a theory of humanity, and of language, that embodies no singular attribute, neither purity nor evil, neither God nor Satan, neither truth nor lie, but rather contains all such attributes, all of the time. This essay explores the clash of social and ideological languages in Rushdie’s novel and situates this contest within the scope of a larger artistic project of social and psychological (r)evolution through the liberation of language from the constraints of totalitarian discursive regimes.

Rushdie begins his program of interrogating dominant discursive regimes by embedding within his text the principle of uncertainty. His narrative is conditioned by the caveat of the ancient fairy-story: “it was so, it was not so.” The ambiguity and inherent contradictoriness of this formative mechanism of the text calls into being a narratorial paradigm in which truth and fact are not necessarily interdependent or mutually referential. Moreover, this insertion of paradox within the text signifies a Bakhtinian appreciation of the multivalent and amorphous nature of language. In an interview with W.L. Webb, Rushdie describes his method in writing the Gibreel scenes in *Verses*. He states:

I found myself writing down connected stories about various historical and imaginary manifestations of the archangel down the ages and connected all together by the idea of this Indian movie star called Gibreel, who comes to think of himself as a reincarnation of the archangel. And as the reader, I suppose, you're asked to accept the possibility that he might be telling the truth.

(qtd. Reder 90)

This problematizing of the nature of truth, of allowing for its possibility within a text that adds to, reshapes, or nullifies traditionally sacrosanct (and therefore immutable and indisputable) discourses, appears to lie at the heart of Rushdie's literary project. It is a project that informs the work of most imaginative writers, according to Ian MacKenzie in his elaboration upon Richard Rorty's view of pragmatism. MacKenzie describes the work of the "ironist," a category into which he places Rushdie, particularly as the author of *The Satanic Verses*, as an attempt not only at social but also at self recreation. He writes that the ironist's method is to "redescribe or recreate...using a metaphorical vocabulary of their own choosing....If they think that the descriptions and narratives furnished by their own culture are inadequate, they will enlarge their acquaintance, generally by reading books, with other times and places" (285). Rushdie "enlarges his acquaintance" not merely through his prodigious knowledge of world cultures but also through his exploration of the imagination in language. This program destabilizes notions of fixed meaning even as it provides alternative access to a realm of "truth," itself an inherently unfixated and ineffable construct.

The situating of these interconnected "it was so it was not so" stories primarily within the figure of an Indian film star serves multiple purposes within Rushdie's artistic program. First, it problematizes the nature of received doctrines in the modern world, illustrating the commodification of social discourse, its form and function determined most often not by an adherence to a perceived absolute truth, but contingent upon very real, very secular external forces. The nature of the divine, as the Farshita episodes exemplify, often is determined by two decidedly unholy means: the interest of money and the will to power.

The second function, however, is less pernicious and pertains to issues already discussed. Farshita's multiple sacred roles refute notions of a singular truth. His incredible success in adopting the persona of deities from various traditions suggests the polyphonic, polymorphic nature of truth and identity in which Rushdie himself so strongly believes. The coexistence of numerous, seemingly mutually contradictory versions of the nature of the truth metaphorizes Rushdie's own vision of truth as all-encompassing, myriad, harmonious, and interdependent, even as it distrusts and vehemently opposes any doctrine which would valorize one of these stories—one of these film roles—and condemn the rest. Rushdie describes his text thus:

The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world...*The Satanic Verses* is for change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining. (394)

Another critical component of the attempt to control language is in the process of naming. In *Verses*, names recur, are abandoned or embraced. They act as figures of social condemnation and as emblems of celestial predestination. Names play an integral role throughout the Rushdie oeuvre in situating a character, psychically and symbolically, within the textual universe. In *The Satanic Verses*, each of the novel's protagonists undergo name changes. Gibreel Farshita, the sometime Indie film star and would-be angel of God, is born Ismail Najmuddin, the impoverished but beloved son of a lunch peddler. *Ismail*, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, is the illegitimate son of the patriarch Abraham, from whom the religions descend. When Abraham conceives a child, Isaac, with his wife, Sara, the illegitimate child and his mother are exiled from Abraham's home, banished to the deserts of Arabia. It is through the line of Isaac that Judaism and Christianity trace their lineage. Islam, however, tracks its roots back to Abraham's first son, Ismail, the rejected child. Conversely, however, the name *Najmuddin* derives from the Punjabi for "star of the faith." Thus, Farshita's original name bestows a mixed legacy, one of hope amid the acknowledgment of loss, one of terrestrial suffering endured with the expectation of celestial transcendence.

It is significant, then, that from Ismail Najmuddin the text's protagonist should become Gibreel Farshita, literally meaning "The Angel Gabriel." Farshita, "angel," is a nickname given Gibreel by his mother for the seeming purity of the child in his youth. The name, however, will take on ironic overtones in the years of Farshita's young adulthood, when shameless bouts of philandering lead not only to numerous broken homes but also to the suicide of a young mother following her murder of her children. In Rushdie's textual universe nothing is ever as simple as it may at first seem, and from such seemingly whimsical origins, a mother's indulgent love for her son, comes a preview of a far darker theme within the text: that of the power of description to transform the described. The angelic label affixed to him in love becomes a simultaneously centering and decentering, stabilizing and destabilizing, force throughout his life. Long before the new name is officially adopted, this seraphic characterization of Farshita's mother would insinuate itself into his self-concept, subtly altering him, until at last his identity is no longer his own. The further cementing of Farshita's angelic identity occurs when he begins to gain success in the film industry. His adoption of the Angel of the Revelation's name stems from his incredible aptitude at portraying sacred figures from a variety of theological traditions. As will be elaborated upon later in this paper, the program of naming in Farshita's example illustrates a dynamic of wish fulfillment, as the titles thrust upon an individual compel metamorphoses of identity, shaping the object's consciousness to fit the demands of the naming subject. Perhaps even more critical to the purposes of this text, pliancy seems to go out of the character of Farshita with the abandonment of his original hybrid name. In its stead comes a title of such unyielding purity that the human being who must embody it cannot withstand the weight of its signification. He chooses suicide over the task of living up to his name.

Another critical aspect of naming occurs in the figure of the novel's second protagonist, Saladin Chamcha. In this instance, it is not a case of a title being imposed from without, but rather an identity being adopted from within. Saladin is an abbreviation of Salahuddin, which the protagonist drops upon leaving Bombay. Similarly, Chamcha derives from Chamchawala. While Farshita's rechristening exemplifies foremost the transformative effects of labels, Saladin's voluntary renaming enacts an opposite relationship, illustrating the extent to which the individual will may metamorphose even so seemingly fixed an object as the

personal name.

Saladin's specific choices in his new name appear highly symbolically motivated; the first name, undoubtedly, manifests an intention of which its bearer is aware. Saladin was the name of the great conqueror of Asia. Similarly, Saladin Chamcha dreams of conquering his beloved London through the appropriation of all things (he perceives to be) British, from customs to accents, from sensibilities to prejudices. Conversely, however, the abbreviation of his last name suggests an ironic play on words by the author. *Chamcha*, in Urdu means Spoon. It was also used, however, to describe a colonized sycophant, one who shamelessly acquiesced to the colonial powers in return for special favors. Though Chamcha, assuredly, is aware of the meaning of his abbreviated name (Farshita nicknames him "Spoon"), he seems oblivious to the irony inherent in it. As M. Keith Booker in the notes to his "Beauty and the Beast" argues, the cooperation of such "chamchas," of would-be Westernized natives, in colonized India made possible the success of the colonial enterprise, even as these so-called "yes-men" were internalizing the discourse of colonization which authorized their subjugation (996). Thus, once again, we see in Chamcha a reciprocal relationship between name and identity, as titles simultaneously shape and are shaped by the individuals to whom they are affixed.

Place names also figure critically within Rushdie's textual cosmos. The thematic of doubling, of the mirror's (warped) reflection, functions not only in Rushdie's dramatis personae, but also in the locales his characters inhabit. Mount Everest occupies a pivotal role in this text, as does its diminished double, Everest Villas, the apartment complex from the roof of which Rekha Merchant, despondent over her abandonment by Farshita, flings her children before leaping to her own death. From this same roof, Farshita, believing himself to be the exterminating angel, Azrael, will push his lover, the conqueror of Mt. Everest, Alleluia Cone. Also of critical importance, Cone is the name of the mountain to which Mahound in this text goes to receive Gibreel's revelations.

The doubling of place names serves multiple purposes in this text. First, it exemplifies the shrunken and specular aspects of the tactile world in which the characters live. Like the miniaturization of London for the filming of Dickens' *Our Mutual Friend* which engenders Farshita's and Chamcha's climactic reunion, the textual universe is frequently perceived by its characters as a degraded and comical echo of a bygone and glorious era. Rushdie describes what will follow from this meeting of Farshita and Chamcha, during which Chamcha learns the secret of Farshita's obsessive jealousy, a secret which he will use to destroy not only Farshita but also, unwittingly, Allie Cone. Rushdie writes:

What follows is tragedy.—Or at the least the echo of tragedy, the full-blooded original being unavailable to modern men and women, so it's said.—A burlesque for our degraded, imitative times, in which clowns re-enact what was once first done by heroes and by kings. (439)

Fools now crawl where gods once tread; the sublime feats of yesterday give way to a farcical shadow of what once was. It is a post-lapsarian world, indeed, in which the characters of *Verses* live. The haunting sense of absurdity in this text suggests a postmodern discourse at odds with the behaviors and espoused

ideologies of many of the characters. There is a sense in which figures such as Chamcha and Farshita experience a profound clash between conscious belief and unconscious doubt, Farshita in the faith he has always cherished, though rarely adheres to, Chamcha in the Anglophilia which he believes will transmute him into the “proper” English gentlemen. The surrealism of the world in which the characters live stems from the clashing of personal and social discourses against the reality of cultural (and individual) systems that give the lie to any claim of unimpeachable, disinterested truth.

The doubling of “Cone” exemplifies this diminished, dubious status to reality as well. Whereas Mt. Cone in the Mahound sections of the text is to be the site of revelation, a revelation which, according to the traditional Islamic purview, is the unmediated and therefore absolute Word of God, Alleluia Cone, Farshita’s lover in the present-day world of the text, is a woman of flesh and blood. She provides no parallel access to a universal truth. Rather, she is both savior and executioner of Farshita. It is to Alleluia Cone that Farshita flees from the demons of his mental illness. It is she who assiduously endeavors to restore his sanity. It is she with whom Farshita shares an almost other-worldly sexual communion, the two describing their congress as an electric spiritual union of two souls into one (Allie says of Farshita: “He just seems to, to *know*. To know *me*” (448)). On the other hand, however, Alleluia is also the target of Farshita’s obsessive jealousy, a jealousy that leads ultimately to Alleluia’s murder and to the suicide of Farshita, who believes his madness to be inexorable this time.

Alleluia Cone herself is a dark figure, besieged by ghosts and obsessions. Specifically, the desire to climb Everest alone haunts Cone, as does the ghost of the man who endeavored to do so, Maurice Wilson, which Cone first sees on the mountainside. According to Farshita, this figure will also be at Cone’s side—visible even to the man who imminently will murder her—in the moments before her death. Because of her obsession to climb Everest solo, she endures excruciating physical training, running flights of stairs barefoot to strengthen her fallen arches. Her physical condition is such that she risks the threat of a wheelchair and must resort at moments to the use of a cane. Yet her obsession stems from the same place as Farshita’s, and also, in a manner of speaking, from the same place as Mahound’s when he seeks revelation. On Everest, Alleluia Cone experiences communion with the transcendent. Language systems break down, morality is suspended, individual identity is abrogated. There is only the mountain and Alleluia’s free-floating, unsigned consciousness inhabiting it. Rushdie writes:

Why I (Alleluia) really went up there? Don’t laugh; to escape from good and evil...This’s what I learned in the revolution...This thing: information got abolished sometime in the twentieth century...Since then we’ve been living in a fairy-story...So how do we know if it’s right or wrong? We don’t even know what it *is*. So what I thought was, you can either break your heart trying to work it all out, or you can go sit on a mountain, because that’s where all the truth went, believe it or not, it just upped and ran away from these cities where even the stuff under our feet is all made up, a lie, and it hid up there in the thin thin air where the liars don’t dare come after it in case their brains explode.

(324-325 emphasis original)

Alleluia's inebriated exposition on the spiritual experience of mountain-climbing, like most everything in Rushdie's corpus, is laden with signification. In the symbolic economy of the text, mountains herald instances of or opportunities for extreme change. They signal revelation, or emotional and/or spiritual sublimity (or conversely, depravity).

Similarly, icebergs and water manifest complementary symbolic functions. Water, as in the Jahilia scenes, represents both need and vulnerability. To the residents of the sand city, water is an imminent but necessary threat. For the Jahilian followers of the burgeoning Islamic faith, however, the emphasis on cleanliness and the daily ablutions serves to differentiate them from the pagan Jahilians. Thus, water assumes another signification: as a menace to the established discursive order, it is also an emblem of change. Furthermore, icebergs, as Rushdie describes them, are water aspiring to be land (313). Alleluia herself is frequently described as the ice queen, and, as she walks alongside the Thames, she hallucinates, believing to see three fog-shrouded icebergs floating down the river.

In this complex system of metaphor, it seems apparent that Alleluia's obsession with Everest, an obsession for which she is willing to break her body, just as Farshita's obsession readies him to fracture his mind, is an obsession with sublimation. The water (signifying ideological change) which aspires to be land or mountain (representing the surmounting of ideology to be in the presence of truth), can be seen to echo Alleluia's own desires in her dream for solo ascent. Just as her name, Alleluia, hearkens back to numerous theological traditions, in which it signifies both joy and praise, Alleluia the character conjures the mystical, transcendent experience without referring to any particular theological discourse. It is a brand of belief, almost Sufistic in its character, which Rushdie himself finds appealing. In an interview with the *Indian Post*, Rushdie says of his novel:

I suppose it is also about the attempt of somebody like myself, who is basically a person without a formal religion, to make some kind of accommodation with the renewed force of religion in the world; what it means; what the religious experience is. It is clear that there is such a thing as transcendence, that mystical events are not entirely spurious, that people see visions and they are not always lying. The question is what is the nature of that experience, assuming that one does not immediately look to the miraculous for an explanation, but, at the same time does not dismiss it as a fraud. That middle ground about the nature of transcendence is, or might be, also what the novel is about. (Reder, 84)

As he goes on to explain, his skepticism is not with the reality of transcendence, nor with existence of truth, but rather with the ideological discourse which would endeavor to shape the ultimately ineffable into dictatorial language (Reder 117-118). Farshita and Cone symbolically suggest the sacred and secular manifestations of the human desire for belief in transcendence. Their communion is inviolable for as long as it remains physical and inarticulate. It is Chamcha's misappropriation of the language of their love that ultimately destroys their union.

Among the most controversial of the doubling episodes pertains to the names of the prophet's wives. In

The Satanic Verses, Farshita dreams a multitude of interconnected stories, each told serially, resuming in an orderly fashion at the precise moment at which it had ended with Farshita's previous awakening. One of these serial dreams occurs in the time of Mahound himself. In one episode of the dream, the satirist/poet Baal, fleeing the revenge of the triumphantly returned Mohammed, takes refuge in the city's most illustrious brothel, "The Curtain." There, disguised as one of the establishment's eunuch bodyguards, he is sheltered for a number of years.

In this dream, the Grandee Abu Simbel surrenders the city of Jahilia peacefully to the former exile, Mohammad. But the people of Jahilia, former devotees of a polytheistic religion and partakers of the sensual and hedonistic pleasures of the market town, soon find Mohammad's theocratic rule too severe. Patrons at The Curtain begin to request that the prostitutes adopt the names of the wives of the prophet while performing their services. The fantasy becomes so entrenched, so popular with clients as well as courtesans, that soon the women abandon their names entirely for the names of the wives. Along with this change, there quickly follows an alteration of personality, as each rapidly transforms into the persona of her namesake. Original names are quickly forgotten, and when the women ask Baal to marry them, another specular image is born. The Curtain becomes the (ostensibly) degraded mirror image of the home of Mohammed.

The implications of this text for the program of scriptural absolutism will be explored later. What remains salient at this moment however is the degree to which this scene further emphasizes the metamorphic power of naming. With the adoption of these surrogate names comes a surrogate identity, and personal and collective dynamics are transformed. Petty jealousies arise; character traits purported to belong to the originals overwhelm the subjectivities of their mirror images; even Baal's affective responses seem to echo those of the man in whose role he stands: it is "Ayesha," reportedly Mohammed's own favorite wife, whom Baal grows to love the best.

As has been noted, this text exhibits a grave concern for the nature of the role its characters have to play. It is skeptical of any notion of discursive exceptionality; that is of any one tradition claiming ownership to the absolute and enduring truth. It is highly cognizant of the very human status of its players, with all of the attendant contradictions, cruelties, and shortcomings of humanity. The days of God-like men, for all of Farshita's delusions, and of divinity dwelling among humans, have long since vanished, if indeed they ever existed at all outside of the minds of the believers and those who would exploit that belief to their advantage (a possibility very seriously entertained in this text). Thus the doubling as it occurs in The Curtain episodes reflects this problematic of the lapsed universe. The Curtain scenes also, of course, open themselves to a strong feminist reading: Rushdie seeming to equate the position of women, within fundamentalist Islam, (which uses as a model for living the examples of the prophet's own life, just as the residents at The Curtain have also done) as within all oppressively patriarchal systems, to that of prostitutes.

What is also critically important for the purposes of this paper, however, is what Rushdie's program of multiple selves, places, and realms has to say about language. The theme of doubling in this text seems to

imply an attempt on behalf of the author to dramatize the amorphous and contradictory nature of language. Bakhtin notes in *The Dialogic Imagination* that every signifier is loaded with a complex web of meanings, and that each word not only strums along a vast, interconnected network of semantic and ideological associations, but also activates a host of contradictory utterances, which is dialogism in its truest sense (276).

It seems particularly useful, then, to consider the instances of doubling in this text as a manifestation of a metaphorical dialogue, as the author's attempt to grapple with entrenched discourses. The Curtain episodes may be seen as a new reading of, and a counter-argument to, the received doctrine. Similarly, the figure of Alleluia Cone may be intended to provide a new interpretative slant on Mohammed's journeys to the mountaintop. It is not my belief that Rushdie employs such inflammatory techniques simply to be irreverent, simply to tear down the existing ideologies with which he may not agree. I suggest, rather, that in employing episodes such as these, Rushdie seeks to provide a new voice, an alternate reading. It may be that the mirror image Rushdie provides is not in fact a degraded one at all, but rather a more accurate reflection because it is deprived of the glamour of divinity that prohibits too close a scrutiny.

Perhaps the most important aspect of place-naming occurs in the figure of London itself. The characters in *Verses* subject London to a constellation of titles: Alphaville, Babylondon, and, by Chamcha alone, "Proper" London. England itself is called Vilayet, which is also a term derived from the Arabic *wilaya*, meaning both "province" and "to administer"¹ and is used in addition to describe one of the chief administrative locales of the Ottoman Empire. Like most of the language used in Rushdie, the term Vilayet in this instance seems to carry multiple meanings. On the one hand, it may reinscribe England's position as the former colonial power and present-day post-colonial powerhouse (second to the United States and now, perhaps, to the financial Goliaths of the east).

An additional reading of the term Vilayet, however, may concern the Saladin paradigm at play here. Vilayet describes an eastern empire, not a western one. This is combined with the echoes of the conquering Arab, Saladin, whose battles against European crusaders in the Middle Ages wrested the Holy Land from western control. Saladin Chamcha's admitted desire is for the similar conquest of the land he loves. A problematic that is highly figured in this text is the degree to which the host nation is changed when immigrants land upon (and in Chamcha's instance, the meaning is literal) its shores, and how that nation responds to such change. As Harveen Mann points out, a reverse colonization appears to be at work here. Londoners of Anglo-European descent express fear and even rage over the influx of the "foreigners," as is evinced in the violence occurring in the streets, particularly near the Shaandaar Café to which Chamcha is taken to recover following his transmogrification. Yet perhaps the most disconcerting example of the racism saturating the British landscape occurs when a genteel-looking, elderly woman hands Gibreel a pamphlet concerning the exportation of African migrants from England. Otto Cone, Alleluia's father, himself an immigrant who endeavors to fully assimilate into his newly adopted homeland, only to later isolate himself in his home when he finds complete assimilation impossible, delivers a critical clue to Rushdie's own idea of the urban melting pot when he tells his daughter:

The modern city...is the locus classicus of incompatible realities. Lives that have no business

mingling with one another sit side by side upon the omnibus. One universe, on a zebra crossing, is caught for an instant, blinking like a rabbit, in the headlamps of a motor-vehicle in which an entirely alien and contradictory continuum is to be found. And as long as that's all, the pass in the night, jostling on Tube stations, raising their hats in some hotel corridor, it's not so bad. But if they meet! It's uranium and plutonium, each makes the other decompose, boom. (325)

In this modern city, in which rising populations increasingly throw these “incompatible realities” together, it is impossible to maintain the isolation that Otto Cone embraces. As the text's street violence illustrates, the explosions are all but inevitable.

The inevitable transformation of the host country by immigration figures into another crucial aspect of naming. In this text, London is frequently dubbed *Elloven Deeowen*, based upon an Indian children's game of the same name. The name is a sort of onomatopoeia of the accented spelling of the place name. What is significant here is the inclusion of the accented pronunciation in the place name. Accentuation assumes critical importance in this text, as will be shown, but its imbrication in the name London, itself such a loaded signifier, a metonym by which British society is conjured, conveys a new level of thematic significance. The accented spelling of London, which soon comes to replace the place name itself, symbolically enacts the sociolinguistic transformation of the host locale by the varying ideological and discursive patterns it will absorb. No matter how earnestly the new-comer endeavors to assimilate, and it must be conceded that no immigrant could endeavor to assimilate more assiduously than Chamcha, the new homeland is always already altered by the migrant's coming. Harveen Mann writes:

Not only are the new immigrants displaced in their British surroundings, but the (white) Britons themselves at times appear to be outsiders in their own country, in an ironic echo of the deracination of indigenous populations under colonial rule. What was once a Calvinist church gives way to a synagogue before being replaced by the *Jamme Masjid*. (295)

In this amorphous and constantly changing London, then, it is not only white Britons who appear displaced. Chamcha, the immigrant who wants nothing more than to belong, speaks an antiquated, “museum” discourse, according to his British wife. Thus, as will be elaborated upon later in this text, his discourse is doubly othered: first, by the ineradicable accent which is the ultimate linguistic marker of difference, and second by the embracing of a dead discursive paradigm, the paradigm of the British Empire. Rushdie writes:

He had been striving...to be worthy of the challenge represented by the phrase *Civis Britannicus sum*. Empire was no more, but still he knew ‘all that was good and living within him’ to have been ‘made, shaped and quickened’ by his encounter with this islet of sensibility, surrounded by the cool sense of the sea. Of all material things, he had given his love to this city, London, preferring it to the city of his birth or to any other; had been creeping up on it stealthily....dreaming of being the one to possess it and so, in a sense, *become* it.....London, its

conglomerate nature mirroring his own, its reticence also his...its hospitality—yes!—in spite of immigration laws and his own recent experience. (412 emphasis original)

As the last lines imply, Chamcha's internalized rhetoric is so deeply entrenched it blinds him even to the realities of his own body. In the clash between the truth of the senses and the collective voice of an antiquated discourse, Chamcha chooses to believe the discourse. His subjectivity, then, is subsumed by the pernicious force of political rhetoric.

Perhaps the most significant instant of renaming occurs in the figure of Mohammed/Mahound. In Islam, the name of the prophet is revered. Its invocation elicits an immediate reaction in the faithful: a required prayer for the continued blessedness and honor of the figure. Mohammad's second appellation, Mahound, however, carries multiple significations. In the medieval period, Western theological plays recast the figure of Mohammad as Mahound, a decidedly diabolical figure (Booker 986). The representation of Mohammad as Mahound hearkens back to earlier Apocryphal teachings of a Mahound as an avatar or attribute of Satan. In Rushdie's text, however, there is an intimation that Mohammad himself adopted the name Mahound (although this is never explicitly stated within the text, just as it is never clear what entity is in fact addressing the prophet by this name). The text suggests, nevertheless, that Mohammad chooses to assume this title as a means of depriving the name of its deleterious effects. By adopting the name with which his enemies endeavor to hurt him, Mahound deprives his detractors of their own weapons. Rushdie writes:

His name: a dream-name, changed by the vision. Pronounced correctly, it means he-for-whom-thanks-should-be-given but he won't answer to that here; nor, though he's well aware of what they call him, to his nickname in Jahilia down below—he-who- goes-up-and-down-old-Coney. Here he is neither Mahomet nor MoeHammered; has adopted, instead, the demon-tag the farangis hung around his neck. To turn insults into strengths, whigs, Tories, Blacks all chose to wear with pride the names they were given in scorn; likewise, our mountain-climbing, prophet-motivated solitary is to be the medieval baby-frightener, the Devil's synonym: Mahound. (95)

In the circular chronology of the text, defense mechanisms of the present inform those of the past. As the above passage, with its mingling of modern political events and ancient theological teachings, shows, language never flows in a linear progression but rather endlessly redoubles upon itself, illuminating opaque discourses, dismantling absolutist rhetoric. It is an endlessly self-reflexive machine. And, Rushdie suggests, the instant one ceases to interrogate, add to, or alter existing discourses through new language, through an endless renaming, that discourse either dies or becomes reified. If dead, it makes fools of those, like Chamcha, who perform or by will inhere in it. But when reified, it becomes totalitarian, a scourge and impediment to all who would think new thoughts in new words.

The problematizing of the structures of English discourse pertains to the issues illustrated by Rushdie's emphasis on the power of names and labels to transform individuals. The power of description is an eminently strong force. What is suggested in the scene of Farshita's nicknaming by his mother is painfully

and movingly dramatized in Part Three of the novel, *Ellowen Deeowen*, in which Chamcha finds himself metamorphosed into a goat-like figure. After enduring psychological torture (he is stripped naked and forced to eat his excrement off the floor) and physical brutality at the hands of the police, he finds himself confined against his will in a government-run medical facility. One night, he and his fellow patients escape their prison, but as he flees he sees for the first time what he could not see while in the hospital (because curtains are used to isolate the residents, their only knowledge of one another comes in speech). In patches of moonlight, the disembodied voices with which he had become familiar are made corporeal. Among the entities he sees fleeing with him into the dark English night are “men and women who were partially plants, or giant insects, or even, on occasion, built partly of brick or stone” (176). Rushdie writes: “[t]hey describe us,’ the other (a manticore, the symbol of the fantastic and dangerous “other”) whispered solemnly. ‘That’s all. They have the power of description and we succumb to the pictures they construct’” (174).

The Satanic Verses indubitably is an attempt to counter the discourses which have served to dehumanize and objectify the marginalized within the society. However, Rushdie argues that the discourses remain lamentably unequal. Once again, in an interview with W.L. Webb, Rushdie states:

The point is that if you come from the black communities in this country, the power of other people to describe you is much greater than your power to describe back. And so, one can’t see it as a fair struggle at the moment, because we are described, and we are described into corners, and then we have to describe our way out of corners, if we can. And it seems to me that that’s one of the things I was trying to do. I was trying to contest the descriptions. (100)

Significantly, however, though Rushdie suggests that there remains a great deal of work to be done before all discourses enjoy equal respect and authority, he does seem to embrace an almost utopian vision of the power of language to chip away at the oppressive discourse. By re-appropriating the power of description, the marginalized individual slowly rediscovers the voice through which to rename, and re-describe, himself.

The methods Mohammad employs in depriving his enemies of the capacity to insult him by willfully adopting the injurious name will be echoed on the streets of 1980’s London in the text. At the time of Chamcha’s transformation, London begins to dream of the fearsome goat-like creature. To the marginalized communities, this figure is messianic, the avatar of their revenge and defiance. To the empowered sectors of the society, he is the embodiment of their conscious and unconscious fears of the other. Significantly, then, when minority youths begin to wear devil and goat horns and other paraphernalia, it inaugurates the community’s first collective effort at defiance, as it endeavors to corporealize the reprehension in which their society holds them. The names that the dominant classes (predominantly white, though Chamcha himself has participated in such naming) have given them are re-appropriated and transformed into a guise through which the insidious and repulsive face of racism can be materialized. It is a forced confrontation, a banishment of hypocrisy and the obfuscatory evasions of political language. It is word made flesh.

This re-appropriation of language textualizes an important component of Rushdie's own artistic project. Often ridiculed for his use of the English language, Rushdie situates himself within a paradigm of postcolonial writers endeavoring to deconstruct the linguistic oppression leveled against so-called marginalized others by turning against the purveyors of the dominant, repressive discourse the language which is the very instrument of their conquest. While Rushdie's refusal to utilize his native Urdu has been perceived by some as a betrayal, the language of Rushdie's corpus is far from the "Master's English" that his opponents criticize him for embracing. Indeed, the English of Rushdie's own creation is, in the words of Harveen Mann, an indigenized form of English (282), a hybrid, nonstandard construct meant to problematize the rigid linguistic structures of the hierarchy. In *Verses*, Rushdie puts what seems to be the thesis for his own artistic program into the thoughts of the Shaandaar Cafe's struggling poet, Jumpy Joshi, as he is confronted by Hanif Johnson, an IndoEuropean attorney and social activist, and "master of the social languages." Joshi thinks:

The real language problem: how to bend it shape it, how to let it be our freedom, how to repossess its poisoned wells, how to master the river of words of time of blood: about all that you haven't got a clue. How hard that struggle, how inevitable the defeat. Nobody's going to elect me to anything. No power-base, no constituency: just the battle with the words...Language is courage: the ability to conceive a thought, to speak it, and by doing so to make it true. (290 emphasis original)

In an interesting shift in technique, the voice of Rushdie's implied author seems to make itself heard more clearly here than at most any other point in Rushdie's extensive body of fiction. The use of italics in the text presumably signals the mental discourse of Joshi. These ruminations are commented upon by the implied author, who, in the final line quoted above, makes one of the most overtly personal statements on language and the writer's craft in the corpus.

Perhaps the most significant element in Rushdie's program of interrogating the parameters of language occurs in the figure of Gibreel, and by this I mean both the actor, Farshita, and the angel who ostensibly wishes to embody him. What is most important for the purposes of this paper is the manner in which the revelations of Gibreel/Farshita are elicited. Islamic teachings hold that the sacred text, the Qur'an, is the infallible word of God transmitted through the angel Gibreel to Mohammad. In this version of the revelation story, however, Gibreel is shown to be merely a puppet, an instrument through which human desires, not sacred truths, are relayed. The relationship between Gibreel and Mahound in this text is parasitic rather than symbiotic, the latter wresting divine sanction from the unwilling and impotent mouth of the angel. Mahound literally appropriates Gibreel's voice. Rushdie writes:

I am the dragging in the gut. I am the angel being extruded from the sleeper's navel, I emerge, Gibreel Farshita, while my other self, Mahound, lies, *listening*, entranced, I am bound to him, navel to navel, by a shining cord of light, not possible to say which of us is dreaming the other. We flow in both directions along the umbilical cord...The dragging again, straining with all his might at something, forcing something, and Gibreel begins to feel that strength that force,

here it is *at my own jaw*, working it, opening shutting; and the power, starting within Mahound, reaching up to *my own vocal cords* and the voice comes. (113-114 emphasis original)

Similarly, Gibreel Farshita seems to embody an awesome force of terrestrial wish fulfillment. Rosa Diamond, echoing Odysseus' capture by the witch Circe, holds Farshita prisoner in her home by sheer force of will. Farshita escapes only through the elderly Diamond's natural death. The intensity of her desires as she lay dying literally at moments renders Farshita immobile. Too weak even to lift his hand from a chair, Farshita, through the force of hallucination or dreams reenacts with Rosa the heady days of her Argentinean youth. In addition to the reenactment of real, lived history, however, the "lives" Rosa compels Farshita to manifest for her include alternative and contradictory realities, the "it was so it was not so" paradigm upon which this text is based. Another example of the appropriation of the will occurs in the figure of the Trinidadian ticket booth operator at the local theater. Confronted by the incredible force of Farshita's presence, Orphia Phillips finds herself relating the precise details of her failed romance with the lift operator. These revelations, however, are consciously solicited neither by Farshita nor by Orphia but are born of Orphia's unconscious compulsion to speak her pain by transferring both her will and accountability for her speech act onto the figure of Farshita.

The Gibreel/Farshita sections are emblematic of a theory of foreignness espoused by Julia Kristeva in *Strangers to Ourselves*. Basing her approach on E. Jentsch's semiotic reading of Freudian notions of the uncanny, Kristeva writes:

The symbol ceases to be a symbol and takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolizes. In other words, the sign is not experienced as arbitrary but assumes a real importance. As a consequence, the material reality that the sign was commonly supposed to point to crumbles away to the benefit of the imagination...We are here confronted with the 'omnipotence of thought' which, in order to constitute itself invalidates the arbitrariness of signs and the autonomy of reality as well and places them both under the sway of fantasies expressing infantile desires or fears. (186)

In his incredible aptitude for recognizing and fulfilling, typically against his will, the desires of others, I suggest that Gibreel/Farshita functions similarly to the empty signifiers described by Kristeva. Magic and animism in Kristeva's analysis give way to magical men, both angelic and animalistic. Gibreel/Farshita, by virtue of their ostensibly unknown and unknowable foreignness, are signs without signifiers, and thus comes their "uncanny" ability to abrogate material reality, the natural laws, in order to manifest the desires of those to whom they are the ineffable, specular other.

Such a compulsion of stories, such loss of control over the voice, figures heavily in Rushdie's critique of perceived absolute truths. Islam is not the singular target of Rushdie's skepticism, however. Rather, Rushdie in this text problematizes all doctrines which would portray themselves as indisputable and self-evident. From the American capitalist businessman with the overtly racist tactics, Hal Valance, to the exiled Imam for whom deviation from his perceived modes of truth signifies certain and justified death,

the avatars of absolutism are among the most dangerous figures within the text. This is a book in which ambiguity prevails, and, where totalitarian regimes of truth are found within it, so are there likely to be found violence, hatred, exploitation, and death.

Absolutism of another form occurs in the figure of Chamcha. His absolutism is not only cultural, espousing the unmitigated superiority of the British society over his own native Indian one, it is also secular/moral. Farshita's refusal to speak a word in defense of his friend leads ultimately to Chamcha's arrest and his subsequent transmutation into animal form. It is this failure to intervene with a single word, to corroborate Chamcha's story of his (and Farshita's) remarkable survival of the aircraft explosion, that is highly problematic. On one hand, it may be viewed as the imposed silence of the post-colonial subject by the authority of the metropolitan elite (although the superior hierarchical status of the policemen is dubious at best: two of them carry the accents of Scotland and Wales and as such are themselves in a sense colonial). Indeed, Farshita's silence seems to relate much more to the wish fulfillment of the elites than to any animosity toward Chamcha—without doubt the policemen are eager to arrest the trespassing immigrant; also without doubt Rosa Diamond relishes the opportunity to be rid of the menacing figure of Chamcha in order to have the seraphic loveliness of Farshita entirely to herself.

Whatever the ultimate cause, Farshita's act of betrayal triggers Chamcha's absolutist moral code (the same moral code which bids Chamcha abandon his father when he discovers the triangular relationship he has created between his new wife and Chamcha's ayah) and leads in turn to perhaps the most reprehensible act in the text. Having discovered Farshita's psychological fragility, and the obsessive nature of his relationship with Alleluia Cone, Chamcha undertakes a program of his own "satanic verses." The illustrious voice actor, the man with "a thousand voices and a voice," systematically destroys Farshita's mental well-being. Using the limitless and graphic details provided by Farshita of his sexual life with Allie, Chamcha begins to make a series of pornographic telephone calls, each employing one of his thousand and one voices. "The verses," as they are called, take more than their desired effect. Not only is Farshita's sanity irretrievably lost, but the murder/suicide described earlier becomes the inevitable result.

The appropriation of the voice is further problematized in the person of Chamcha as well. Indeed, in many respects Chamcha may be viewed as the supreme example of what Homi Bhabha calls "mimic men," that is, marginalized individuals who endeavor, as has been discussed earlier in this paper, to reflect back upon the dominant authority its idealized image. This mimicry, however, constitutes a repetition with a difference. In this case, however, unlike the case of the mimic men, whose difference ultimately may be transmuted into a source of power, Chamcha's difference is wholly involuntary in the first stages of the book. He finds shame in his dissimilarity to the British world he loves. Nevertheless, his dissimilarity is irrefutable. Zeeny Vikail, Chamcha's lover, notes the slippage of his accent. Indian speech forms perpetually threaten the "purity" of Chamcha's English, a threat that grows decidedly more difficult to evade as Chamcha travels east. In Chamcha's purview, the encroaching accent represents a humiliating marker of his inexorable Indianness. He has internalized the doctrines of the former empire, doctrines which necessarily espoused the inferiority of the colonized races in order to solidify the colonial enterprise (Fanon 210-212).

Chamcha embodies the spirit elucidated in Bhabha's text: that of the culturally engineered (by (post) colonial discourse) man, a man English in education and sensibility, but Indian in body and temperament (which according to this doctrine means that he is ascribed to the inferior class and never questions the legitimacy of his inferior status). Mimic men, in Bhabha's hypothesis, are born within this climate of concerted social engineering and, superficially, they carry out its tenets. But in their role as specular image, they become dangerous for the truths they reveal in the act of mimicry and for the inevitable destabilization that their performances engender (86-92). There is, after all, no wholly accurate mimicry. All parody carries with it its own individual difference.

Chamcha's variation of the mimic man, at least before his "redemption" through reconciliation with the father and the homeland that occurs at the text's conclusion, carries with it no such hope for social change. There is no intent to mimic in Chamcha. His desire is not to parody, nor even to approximate, but to *become*. But the discourses against which he is made to clash in his desperate attempts to assume this new (and entirely unattainable) subjectivity warp him until, at last, ungirded as he is with an insulating personal discourse with which to protect himself, he is unmanned, made bestial by the social languages he wishes to participate in but cannot.

In *The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie problematizes the nature of social discourses. He traces their effects upon the individuals who use them, as well as those who would be used by them. Above all, with limitless courage and dazzling ingenuity, he challenges those discursive regimes which claim absolute and unquestionable access to a singular truth. In another, stirring example of doubling and renaming, Salman the Persian is shown rewriting the sacred texts of Islam. Under the threat of death, the authorities demand that the scribe repent of the crime of "set[ting] your words against the Words of God" (387). Salman Rushdie offers no such repentance. Instead, he continues unapologetically to push against the boundaries of language, to set his words against the Words of Theocracy, of Nation, of Law and Culture. Through his writing, Rushdie continues his search for a linguistic, imaginative, and social freedom that ever exceeds the confining and confounding grasp of ideological discourse.

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Notes

¹ See Definition 1 for "Vilayet." in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 4th ed. 2000.

Development and Nationalism: An Analytical Model on Economic Growth to Social Preference and Party System.

By Caroline Law

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine the thesis that civic nationalism is more likely to flourish in high-income multi-ethnic countries while ethnic politics is more likely to occur in multi-ethnic countries with low social and economic development. The term “civic nationalism” in this paper is used to denote the phenomenon that a single overarching shared identity exists regardless of the ethnic and other divisions in the society. Although there is an absence of statistical correlation between income and ethnic nationalism, countries with the most successful record of building civic national identity are high-income states. On the other hand, although not all low-income multi-ethnic states resorts to ethnic politics, the most divided ethnic party systems can be found in low-income countries. To explain this phenomenon, one must explore the causes of ethnic nationalist politics. The formation of an ethnic party system is the combination of top-down and bottom-up reasons. Ethnic politics are often promoted by elites from top-down, to mobilize the population for political gains. This elite-initiated nationalism must also be matched by a concomitant bottom-up movement. The population can only be mobilized if a sense of insecurity prevails in the society. The example of the dissolution of Yugoslavia is used to illustrate this dichotomy of the rise of nationalism. This can shed light onto the question of why civic national identity is more likely to develop in industrialised countries. This paper argues that when a country’s income increases, its social activities would also increase which creates cross-cutting cleavages to replace ethnicity as the predominant political agenda. When there is an absence of extreme inequality between different groups in terms of economic resources and political power, it is much harder for the elites to capitalize on the abstract nationalist feeling of the people. When the population secures a relatively high living standard, they have much higher stake to disrupt the status quo and to engage in ethnic conflicts. Moreover, ethnic politics itself is based on pre-existing ties of people, not objective, meritorious competition as in a non-ethnic multi-party system. The fact that election outcome is pre-determined by demographics affects the efficacy of the system and leads to poor development in a country. Ethnic politics and poor development, therefore, form a vicious cycle. By knowing how both ethnic and civic nationalism emerge, one can search for means for

a country to transit from ethnic to civic politics. This is of paramount importance because the latter tends towards political stability while the former is often the cause of conflicts. This issue of building a viable shared identity in multi-ethnic countries is exceptionally crucial for some newly independent countries in South Eastern Europe. The paper would conclude by assessing the likelihood of economic growth in eroding the role of ethnic politics in this region. Throughout the discussion, an original model is proposed to illustrate the parallel but threaded evolution of the party system and voting pattern (Figure 5). Income change leads to changes in social structure, which affects voters' preferences. The party system then adapts to this change accordingly.

Empirical Analysis

Empirical evidence suggests that multi-ethnic countries with higher social and economic development tend to be more successful in building a civic national identity. Ethnic and linguistic diversity in these highly industrialised countries seems to be more manageable than their less developed counterparts. This is not to suggest that a correlation in the strict statistical sense exists between income level and ethnic politics. On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that anomalies exist. Canada, for example, being the country with the third highest human development index in the world, has a strong separatist party that won over 12% of seats in the 2000 election (see Chart 1). Nevertheless, politics with ethnicity as the main political cleavage is more likely to be found in lesser developed countries or regions.

The United States and Switzerland are multi-cultural societies that have successfully created a national identity based on shared political values. Both countries are very high in their human development. The per capita GDP of the United States was \$34,142USD in 2002, whereas Switzerland has a per capita GDP of \$28,769USD.¹ The United States is composed of citizens with different racial, ethnic, and cultural background. Yet, the idea of a shared identity of being American is deeply entrenched in the society. The American nation is strongly patriotic in spite of its cultural diversity. This strong sense of American identity is built and reinforced by citizenship literature and school curriculum.² Voters, regardless of their ethnic origin, predominantly support the two major political parties—Democratic Party and Republican Party. These two parties differ mostly in their economic and social policy platform. In the case of Switzerland, the country is divided into 26 cantons. Each canton has its distinct cultural characteristics and legal tradition to accommodate its multi-cultural population. The population is divided into three major linguistic groups: French, German, and Italian. Within a linguistic group, there is sometimes a religious sub-division. This cultural diversity is institutionalized in the country's constitution.³ However, despite all these cultural differences, a single Swiss identity exists. The Swiss political parties are divided along the traditional left-right continuum.

Canada and Belgium are examples of countries of which diversity is being managed successfully. The

two countries rank third and fourth in terms of human development in the world. The per capita GDP of Canada is \$27,840USD in 2002 while that of Belgium is \$27,178USD.⁴ The Belgium population is divided into the Flemish and French speakers. The country is also geographically divided to reflect the differences of the two groups. The Flanders region is inhabited mostly by Flemish speakers while Wallonia is inhabited mostly by French speakers. Regionalist movement was strong in the 60s and 70s. It led to the increased decentralisation of the country, which gradually turned into a full-fledged power-sharing system between the two groups.⁵ However, recent election results do not suggest a strong support on regionalists or separatist parties. The majority of the voters vote according to their policy preferences instead of their ethnicity. Class and religious issues are well-represented in the party system, which had impeded the growth of ethnically-based parties.⁶ In the case of Canada, division exists between the French and English speaking population. Although over 75% of votes in the 2000 election went to non-ethnic political parties, the French separatist party (Bloc Québécoise) won 38 seats in the 2000 Parliamentary election (see Chart 1). Federalism is adopted to manage cultural diversity in Canada. The Provinces are given a great amount of autonomy to preserve their (the provinces') own cultural characteristics. They can also opt out from federal programmes. The province of Quebec, therefore, has its own language law, immigration policy, legal code and so forth. The most recent secession attempt of Quebec was conducted in the form of a referendum, and the entire process was undertaken peacefully. The diversity in Canada is being successfully managed by these institutional mechanisms to prevent physical violence.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are the epitome of an ethnic party system, and both states belong to the less developed countries in the world. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the majority of voters vote for the party that represents their respective ethnicity. Bosniaks constitute 44%⁷ of the population while about 32.4% of the total votes went to the two Bosniak nationalist parties in the 2002 House of Representatives election. Serbs constitute 31%⁸ of the population, and 14% of the total votes in the election went to the Serbian nationalist party (see Chart 1). Similar electoral results can be found in the TFYR Macedonia. The voters of the Social Democratic League of Macedonia and Liberal-Democratic Party are mostly Macedonians. On the other hand, the Albanian minority often vote for the three Albanian parties (Democratic Union for Integration, Democratic Party of Albanians, and Democratic Prosperity Party). Albanians constitute 22.7%⁹ of the population in Macedonia, and 19.4% of the total vote cast in the 2002 Assembly election went to the Albanian minority parties (see Chart 1). Different minority groups have their own ethnic party: the Democratic League of Bosniaks for the Bosniaks; the United Party of Romas in Macedonia for the Roma minority; the Democratic Party of Serbs for the Serbian minority; the Democratic Party of Turks for the Turkish minority; the Democratic Union of Vlachs for the Vlachs minority. Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and TFYR Macedonia belong to the low to medium income group of countries. The per capita GDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina is estimated to be \$1657USD,¹⁰ and the GDP per capita of Macedonia is \$5,086USD.¹¹

Theory of Ethnic Nationalism in Politics: Dissolution of Yugoslavia as Example

The cause of ethnic nationalist politics can be examined from the top-down and bottom-up dichotomy. When the actors of the two levels interact, it usually evokes ethnic nationalism in politics. The top-down approach focuses on the political elites. Very often political elites use nationalist rhetoric to mobilize the mass public in order to attain specific political goals. This tactic is used remarkably often when there are pervasive social or economic problems in the society.

In the example of Yugoslavia, some elites from the republics used nationalist rhetoric to achieve their own political goals. Slobodan Milošević began his populist campaign of raising the nationalist feelings among Serbs in Kosovo in 1988. He organized a large number of mass rallies throughout Serbia to publicize the grievances of the Kosovo Serbs.¹² This led to mass demonstrations of patriotism. Thousands of Serbs showed up for these skilfully managed rallies, which had promoted the popularity of Milošević.¹³ In 1989, Milošević capitalized on his image of being the patriotic national hero to win the presidential election in Serbia with a landslide victory.¹⁴ On the other hand, anti-Serbianism also helped Franjo Tuđman to gain popularity in Croatia. In the first free multi-party elections in Croatia in 1990, parties promoting separatism were big winners.¹⁵ Moreover, since Slovenia was the most economically developed republic of Yugoslavia, nationalist politics of Milošević also gave rise to nationalist feelings in Slovenia which led to conflict between Serbia and Slovenia.¹⁶ The Slovene communist elites used this conflict to promote national homogenisation in the country. Protests were organized to demonstrate against the Serbian and federal oppression of the Kosovo Albanians.¹⁷ The Serbian elites in return, used this conflict with Slovenia to intensify ethnic mobilization.¹⁸ Nationalist euphoria could sideline any negative social economic news. Passionate nationalist platform can easily transform a politician from being a poor manager of the economy to a national hero. Unemployment in Yugoslavia had reached 16.6 percent by 1986,¹⁹ and the country's debt had also hit \$20 billion in 1982.²⁰ The true scale of the country's debt was only discovered in 1982 because the republics had been spending money recklessly without even informing the federal government.²¹ Nationalism was, in part, used in the Yugoslav case to divert the people's attention from unpopular policies and economic mismanagement.

In this case, since nationalism is orchestrated by the elites in the different republics, it can be easily institutionalized by the ethnic party system. Theoretically, if one party turned into an ethnic party, other political parties also tend to become ethnic-based parties. The rationale behind this being once a party turns into an ethnic political party, it takes away voters from the other non-ethnic parties as ethnicity overlaps with other social, political identities. Therefore, the stake for any party in losing the ethnic votes is too high. And once a party becomes an ethnic party, it would be too risky for it to change its line of politics into a non-ethnic one.²² Usually ethnic parties represent exclusively members of an ethnic group. Voters are unlikely to vote for parties of the other ethnicities.²³ Voters also face the pressure that if they do not vote for their own ethnic party and members of the other ethnicities do, they would be put into a disadvantaged position. This further reinforces voting patterns along ethnic lines. So, the formation of one ethnic party is likely to produce a chain reaction that leads to the formation of an ethnic political party system. This is basically what happened in the first Yugoslav multi-party election.

The bottom-up analysis focuses on the population. Mass nationalist mobilization often occurs when a sense of insecurity prevails in the society. This insecurity is usually generated by a sudden occurrence of social, economic and political uncertainty and instability. Furthermore, the existence of severe regional disparity also causes the increase of ethnic nationalist awareness.

Yugoslavia, upon its dissolution, was encountering economic difficulties. The country had accumulated a significant amount of debt. Borrowing was the means to sustain the per capita GDP growth. Growth averaged 5.1% in Yugoslavia between 1970- 79 although foreign debt grew by 20% a year in the same period.²⁴ The population soon realised that their real income was actually declining because of the high inflation rate. Real income was down by one-quarter from 1983 to 1988.²⁵ The oil crisis caused worldwide recession and affected the Yugoslav economy. About 80% of the household found their savings diminishing.²⁶ Unemployment had gone up from 13.8% to 16.6% from 1981 to 1986.²⁷ Strikes had become more and more frequent. The population was unprepared for this sudden drop in living standards. This caused insecurity and fear among them. To an extent, nationalism provided some sort of certainty for the people. Moreover, the population was frustrated by the failed attempt of the party to modernize the political system. When the multi-party system was finally introduced in 1991, grievances had already reached an insurmountable level.

Inter-republic income inequality was also conducive to nationalist politics. There was a great disparity of income between the richest (Slovenia) and the poorest (Kosovo) regions. In 1988, the per capita gross material product (goods without services) of Slovenia was 7.5 times more than that of Kosovo. 28 Kosovo depended heavily on subsidies from the federal state while Slovenia was a net contributor to the federal budget. The poor economy and high unemployment in Kosovo inevitably created a sense of frustration and alienation in the region. The rise of Milošević had alarmed the Albanian population in Kosovo. The Albanians felt threatened by the nationwide Serbian nationalist movement and the abolition of their autonomy by Milošević. So, they started their own separatist movement to call for Kosovo to become a republic. On the other hand, the economic superiority of Slovenia also gave rise to nationalism and the wish for more autonomy in the republic. Therefore, fear and insecurity (bottom-up factor) together with the nationalist rhetoric of the politicians (top-down factor) resulted in the revival of each republic's own national identity.

Ethnic Politics and Underdevelopment

Underdeveloped countries are more prone to ethnic politics; while ethnic politics is more likely to occur in poor countries. It is because ethnic politics actually create poor economic development and poor economic development often leads to the rise of ethnic nationalism. Some countries are trapped by this vicious cycle of ethnic politics and underdevelopment.




Figure 1: The Relationship of Ethnic Politics and Poor Economic Development

An ethnic political party system creates stable electoral outcomes but produces unstable politics. An unstable government does not provide a healthy environment for economic development. When voters vote according to their ethnic affiliation, the outcome of an election will depend on the demographics of the country. Demographics do not change in a short period of time, consequently, nor do electoral outcomes. Ethnic politics tend towards conflicts because of this low voter fluidity. Voters rarely vote for any other parties besides their own ethnic one. This sometimes produces a permanent majority or a permanent minority in government, which is inherently antagonistic. Party policy that is based on rigid ethnic lines is not conducive to compromises between political parties and often leads to stalemate. When new ethnic parties are formed, it is usually because they advocate more radical policies than the existing ones.²⁹ They are often splinter groups from an existing nationalist party with more extreme views. Therefore, the direction of competition in an ethnic party system tends to be centrifugal.³⁰ Furthermore, ethnic politics emphasizes primordial ties and kinship. Politics as such tends to be nepotistic instead of meritorious. Since the election result is predetermined by demographics, competition is limited. An ethnic political party system is potentially undemocratic. This lack of competition damages the quality of policy. As mentioned in the previous section, economic crisis is often a cause of the rise of ethnic nationalism. Underdevelopment breeds social insecurity and elites often capitalize on this insecurity. They mobilize the public for their own political gains by attaching an enemy-identity to a particular group and divert the attention of the public from internal problems of the country. Therefore, underdevelopment and ethnic politics affect each other and form a vicious cycle.

Civic Nationalism and Economic Growth

The most successful record of civic national identity building can be found in highly industrialised multi-ethnic states. Although there is no causal relationship that shows that civic nationalism leads to economic growth, the two affect each other. Economic growth facilitates the building of a civic national identity while a non-ethnic political party system tends to be more stable and is conducive to economic growth.




Figure 2: Relationship Between Economic Growth and the Building of Civic National Identity

Industrialisation often changes the social structure of a society. Historically, modernization leads to the emergence of a class system. Class politics often replaces ethnic politics as the basis of electoral competition in high-income multi-ethnic countries. For example, class and religious issues formed the core of Belgium politics, which has stifled the growth of regionalist parties.³¹ Once ethnicity is being eroded by class division, civic national identity is more likely to take hold. Besides the forming of class structure, economic growth also increases the complexity of the society. Media, transport, and communication systems tend to improve when income increases, which establishes closer links between different groups. When social activities increase, citizens tend to develop various identities besides their ethnic one. Rise in living standard allows people to pursue their different interests. Civil society is more developed in high-income countries because of the diversity of interest that comes with income growth. Various forms of social clubs and interest groups draw people together, allowing them to discover commonality with others besides ethnic affiliation. In the case of Yugoslavia, a civil society that creates cross-cutting cleavages and links the different republics together was lacking. The feminist movement, for example, was attacked in Yugoslavia as being elitist and encouraged the love of power.³² Spectator sport was probably the leading intra-Yugoslav activity.³³ Due to the absence of strong civil society and class division, the primordial ethnic identity remained, and the Yugoslav common identity, promoted by Tito, failed to take hold. Moreover, high national income level generates post-modernist political demands. Once a high living standard is reached, voters tend to develop interests on post-modernist, non-material issues such as education, environment, gender and so forth. Therefore, the above analysis shows that economic growth tends to produce a non-ethnic voting pattern which allows the building of a single national identity in the country.

Below is a scale that shows the likely preference change of voters when income level changes:




Figure 3: The Scale of Political Preferences

When the society is still in its pre-modern state, ethnicity is the most important social identity for the population. When the country modernizes, it often produces income inequality, which leads to the emergence of a class system. After the initial state of modernization, this inequality reduces due to higher social mobility. The reduction of severe inequality means fewer grievances from the people and leads to a lesser likelihood of one group to feel oppressed. Since the living standard of the general public improves, people are more concerned with social policy that affects their existing living conditions. The role of the state then becomes a salient issue in politics, and political parties are usually located along the left-right continuum. Once the majority of the population have attained a satisfactory living standard, the quality-of-life issues such as the environment become important in politics. Nevertheless, ethnic issues sometimes revisit even when income level is high in a country. In reality, there is usually a mixture of parties from the different stages of development co-existing in the political arena.

As the income of a country increases, voter fluidity also increases. When the party system is based entirely on ethnicity, the party system is rigid. Vote transferability from one party to another is extremely low. Voters usually vote for their own ethnic party, and electoral result is pre-determined by demographics. Once economic growth increases, a class system develops. Class politics produces more fluid voters than that of ethnic politics because people can get richer or poorer but they cannot change their ethnicity. Vote transferability increases with the emergence of a class system. When the party system is divided along policy lines, voting patterns become issue-based. The voters are most fluid in such a party system, and voting patterns are rather volatile. High voter fluidity means that parties would attempt to capture the floating voters. The floating, undecided voters often prefer moderate policy that is in between the two parties' agenda. This gives incentives for the political parties to move closer to each other in terms of political platform. Thus, non-ethnic political party systems tend to be centripetal.³⁴ This absence of severe political conflicts provides a healthy environment for economic growth. When government administration is not based on ethnic favouritism, the quality of policies tends to improve. This forms the virtuous cycle of growth and civic nationalism as depicted in Figure 2.

Moreover, high a living standard provides a disincentive for people to disturb the status quo. It provides incentives for people to manage differences peacefully. Allowing diversity in a country is often costly. Switzerland has the population of 6.3 million³⁵ and is divided into 26 different cantons each of which has its own distinct institutions according to its cultural needs. With all these institutions, administration costs in the Swiss case are obviously higher than those in a unitary state. A country needs a developed economy in order to successfully sustain territorial and non-territorial power sharing arrangements.

Moving From Ethnic To Non-Ethnic Politics

Very often countries are trapped in the vicious cycle of ethnic politics and poor economic development. There are three likely directions toward which an ethnic party system is likely to move: one-party authoritarian regime, military regime, or the formation of multi-ethnic parties and coalitions.³⁶ An ethnic party

system often results in a one-party system because there is often a minority that has a permanent minority status. Naturally, the minority is continually dissatisfied and this causes tension and instability. If the ruling party tries to reduce tension or to use this instability as a pretext to limit party rivalry, a one-party system is resultant.³⁷ The same political tension can be crushed by military intervention, resulting in a military dictatorship.³⁸ The third option, the forming of multi-ethnic parties and coalitions, is likely to move the country out of the vicious cycle of ethnic politics towards economic development and the building of a civic national identity.




Figure 4: Three Trajectories of Ethnic Nationalist Party System

Coalition is formed between different parties when there is an electoral advantage to do so. Sometimes government cannot be formed by one ethnic party alone; it requires the co-operation between ethnic parties or between ethnic and non-ethnic parties. Co-operation between ethnic parties is only possible if they have agreed on at least some policy compromises.³⁹ This compromise is more likely to reach if the voting pattern of the society is gradually “de-ethnicized”. If the society continues to be severely divided along ethnic lines and ethnic lines alone, coalition between parties is either impossible or is short-lived. Therefore, the trajectory for an ethnic party system to move towards a non-ethnic one must progress side by side with the change of political preference (see Figure 5). If this coalition is successful in election, over time it develops into a permanent alliance. Once the voting pattern becomes more fluid, these alliances evolve into non-ethnic catch-all parties to correspond to the voters’ preferences.




Figure 5: Model of Progression From Ethnic to Non-Ethnic Politics

Ideally, this is the trajectory for a country to move from having an ethnic party system to a non-ethnic one. Yet, in reality, the party system often does not follow a linear progression as depicted in the model, it regresses or digresses from time to time. While social structure is changing parallel to the party system, diversity management mechanisms can be used to allow for a peaceful transition. These mechanisms can be territorial (such as federalism or the designation of an autonomous region) or non-territorial (power-sharing/consociationalism or minority protection). The growing of civil society and the forming of alliances between parties can promote a culture of compromise and co-operation.

The final stage of consolidating a non-ethnic party system is to develop a common national identity. The previous analysis shows that the growth of civil society as a result of economic development can help the building of shared values. Shared values are a necessary condition for nation building. However, shared values alone are not sufficient. Swedes and Norwegians are culturally similar and share a lot of values, yet they are separate nations.⁴⁰ Shared identity is what fulfills the sufficient condition.⁴¹ According to Renan, a nation consists of two things: the past and the present.⁴² In a multi-ethnic country, a shared past is absent, so the present is what counts. The existence of this kind of nation is “an everyday plebiscite,”⁴³ its survival depends on the desire of its citizens to live together. Although economic development helps the growth of shared values in a society, it does not guarantee the forming of a shared national identity. However, this shared national identity or the willingness to live together is more likely to be formed over time, if shared values exist and the citizens live in a harmonious society with a decent living standard.

Conclusion

The conflict-prone nature of ethnic politics has profound implications for countries governed by the ethnic party system. To achieve successful political reform - to move from ethnic to non-ethnic politics, parallel economic reform is necessary. Both the economy and the civil society of a country must be strengthened. Ensuring an even distribution of income between different groups and different regions in the country is extremely important. Reducing inequality can ameliorate the grievances of the disadvantaged groups. If any group feels severely disadvantaged in economic or political terms, the political system is potentially unsustainable. However, in countries that had just suffered from ethnic conflicts, economic development is extremely challenging. This is the case in the former Yugoslav republics. Most of these newly formed states found attracting foreign investment difficult, while their domestic infrastructure had been destroyed or damaged by the war. To break away from the vicious cycle of ethnic politics and poor economic development, these countries require help from external forces - such as investment programmes promoted by international organizations. Since economic development takes a prolonged period of time, while political instability takes much less time to surface, external monitoring might be needed for a country's political restructuring.

To build a non-ethnic political party system that lasts, developing a common national identity is the most effective way. Diversity can be managed by various mechanisms such as consociationalism, federalism, and the protection of minority rights, while an overarching common identity takes root. Diversity and a common national identity are not two mutually exclusive concepts. Nonetheless, the problem for a deeply divided society is that there is usually a general lack of will for the different groups to live together. The development of cross-cutting cleavages can erode ethnicity as the main social identity, and the building of the social thread can link different groups together. A good living standard and economic stability can make the process less tenuous. Yet, developing shared values might not be enough to keep a country together. The missing ingredient might be capable leadership or civic education programmes. The United States is a good example that civic education programmes yield a desirable result in the building of a single national identity. The prospect of developing a shared national identity in a divided society is not as pessimistic as believed. History has shown that identity changes over time. At different periods in history people prefer to identify with different forms of political entity. Sometimes the trend points towards regionalism; at other times the nation state is fashionable; in recent times, supranational identity, like that of the European Union, is becoming increasingly popular. Although identity shaping does not necessarily follow a linear evolution as depicted in this theoretical analysis, national identity is not immutable. Optimism and creativity is needed in order for differences to co-exist.

Chart 1: Comparing Development and Party System in Multi-ethnic and Multi-cultural Countries From Selected Elections⁴⁴

Country	Major Political Parties	Description	Share of Popular Vote in Latest National Election
<u>Party System Based on Predominantly Ethnic Cleavages</u>			
Bosnia-Herzegovina - Zastupnicki dom (House of Representatives) Election Date: 5 October 2002 GDP per capita in 2002: \$1,657 USD ⁴⁵	Party of Democratic Action (SDA) - Stranka Demokratski Akcije	A Bosniak nationalist party	21.9%
	Serb Democratic Party (SDS) – Srpska Demokratska Stranka	A Serbian nationalist party	14%
	Party for BiH (SbiH) - Stranka za Bosnu I Hercegovinu	A moderate Bosniak nationalist party	10.5%
	Social Democratic Party (SDP) - Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne I Hercegovine-Socijaldemokrati	A social democratic party	10.4%

	Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) - Stranka Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata	A social democratic party	9.8%
	Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica	A Croatian nationalist party	Coalition with the Christian Democrats received 9.5% of the vote
TFYR Macedonia - Sobranie (Assembly) Election Date: September 5, 2002 GDP per capita in 2002: \$5,086 USD Human Development Index: 0.772	Social Democratic League of Macedonia - Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija	A social democratic party	A coalition of the 10 parties formed Together for Macedonia (Za Makedonija zaedno) and won 40.5% of vote
	Liberal-Democratic Party - Liberalno-Demokratska Partija	A liberal party	
	Democratic League of Bosniaks – Demokratska Liga na Boshnjacite	Party representing the Bosniaks	
	United Party of Romas in Macedonia - Obedinita Partija na Romite na Makedonija	Party representing the Roma community	
	Democratic Party of Serbs – Demokratska Partija na Srbite	Party represents the Serbian community	

	Democratic Party of Turks – Demokratska Partija na Turcite	Party representing the Turks	
	Democratic Union of Vlachs – Demokratski Sojuz na Vlachte	Party represents the Vlachs	
	Labor-Agricultural Party – Rabotnicka Zemjodenska Partija	Minor labour party	
	Socialist-Christian Party of Macedonia - Socialisticcka Christijanska Partija na Makedonija		
	Green Party of Macedonia - Zelena Partija na Makedonia	Minor ecology party	
	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity - Vnatrešno- Makedonska Revoluciona Organizacija- Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edintsvo	A conservative party	Coalition of the two parties won 24.4 % of vote
	Liberal Party of Macedonia (LMP)- Liberalna Partija na Makedonije	Advocates liberal policies	
	Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) – Demokratska Unija za Integracija	An Albanian minority party	11.9%

	Democratic Party of Albanians (PDS) - Partia Demokratike Shqiptare/ Demokratska Partija na Albancite	An Albanian minority party	5.2%
	Democratic Prosperity Party (PDP) - Partia e prosperiteti demokratike /Partija za Demokratski Prosperitet	An Albanian minority party	2.3%
	<u>Party System Based on Both Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Cleavages</u>		
Canada - House of Commons Election Date: November 27, 2000 GDP per capita in 2002: \$27,840 USD Human Development Index: 0.940	Liberal Party of Canada	Advocates social democratic policies	40.8%
	Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance	A centrist party	25.5%
	Progressive Conservative Party	A conservative party	12.2%
	Quebecers Bloc - Bloc Québécois	Advocates the secession of Quebec	10.7%

<u>Party System Based on Cleavages Other than Ethnicity</u>			
Austria - Nationalrat (National Council) Election Date: November 24, 2002 GDP per capita in 2002: \$26,765 USD Human Development Index: 0.926	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social-Democratic Party of Austria	A social democratic party	36.5%
	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party	Conservative policy with Catholic influence.	42.3%
	Die Grünen (Grüne) - The Greens	An ecologist party	9.5%
	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria	Pursues nationalist, anti-immigration policies	10%
	Liberales Forum (LIF) - Liberal Forum	Advocates liberal policies.	1% - no seats

<p>Belgium - Kamer der Volksvertegenwoordigers/ Chambre des Représentants (Chamber of People’s Representatives)</p> <p>Election Date: June 13, 1999</p> <p>GDP per capita in 2002: \$27,178 USD</p> <p>Human Development Index: 0.939</p>	<p>Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD) - Flemish Liberals and Democrats</p>	<p>Advocates conservative to liberal policies</p>	<p>14.3%</p>
	<p>Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) – Christian People’s Party</p>	<p>A Christian democratic party</p>	<p>14.1%</p>
	<p>Parti Socialiste (PS) – Socialist Party</p>	<p>A Social Democratic Party</p>	<p>10.1%</p>
	<p>Parti Réformateur Libéral – Liberal Reformist Party</p>	<p>A conservative to liberal party</p>	<p>A coalition of the three parties received 10.1% of popular vote</p>
	<p>Front Démocratique des Francophones - Democratic Front of Francophones</p>	<p>A Brussels regionalist party</p>	
	<p>Mouvement des Citoyens pour le Changement - Citizens’ Movement for Change</p>	<p>A Christian democratic party</p>	

<p>Switzerland – Nationalrat/Conseil National/Consiglio Nazionale/Cussegl Naziunal (National Council)</p> <p>Election Date: October 24, 1999</p> <p>GDP per capita in 2002: \$28,769 USD</p> <p>Human Development Index: 0.928</p>	<p>Swiss People’s Party (SVP) - Schweizerische Volkspartei</p>	<p>A conservative party</p>	<p>22.5%</p>
	<p>Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS) - Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz</p>	<p>A social democratic party</p>	<p>22.5%</p>
	<p>Freethinking-Democratic Party of Switzerland (FDP)- Freisinnig- Demokratische Partei der Schweiz</p>	<p>A liberal party</p>	<p>19.9%</p>
	<p>Christian Democratic People’s Party, Christlich (CVP)- Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz</p>	<p>A Christian democratic party</p>	<p>15.8%</p>

United States - House of Representatives Election Date: November 5, 2002 GDP per capita in 2002: \$34,142 USD Human Development Index: 0.939	Republican Party		51%
	Democratic Party		46.2%

Source: Chris Cook and John Paxton, *European Political Facts 1990-1996*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1998); *Election Around The World* available at www.electionworld.org; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002 – Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Ioan Hosu, Camil Postelnicu, and Daniela Tarnovschi, *Youth Issues and Challenges In South-Eastern Europe*, (Civitas Foundation for Civil Society: 2002).

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¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002--Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 149.

² Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 189.

³ Lidija R. Basta Fleiner, “Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal State—An Outsider Perception of the Swiss Model”. In Lidija R. Basta Fleiner and Thomas Fleiner (ed.), *Federalism and Multiethnic States—The Case of Switzerland* (Institut du fédéralisme Fribourg Suisse: 2000), p. 99.

⁴ UNDP, p. 149.

⁵ Ulrich Schneckener, “Making Power-Sharing Work—Lessons From Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation”, *In IIS-Arbeitspapier* Nr. 19/2000, (Institut für Interkulturelle und Internationale

Studien: 2000), p. 6

⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley & Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1985), p. 303-304.

⁷ Ioan Hosu, Camil Postelnicu, and Daniela Tarnovschi, *Youth Issues and Challenges In South-Eastern Europe*, (Civitas Foundation for Civil Society: 2002), p. 59. Figures concerning population are subject to error due to the dislocation caused by the recent war.

⁸ Ioan Hose, p. 59.

⁹ Ioan Hose, p. 161.

¹⁰ See footnote 13.

¹¹ UNDP, p. 149.

¹² Metta Spencer, “The Breakup of Yugoslavia” in *Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration*, edited by Metta Spencer (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 173.

¹³ Metta, p. 173.

¹⁴ Metta, p. 173

¹⁵ Metta, 174

¹⁶ Dušan Janjic, “The Spread of Ethnic Conflicts in Europe: Some Comparative—Historical Reflections” in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation*. Edited by David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, p. 21.

¹⁷ Janjic, p. 21

¹⁸ Janjic, p. 21

¹⁹ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History—Twice There was a Country* (Cambridge, UK; New York; USA: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 333.

²⁰ Lampe, p. 322.

²¹ Metta, p. 169

²² Horowitz, p. 342.

²³ Horowitz, p. 324.

²⁴ Lampe, p. 322.

²⁵ Lampe, p. 333.

²⁶ Metta, p. 169.

²⁷ Lampe, p. 334

²⁸ Lampe, p. 336.

²⁹ Horowitz, p. 347.

³⁰ Horowitz, p. 347.

³¹ Horowitz, p. 304.

³² Leslie Holmes, *Post-Communism: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 276.

³³ Lampe, p. 341.

³⁴ Horowitz, p. 346.

³⁵ Fleiner, p. 103.

³⁶ Horowitz, p. 363.

³⁷ Horowitz, p. 363.

³⁸ Horowitz, p. 363.

³⁹ Horowitz, p. 368-369.

⁴⁰ Kymlicka, p. 188.

⁴¹ Kymlicka, p. 188.

⁴² Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" in *Nationalism*, edited by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (Oxford

University Press: 1994), p. 17.

⁴³ Renan, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Chart 1 is a compilation of data from various sources. Chris Cook and John Paxton, *European Political Facts 1990-1996*, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1998); *Election Around the World* available at www.electionworld.org; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002—Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Ioan Hosu, Camil Postelnicu, and Daniela Tarnovschi, *Youth Issues and Challenges In South-Eastern Europe*, (Civitas Foundation for Civil Society: 2002).

⁴⁵ The total GDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2002 is estimated to be \$6.5 billion USD with a population of 3,922,205. However, a large unaccountable black economy exists in the country and figures concerning population are also subject to error due to dislocation caused by the recent war. Data taken from Ioan Hosu, Camil Postelnicu, and Daniela Tarnovschi, *Youth Issues and Challenges In South-Eastern Europe*, (Civitas Foundation for Civil Society: 2002), p. 60.

23 Maxims for Anatomy.

By Nicholas Packwood

1

Boredom is excess.

2

Nothing succeeds like excess.

3

Excess in nonsense as some kind of stimulation which just past too much is nonsensical. Torture and boredom are kissing cousins, just across each other from parted lips. Torture, by definition, cannot be experienced as excess. Past the line traced deep red into flesh it numbs out, is overwritten and exhausted past noticing. This is the little known reason for the failure of water torture.

4

Or can it work that way? Does this formula not imply the alchemist's transformation of torture in excess... literally bored to tears. Long slow movies can do this. Magic is the transgression of skin-like distinctions of torture and boredom. Kissing cousins fucking through porous communicative mathematics. Or is this a game of semantics? Another boredom. Really.

5

Neighbours fighting all the time. Hear it so often, stomp on the floor, call police, blasts of fire out back window and nothing changes. Then the noise stops. Now achieved a selective and useful stupidity. Too much to handle, even erratic stimulation is ignored like breathing and all but uncomfortable bowel movements. Boredom covers like a blanket or long lost membrane. Bowel movements trace a long brown four dimensional line ignored by all but the most erratic and selective genealogists. Nietzsche got it ass-backwards. Philosophers must provoke tortuous bowel movements and therefore profit from poor climate and nutrition. A kind of reminder too much for the over-wimp. Who needs this 98lb weakling anyway? Dead backwards the face of God stares out Nietzsche's rear belching books and prophecies. Shooting fire into the night the neighbours long unloved and forgotten.

6

Impacted bowels turn the trick of it. So to speak. Boredom and excess do not “is” each other but are rather always already in/different.

7

Nothing exceeds success but boredom. The road has not ended at the end but has eaten its tail and thereby escaped not tangentially (as some nomads would have it) but rather in a polar orientation. Swallowed not by the mouth but by the asshole. Bound for boredom.

8

Constipation does not imply blockage but movement. A species of persistent stimulation. A provocation. Uncomfortable, tortuous, the only line of flight is an ejecta sometimes rocket-like. Boredom is, in this instance, the release of a monstrous child. “Who needs Oedipus?” the fucker gurgles as it sticks in the knife. A gut wound ruled ungentlemanly and more correctly, unanythingly. No identity required the shit-kiddy goes for daddy’s insides before setting eyes on forbidden fruits of any description. Painfully, undeniably an-Oedipal gripping and reluctant. An unwanted tenant finally given the heave ho and who can say it’s for the worse? No language need apply - the sign smeared in brown hieroglyphs in Niles of flesh and porcelain. The knife requires no grammar. Fuck the apparatus... should never have come for that second helping.

9

Rocket crap is excess.

10

Everything in moderation may too be characterized by boredom. Sucking neither too much nor too little does not produce the same effect as no cock or the same damned cock all the time. Think of the penillion, an improvisation on song played fast then slow then fast again. Dancers talk about this sort of thing as do musicians. Improvisation helps but does not answer any questions or point a way out. The idea is not a metaphysics or ends doctrine or final questions with answers attached, but asking why ask in the first place. This answer isn’t an answer either. “Don’t bother asking. After that it’s cocks, cocks, cocks all the way down...”

11

As the point past torture is nonsensical so excess cannot be experienced. This is not some Jamesian infidelity but a question of definitions. Excess has burnt out the nerves leaving canyons in its wake. Excess

may only be experienced at a distance or after the fact. This necessitates two bodies split from one another. In this sense Aristotle was perfectly half right. Bottoms constitute a body or field upon which the play of tops may be carried out. As the strategy of the slave is the

contract so the strategy of the master is lesson-giving. Here the contract may be understood as

both ultimate and penultimate sensation in anticipation of excess. The lesson, conversely, is the apprehension of excess possible only at a distance.

12

Only objects may be taught lessons. Only subjects may sign contracts. Only subjects may teach lessons. Only objects may bind subjects. This last is seduction.

13

As excess may only be apprehended at a distance so the infernal machine of visuality has produced cognition and perception in models consistent with this rule. Descartes hit the target, but it was the size of a barn.

14

Love is joy with an object. Fear is sorrow with an object. Here Spinoza has bit his own ass. Love is joy experienced through object. Fear is sorrow experienced through object. Anything direct renders love and sorrow relative forms of torture and therefore in/different. Love and sorrow in excess are only possible at a distance and are apprehended through instruction. Discipline is an object's path to the point before the end of torture. Torture ends when perfect love and perfect fear are realized. They had to invent God as an audience if not for their slaves then for their own perfect bottoms. Spinoza re-inscribes the rule by biting his ass then shooting up his asshole.

15

Ressentiment is excess at a distance. The sheep know only torture and wish for an ineffability which can only disappoint them. They are always already as close as they can get. Grunting. Muttering. They would not know boredom if it bit them in the ass.

16

Slaves and masters are in/different. Torture bordering on boredom is the rule for all. These relations are only a question of position. Neither triumphs over the other as neither could be distinct in any case.

17

Nothing succeeds excess but boredom. There is no afterwards to sensation except by proxy and at a distance. And Jesus wept but felt nothing. He was bored to tears.

18

So what is this nothing? Nothing is the condition of excess. No nothing as subject as this would be nonsense. Nothing is only at a distance. They invent God as nowhere man to make sense of nothing. His job to watch and make object where else no nothing anywhere.

19

Excess is spectacular and the only complete spectacle. This is necessarily at a distance or after the fact. All other sensation is possible and most do not bother in the first place. To do so simply invokes another boredom and, in this way, another excess. Not to say this does not happen all the damned time. There is no accounting for stupidity. But as excess is only sensible as second order experience it is the only show in town worth putting out for.

20

All science is voyeurism and peeping-Thomism. Feverish masturbatory torture at a distance. Creepy infantile self-castrating sense through nonsense. As the rules play it out objects shoot their wad while subjects watch. The erection is always close at hand but is useless short of an anatomical impossibility. AnaThomists to peeping-Thomists: "Go fuck yourselves!"

21

Marcus Aurelius understood indigestion and its uses.

22

Of course Foucault did his best thinking at the baths. Perhaps he thought of nothing else - it would be hard to explain the walls and cubicles at every turn. Excess at a distance stripped to its fundamentals, of course Foucault was head fucked into the apparatus, demons have a way with configurations. Sex as torture produced with Fordist efficiency. Utility, money economy and semantics are all sorcery governed by a belief in the incest tabu. Here torture and excess may long for each other but are held apart by the law when in fact they are kissing cousins and more. Torture fucks itself into excess and thereby disappears up its own ass. A portable hole. Only assholes practice safer semiosis.

23

The practice of transgression takes its shorthand as magic. Torture becomes excess and becomes nothing.

A disappearing act. That is not to say it no longer “is-es” but that it no longer appears. Vision of a sort only thinks itself as subject jacking off to object on this edge of obliteration at its end mathematics. Bataille in black robes leading a critical mass. When sensation fails, boredom rules bodies after math. Simultaneity of affect equals a full measure of hot white ejecta. The subject spurts having found object in itself as its own threshold is crossed. The two are one only in boredom. Maybe. A millennium of in/difference with more screams to give the lie to the whole process.

The Land and Nightfall...

By Bruce Isaacs

The land nocturnal rises in the glare of firelight,
Rises and falls,
And the softly looming mountains sleep.
Dust and darkness of the same pliant stuff,
The same suspirant murmur,
It wakes to its revisionist calling -
New but not unfamiliar -
Reverberate, clamorous, the sound of real, virulent intent -

Born of dust and breath,
The breathlessness of the creator,
One true form, intransigent,
And the work, verisimilitude of the Divine,
That falls to memory.

Now its limbs shudder, spasm -
It holds its breath for fear it will be its last.
When night descends, and the depths of the day reveal the rubble-strewn soul of the land-
Gaza stripped, ravished,
Made of the same pliant stuff -
When the land sleeps and the dust settles,
All that remains is the reverb of a clash:
Staccato, rhythmic, time manacled -
The last trembling gasp for civilisation.

Post Card to Gilles Deleuze (mailed two weeks before his death)

By Nicholas Packwood

Post card with photo of Earth as seen from space. A red line connects the planet to the word "TORONTO" in red Times Roman font.

The post card reads: *"TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA. North America, as seen from 250,000 miles above. This dramatic photo was taken during one of the Apollo Missions. Photo Courtesy of NASA Printed in Canada"*

"Dear Pr. Deleuze,

I found your two volume "Capitalism and Schizophrenia" to be informative and entertaining. I felt I should draw to your attention Pr. S. Freud's "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" in which he points out that God's sacrifice of his son - by law of tally - is a payment of a primal debt re. the death of the Father. Therefore, Christ is the Anti-Oedipus.

Thanks anyway,

Nicholas Packwood"

Return to Nevèryon: A “Derridian-esque” Meditation.

By Wendy Galgan

Having finished Samuel R. Delany’s *Nevèryon* series, readers (we readers) stand at the Bridge of Lost Desire one final time, ready to journey beyond Kolhari and into other lands and other languages. But before we leave *Nevèryon*, before we slip silently past the old, nameless gods that guard the southern border of the land, we might take some time to reexamine some of the themes that Delany has woven through his stories, woven them in much the same way that yarns of gold and silver are woven through the finest cloth. This reexamination – this revisiting – I believe is one of the reasons Delany placed “The Tale of Gorgik” at the beginning **and** the end of all his tales of *Nevèryon*, for when we revisit Gorgik’s story after having read the entire epic, we discover that all of the components of all the tales had their beginnings in that first story. By returning to that tale, Delany gathers up all the yarns he has put through the loom of his storytelling and winds them together into one skein as a way of signaling (or, better yet, signifying) that his tales are finally at an end – for isn’t “to spin a yarn” also to tell a tale? Thus, Delany mentions weaving frequently, and in ways that show how the cloth being woven mirrors the text being written: “. . .she lingered at the loom for minutes, watching the pattern, with its greens, its beiges, its blues, extend itself, fixed and stable, line after line. . .” (*Return* 13). More than just suggesting the parallel between lines of text and lines of threads, however, Delany makes the connection between weaving and storytelling explicit, when Gorgik says, ““Yes, I have such memories. You have, too. We both return to them, now and again, to weave, unweave, and reweave the stories that make our lives comprehensible to us”” (32). Indeed, Delany casts himself – the teller of the *Nevèryon* story – as a weaver producing a tapestry, telling the reader, “But we have one more strand from the past to weave into our tale in order to reveal the smallest pattern in the present” (169).

Now that we readers have read all the tales of *Nevèryon*, now that we have seen Delany’s tapestry in its completeness, now that the epic’s fabric is laid out before us whole and entire, now that he has shown us that “smallest pattern in the present,” let us take a few minutes to trace the way in which those shining threads have been woven throughout the material. These threads are many, and are deftly worked into complicated and shifting patterns, but by looking at where the tapestry ends, that is, at *Return to Nevèryon*, we then will be equipped to trace them backwards, back into the whole of the *Nevèryon* epic.

Before we begin, however, I want to place a question into consideration, a question to which I do not have an answer. Here is a book with two of its three stories written in the mid- 1980s, one in 1985 and one in

1987. Thus I would ask you, in a book written during our own plague years (when we were all watching people we loved die before our eyes), in a book written at the height of the AIDS epidemic, what does it mean (or does it mean anything) when the very first word of the very first story is “no?” As I say, I have no answer; I may, in fact, be reading too much into that one word, but I cannot help but hear it as the *cri de coeur* of a man living in the midst of a pestilence that was killing people all around him. The presence of this illness, disguised and transformed as it is within the world of Nevèrÿon, becomes part of Delany’s strategy of resistance, his method of engaging with his readers (gay and straight, male and female) in an attempt to open up a necessary and difficult dialogue about AIDS. It is Delany’s way of using discourse to place himself in a position of power (by initiating the dialogue) while also acting from within a position of opposition/powerlessness to point toward the shortcomings of those holding the real power in AIDS discourse during the 1980s. As Michel Foucault wrote, “[w]e must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point or an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (101). In the days of the writing of *Return to Nevèrÿon*, it was silence that was killing people, and those writers who, like Delany, attempted to put into words what was happening, attempted to “undermine” and “expose” that silent discourse, found themselves trapped in the space Jean-Françoise Lyotard would call the *différend*. “In the *différend*, something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence. . . that they are summoned by language, not to augment to their profit the quantity of information communicable through existing idioms, but to recognize that which remains to be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase” (13). Whether this particular “no” of Delany’s means anything more than what it says or not, whether it is something crying out to be “put into phrases” or just a means of opening “The Game of Time and Pain,” I cannot say. But the plague to which it gestures, the disease which would become known as AIDS, that word becomes, of course, one of the threads woven throughout the Nevèrÿon epic. It is a dark thread, thick and purple, and it lends its color to all the stories written during our plague years.

One more thing before we turn to *Return to Nevèrÿon*. I have used the word “epic” three times now – very deliberately – to describe the Nevèrÿon series in its entirety, for I believe the work is truly an American epic. Written in postmodern times, the series does, of course, adapt some of the traditions of the epic, molding and changing them to fit both the modern-day sensibilities of the reader and the linguistic modalities inherent in what Delany calls “this most despised sub-genre of paraliterary production, sword-and-sorcery” (*Silent Interviews* 129). Instead of the Homeric hero – the one character who stands at the center of a classical epic and, by virtue of this privileged position, becomes the focus of the point-of-view through which we perceive the unfolding action – we follow a number of different characters throughout Nevèrÿon, becoming privy not only to their outward speech and action but also their interior dialogue. And yet...Delany does provide a focal character of sorts, for doesn’t every main character, at one point or another, meet or speak about or hear about Gorgik? There is no great war in the Nevèrÿon tales such as we find in the *Iliad* and yet there is a guerilla war being fought by Gorgik and his followers to end slavery,

and while most of the battles of Gorgik's war take place "off stage" in terms of the *Return to Nevèryon* narrative, we do "witness" some combat and hear of other instances of fighting between those who would end slavery and those who own slaves. In its very ambition – to trace the history of slavery in America **and** tell the story of the AIDS epidemic as it was being lived in the 1980s – the *Nevèryon* story is epic in scope and intention, and it plays out across a vast land and within the lives of many characters. Finally, I believe Delany gives us a clue that he, himself, views his work as an epic: by beginning and ending the series with "The Tale of Gorgik," he follows within the structure of his narrative the traditional definition of an "odyssey," which is a journey that begins and ends in the same place. Thus, Delany signals, through this allusion to Homer's *Odyssey*, that the tales of *Nevèryon* can, indeed, be read as an epic. For the purposes of this essay I will, of necessity, be focusing on *Return to Nevèryon*, which comprises the final chapters of the *Nevèryon* epic, but I believe it is important for the reader of the tales of *Nevèryon* to keep this epic structure in mind when examining the themes of the work. As we trace the myriad colors, the many themes, that Delany has woven into these tales of *Nevèryon*, we find some recurring frequently. It is these threads – gold and silver, iron and copper – that I would ask us to think about one more time before we leave the land of double-blades and dragons.

First, I would like to put a little pressure upon the name: Bridge of Lost Desire. Perhaps we could look for the Derridian *différance* in those two words, "lost" and "desire." For, is one destined to lose the object of one's desire that one has seen on the bridge, as Clodon wonders as he searches for the woman with perfect hands, feet and eyes (*Return* 157)? Or, is the bridge the place where one can find the desire that one had lost in the past, as do many of those who search for – and find – a willing partner in a sexual version of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic? Or, (and there's Derrida's favorite copula once again) does one risk losing one's desire by indulging one's lust on the bridge? And what of desire? Can we only desire what is absent? Is that what it means, then, to have a Bridge of Lost Desire – that the absent object, the desired object, can no longer be desired once it is present and available? Or, is it that, through our desire for the absent object, we become, in Kristeva's formulation, abject? That it is the gap that is telling and important? Gorgik speaks of how "the pause holds desire as much as it holds all my uncertainties about it" (*Return* 32), thus introducing Delany's formulation of desire as existing within the pause – indeed, Delany ends "The Tale of Rumor and Desire" by telling us, "You know what to read in the pause" (*Return* 213). So perhaps it is not true absence, but a momentary abeyance of language, that signifies desire. As Gorgik explains to Udrog in "The Game of Time and Pain":

'Tale tellers talk of lust as a fire that makes the body shiver as though cased in ice. But it's not the fire or the ice that characterizes desire, but the contradiction between them. Perhaps, then, we should go on calling it a pause, a split, a gap – a silence that, on either side, though it seems impassable, is one that, while we are in it and it threatens to shake us apart, it seems we will never escape.' (*Return* 53)

Perhaps that abeyance occurs within memory, and is signaled as a loss to the one who remembers, for, as "remembered, something is presently tensed in its loss" as a "*past* presence," a "strange intensity of not now and most surely now," an "intention of time," a "place of time" (Scott 55). And the silence Gorgik

mentions, that deadly silence of the *différend* against which Delany was fighting as he wrote his Nevèryon epic, becomes/remains both a loss and a yearning, something to both push against and to embrace as a part of a desire itself, as part of the abeyance of language.

But an abeyance of language, while it does hold “the pause” within itself, is – in and of itself – not exactly the location of desire, either, for it seems that desire (at least in Nevèryon) is very much rooted within the language act itself. The gap, the pause, is that instant of balance between the *remembering* of something and the *naming* of that something, that is, the *re-calling* of desire by naming it, by bringing it back before us through the use of the word, for when we use a word as a name “we reenact, or adopt, or reanimate, or entertain the thought of previous users of the same word or some part at least of that thought” (Barfield 24). In other words, we desire what has been named before, by us or by others, and by enacting and re-enacting that naming we bring desire forward into the pause, the gap, the space prepared for its reception within our acts of both speaking and listening. Delany himself has suggested elsewhere that speaking and listening are what constitute the desiring and the desired subject. “She or he who desires, listens,” Delany writes. “She or he who is desired, speaks . . . I might go so far as to say that to speak is to constitute oneself as a desired subject. To listen is to constitute oneself as a desiring subject. . .” (*Silent Interviews* 137). Perhaps, then, it is the resonance between and among the words and silences, the wholes and parts, of language, that help constitute the desire which we seek. If every word and sentence “causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole of the view of the world which lies behind it to appear” (Gadamer 415-16) – that is, for our purposes, if language’s resonance acts to display the desire that lies/hides/waits *behind* the words – then desire’s appearance, its display, must, of necessity, take place within the pause, within the gap. Desire balances and is balanced, is held by and held in abeyance by, the gap which is the pause which is, finally, the Derridian *différance*, “the (active *and* passive) movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving” (*Positions* 8). The play of interiority and exteriority, the presence and absence inherent in the language of desire (Derrida, *Grammatology*), serve to both bridge and widen the gap within which desire resides/waits. Yet, for Delany, that pause/gap/delay is found not only between those words and sentences that display desire, but in the difference between our desires and our experience:

The discrepancy between what we desire (want, wish for, expect) and what happens contours the space in which language repeatedly and repeatedly occurs. The discrepancy between what we say and what happens contours the space in which language repeatedly and repeatedly occurs. The discrepancy between what we say and what happens is the endlessly repeated locus of desire. And the discrepancy between what we desire and what we say revises and revises the space *of* what happens *to* what happens (our experience *of* our experience, if you will). Yet by the same tense tripartition, none of the three will ever be adequate to the other; and their inadequacies are a field for play, slippage, endless revisions and changes on and in all three. (*Silent Interviews* 158)

Thus, our *speaking our desire* is, perhaps, an incantation, an apostrophe, a summoning if you will; our “speech act is directed toward an object which is not yet present, has not yet appeared, is coming” (Welton

306), and that speech act summons the not-present object to the “field for play” and “slippage” that is inscribed within the locus of what we desire/what we say/what happens, described within Delany’s narrative.

There are other threads to follow, however, and our time grows short.

Metaphysics is woven throughout Delany’s linguistic tapestry. Indeed, near the end of “The Game of Time and Pain,” we find one of the neatest distillations of philosophical questioning I have seen in a fictional work. Gorgik is thinking about how he had defined himself against Lord Krodar, who is now dead:

When the old definitions are gone, he [Gorgik] thought, how we grasp about for new ones!

What am I, then?

And what is this ‘I’ that asks?

Yet to articulate them was to be aware of the split between them, between the mystical that asked them and the historical they asked of, between the unknowable hearing them and the determinable prompting them, so that finally he came to this most primitive proposition: only when such a split opened among the variegated responses to a variegated world *was* there any self. (Return 116)

Here, in eleven lines, we find Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger, Pascal, Kant and Augustine. Here, in eleven lines, we find the question of being examined sympathetically and articulately. Yet while metaphysics and its language are very much a part of the tales of Nevèrjôn, it is not just metaphysical language, but also the question of language itself that has become part of the warp and woof of Delany’s weavings – and it is within that question of language itself that Delany is able to gesture towards the question being raised by metaphysics; and to answer these questions, Delany returns time and again to tale-telling, history making, and the use of signs.

For Gorgik, it is the ability to be the story teller, to take hold of one’s history and the history of those around one, which defines the self. Gorgik describes the moment ““when. . . I gained my self, the self that seeks the truth, the self that, now and again in seeking it, becomes entangled in falsehood, error, and delusion, as well as outrage and pride – the self that tells the tales”” (Return 57). Notice that it is *within* language – truth, falsehood and the telling of tales – that Gorgik gains his *self*, his *being*. This is Gorgik’s recognition that we live within (*are* within, *exist* within) language, that language is “something by which we are sustained and in some senses encompassed” (Olafson 189). Later, as Gorgik moves from *being* a slave to *being* a soldier to *being* “the Liberator,” he comes to understand that “the self that tells the tales” takes into him-*self* the ability – the power – to construct history, both for himself and for those around him. Gorgik talks to people, and in the talking draws their stories from them, listening to the tales of slaves about to be freed (Return 74), and the stories told by the men and women who sell themselves on the

Bridge of Lost Desire (Return 220), and within this performance of talking/listening he takes into himself the ability to *be*, at least linguistically (that is, in his re- telling of their tales), the people whose stories he absorbs: “To tell a tale, [Gorgik had] often felt, was to take as much as you gave” (Return 116), and in the taking and the telling lies the very act of *being*, of *be*-coming, of *be*-lieving the story you are telling, the history you are constructing.

Yet, as the Handmaid and Vizerine Myrgot suggests in an imaginary conversation she has with Gorgik, it is not enough just to *be*, it is not even enough to collect the stories of other people’s *be*-ing. A person’s history will not outlive her if she does not make sure that others can tell her tale after she’s gone:

‘As Vizerine to the Empress, as Liberator to the land, you and I have lived those tales – yet even we, in these basic and barbaric times, would be hard put to tell them: we were too busy living them to attend to their narrative form. And neither of us thought to keep a mummer or a tale teller about to narrate them for ourselves and others, to give them a classic mold. We must satisfy ourselves, then, with empty signs, marginal mutterings, attending rather to the celebratory engine of someone else’s distant and speculative art.

‘Will someone someday ever essay their rich specificity? No, I will never hear mine related. I doubt you will ever hear yours. However laudable our actions, as tales neither aids enough men now in power.’

(Return 113)

The tales of the Liberator and the tales of the Vizerine will be lost, because they will not be remembered; and they will not be remembered because, in addition to not being useful to those in power, they will not be written down. For it is in the writing that a tale is truly preserved. It is within writing that knowledge “becomes stratified,” that “deposits of knowledge accumulate like tools and the works which result from them. Concretely, it is writing and especially printing which have permitted knowledge to accumulate and leave traces.” On “the basis of this sedimentation, the quest for knowledge, like the technical pursuit, is irreversible. For all new thought uses the thought of the past as a tool or instrument and in this way carries history forward” (Ricoeur 83). And because neither Myrgot nor Gorgik have written down the stories of their lives (despite their both being able to write), and because they have not thought to have a tale teller form their lives into narratives as those lives were being lived, there is little possibility that their own histories will be carried forward.

There is, however, a suggestion within what the Vizerine says that perhaps the histories of Gorgik and Myrgot would not be preserved even if they were written down, because they do not aid the “men now in power.” And here we find ourselves back within/amid the question of power and language, back in Foucault’s suggestion that both power and powerlessness exist within the use of language, back in Lyotard’s *différend* as it was in the 1980s, where the men in power used language – and silence – to control debate about the illness killing gay (read: powerless) men. “Language,” Delany writes in “Appendix: Closures

and Openings,” “is first and foremost a *stabilizer* of behavior, thought, and feeling, of human responses and reactions – both for groups and for individuals. . . .Language is a stabilizer among our responses to the world and to our problems in it” (Return 274-75). It follows, then, that those men in power have used/are using/will continue to use, language as a means of keeping public discourse (and public action and reaction) under control.

And with this, the question of power, we come to the overarching theme of the Nevèryon stories. That theme is, of course, slavery. Its iron-and-blood- red thread runs end-to-end and side-to-side throughout the entire linguistic tapestry that comprises the tales of Nevèryon, and it is ever and always interwoven with the metallic gold threads of power. As I suggested before, we find Hegel’s master/slave dialectic embodied in the slave collar worn by Gorgik and Noyeed. When Clodon encounters the undertaker’s son in “The Tale of Rumor and Desire,” the son bids Clodon to wear an unlocked slave collar and go sell himself on the Bridge of Lost Desire: “If you wear a slave collar; and if you carry the scars of a marked rebel; and if you stand out on the Bridge of Lost Desire – well, these, taken all together, become a kind of sign. . . .What all those signs mean, brought together and placed in the positions that we have discussed, as I’m sure you have now understood, is that you. . .are the Master” (Return 174-75). Delany, however, makes very clear the idea that, while there can be a blurring of the roles of Master and slave when an unlockable collar is worn by a man who chooses to wear it, no such blurring occurs when the man in the collar is, in truth, a slave – and this is because the Master holds a terrible power over his slave. A locked collar, and the slavery it signifies, steal the humanity, the very *being*, of the one who wears it:

‘Everything that allowed thought to become word, idea to become act, or plan to become practice had been shucked, stunned, petrified. . . .The lesson was that, when you are oppressed, your acts, even if gratuitous, must not only be, but must seem, aimless, random, purposeless. . . .I was to [*sic.*] cowed even to consider the linkage moment makes with moment to create the history that, despite our masters, is never inevitable, only more or less negotiable. . . .[T]he self which gives life meaning had been banished from my body.’ (Return 35)

Gorgik, who speaks the above lines during his recitation of a tale of his own life, was able to recover his lost self, “the self that tells the tales,” but even as he recovered that self Gorgik realized that he could gain his own physical freedom from slavery and that would still not be enough: “I knew I would not be content till I had seized. . .freedom and power for myself, even though I knew I had to seize the former for every slave in Nevèryon – before I could truly hold the latter” (Return 55).

Slavery has been written onto the human body, and into the lives of the people, within Nevèryon. Slavers can capture anyone – barbarian or Kolhari alike – who is vulnerable and alone outside the city’s borders, and those in power, those who control social and political discourse, can make a slave of whomever they choose. Gorgik realizes that he must, through *whatever means necessary*, fight to end the institution of slavery in his world. At the beginning, that means physical battle with slave owners and those who supported them. But as time goes on, Gorgik comes to realize that he must enter into the halls of power himself; he must no longer define himself merely as the opposite of Lord Krodar, the man fighting to

prevent slavery's abolition, but must instead learn the signs and signifiers that make up the *language* of power within the High Court of Eagles. Gorgik explains,

‘. . .as I came within the walls of the council room with a voice and a vote and at last the title of equal, my enemy was suddenly my teacher, my critic, my exemplar. He was the mirror I had to look into to learn what I was to do. . . .’ ([Return 31](#))

Yet even as he realizes that the mirroring he must perform in relation to Lord Krodar is in some ways no longer the reversal/opposition/resistance it was originally, even as he realizes he must adopt the grammar and syntax of the Court, Gorgik continues to define his very *self* against Krodar. Thus, when Krodar dies, Gorgik finds himself (almost literally) off-balance:

He'd [Gorgik] defined himself so long by his opposition to this dead lord, it was as if – at the death – he'd been pushing against a mountain to have it collapse into a field over which he'd gone staggering and reeling; as if, running across a plain, he'd gone over a cliff, into the air, flying, flailing, falling; as if he'd woken with an unspeakable power that felled all he looked at so that even as he gazed around to assess the damages, he'd only wrecked more. ([Return 116](#))

Here, then, we find a metaphor for the transfer of political power, and it is power of the most dangerous kind, for in its own way the power of the Court – its intrigues, its punishments and rewards, its full and ebb tides – holds captive those who live within it. This power is Byzantine and tyrannical, for “the hierarchy of prestige branched;. . .the branches interwove; and. . .the interweavings in several places formed perfectly closed, if inexplicable, loops” within the High Court; all the “elegant lords and ladies” were slaves to it, to “power, pure, raw and obsessive” ([Return 241, 43](#)). Yet, for Gorgik, gaining power for himself is the only sure means to end slavery, so he works to gain it and, upon gaining it, brings about the end of slavery for the people of Nevèryon.

Is this, then, Delany's answer to the silence of the *différend* of the 1980s? Perhaps it is. Perhaps he is suggesting that, rather than slave within the silence (for, as we heard over and over again during our plague years, *Silence=Death*) we should push against it (the silence, and its companion, death). Suggesting that, somehow, the tales of Nevèryon speak to our own tales of time and pain, rumor and desire. Suggesting that, like Gorgik, we must develop our own strategy of resistance. Suggesting that we should stand in opposition to the discourse that is both an “instrument” and an “effect” of power and, instead, speak out from the *différend*, claiming for ourselves and for all the powerless the grammar and syntax of our own High Court of Eagles. Suggesting that the pain and death of silence must, once and for all, be “put into phrases” and brought out into the public discourse.

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Carnavalesque and Bifurcated Labels: Writing the Tale¹

By Laura Madeline Wiseman

My analysis in this piece will focus on two texts as instances of breaking

normative narratives. This paper explores the music video *What it Feels Like for a Girl* and the film *Freeway*. First, this inquiry aims to explore the music video, specifically the ways in which Madonna's body and the bodies of others are represented there within. I will consider how Madonna embodies ideals of the carnivalesque, by incorporating theories of the grotesque and the unruly. More specifically, this essay utilizes the theories as posited by Mary Russo in "Female Grotesques: Carnival and Theory," and by Kathleen Rowe in *The Unruly Woman: Gender and the Genres of Laughter*. Second, this analysis will explore the film *Freeway* and Reese Witherspoon's character, Vanessa. I will consider how Vanessa embodies both the victim and the survivor. Thus, this essay employs a theory on bifurcated terminology as posited by Tami Spry in "In the Absence of Word and Body: Hegemonic Implications of 'Victim' and 'Survivor' in Women's Narratives of Sexual Violence." In both instances, my analysis in this piece will incorporate feminist theory that depicts the female body as a subject. An integral part of this reading is the concept of the embodiment of the carnivalesque and dichotomous labels as subversive acts. Moreover, I will argue that the characters embodied by Madonna and Reese Witherspoon are subversive and work to restructure the normative tales of female subjectivity.

Carnavalesque: Grotesque on the Loose

Mary Russo discusses female grotesque in "Female Grotesques: Carnival and Theory," and articulates the body as the site of female contamination and resistance. She suggests that the carnivalesque destabilizes binary categories and presents momentary expressions of transgression. Thus, a spectacle allows for the questioning of difference and reproduction or counterproduction of knowledge. In this piece I will take the idea as grotesque as a body that morphs and changes, a body that loses boundaries, and as the synthesis of old and young bodies. But, how is Madonna grotesque?

Perhaps in part, Madonna is grotesque because of her ability to morph and change. She plays, subverts, and recreates the "ideals" of conventional versions of womanhood, motherhood, virgin, and whore, and thus

resists the dichotomizing categories allotted to women in western society. Russo writes, “The grotesque body is open, extended, protruding, [it is the] secreting body, the body of becoming, process and change” (219). As such, her body is not “natural,” because she is always becoming something or someone else. The old woman in *What it Feels Like for a Girl* is an integral part in understanding Madonna as grotesque. In this video, the only women who are featured are Madonna, the old woman, and a chubby waitress. Where popular culture might deem a woman of forty-four as old, next to an elderly woman, forty-four is quite young. In this context, Madonna becomes the youngest and the most beautiful. She is grotesque because she morphs and changes into what is popular in culture: youthful images.

Grotesque is also a loss of boundaries. A closer examination of the old woman reveals that she is absolutely dependent on Madonna. She cannot move her body, push up her glasses, stand by herself, or walk to another car. The older woman is the epitome of the patriarchal model of what a woman should be: she lacks agency, is dependent, and comes along for the ride. And the question the viewing audience may be asking is: why would Madonna want to hang out with someone old? Russo offers a possible explanation: “For a woman, making a spectacle out of herself had more to do with a kind of inadvertency and loss of boundaries...yet anyone, any woman, could make a spectacle out of herself if she was not careful” (Russo 213). Madonna seems to purposely make a spectacle out of herself as she allies herself with the spectacle itself: the old woman and female old age. She seems to joke at the mockery of old age by caring for it. It is as though she’s saying this old body is you, not you in 70 years, but you right now. Thus, her message embraces age as the boundary that divides women but also severs that divide by taking it by the arm. And so, Madonna is grotesque because she eradicates the boundaries between object and abject and herself and other. More specifically, Madonna is the spectacle.

Grotesque is a coupling or merging of youth and death, epitomized as the pregnant hag. In part, Madonna is loathed by ageist social perceptions in this video because the old woman and Madonna are blurred into one entity. Madonna is the “pussy cat;” the old woman is the “ol’ kunt.” Hence, simply they are versions of the same self. Rowe writes, “[The pregnant hag] is loaded with all the connotations of fear and loathing associated with the biological process of production and of ageing” (219). As such, the fear of aging is the fear of death. The last scene is an interesting example of the brutality in a video that is writhing with violence. One might ask: Does Madonna die? Does the older woman? On the contrary, I am wondering, does it matter? Madonna assists in the death of the old woman by euthanasia, MTV style. Cloaked in black, Madonna as death gives the old woman the time of her life and then helps her end it. Hailing Dickenson: “Because I could not stop for death/ He kindly stopped for me;/ The carriage held but just ourselves/ And Immortality” (Dickenson). Madonna is grotesque because she is aiding in the death ritual of someone who is considered useless in our culture. This act is subversive because Madonna stays in the car and joins her in the end. This further suggests that Madonna and the old woman are one and the same: the pregnant hag. Taking this into account, I do not think the death scene as insignificant. The “pregnant hag” crashes straight into and wraps the car around the phallic symbol of the light pole. More specifically, it is the live death-womb violently swallowing the phallus. It is this repulsion of the female reproduction and aging that makes women grotesque. Madonna is grotesque because she couples life with death and welds them together in one night of adventure that ends in a vicious destruction.

Unruly with Mouths Wide Open

Madonna is carnivalesque and grotesque because she couples life with death, loses boundaries, and morphs and changes. But is she unruly? In Russo's essay, she suggests that women are unruly when they fail to control their mouth, either through consumption or exclamation, and when they claim cultural symbols of power. This next section of the paper will detail how Madonna in *What it Feels Like for a Girl*, embodies Russo's unruly woman qualities. Accordingly, I argue Madonna eats too much and co-opts cultural emblems of power for her own advantage.

Madonna is unruly because she eats as she pleases. Through the entire second half of *What it Feels Like for a Girl*, Madonna crashes into cars, brakes up a hockey game, and steadily feeds her face. Madonna eats French fries, the fat, greasy essential of the fast food consumer market. Russo writes:

That the unruly woman eats too much and speaks too much is no coincidence; both involve failure to control the mouth... [it] is a more generalized version of that other, more ambivalently conceived female orifice, the vagina. Together they imply an intrinsic relation among female fatness, female garrulousness, and female sexuality. (37)

Moreover, in a society where women are expected to be thin and told by *Cosmo* to eat salads on first dates, Madonna is not following the rules imposed by a patriarchal and capitalistic culture. In this way, Madonna normalized her behavior as the voyeuristic pleasure of a woman's mouth engulfing what women are not "allowed" to eat, and thereby also mocking what women's mouths are "allowed" to eat. Thus, Madonna's gluttonous consumption is deemed an unruly act.

Unruly also means to claim cultural images of power; in this video it is violence. As mentioned, the media criticizes *What it Feels Like for a Girl's* violence. On the contrary, violence on MTV is not new. Think of, for example: *Jackass*. This MTV run show, and now movie, features predominantly male characters as the instigators of violence and destructible behavior as entertainment to illicit laughter from the audience. This said, violent power on MTV is a power that is predominantly, if not exclusively, reserved for men. Rowe writes that the "unruly woman's rebellion against her proper place not only inverts the hierarchical relation between the sexes but unsettles one of the most fundamental of social distinctions—that of male and female. The woman on top is neither where she belongs nor in any other legitimate position... The taboos placed on her suggest that her power arises ... from the need to enforce conformity to a particular set of beliefs in which gender is a critical linchpin" (43). Gender is critical here. Madonna claims the top position in this video by explicating that a woman can perpetrate and commit violence. This does not necessarily imply that women carry out violence in equal numbers or in acts of equal severity as men, as research has shown that violence is indeed gendered. Rather, Madonna's use of violence in this video seems to mock violence and its social power itself. This is similar to another Madonna video, *Music*, and her performance as the pimp or sexual voyeur at a strip club. In *What it Feels Like for a Girl*, Madonna suggests that violence

is yet another face she can claim—*Music* one day and stun-gun toting, Camero-driving, bad-ass-mother-fucker the next! Madonna is unruly because she claims the cultural symbol of power: violence.

Bifurcated Labels: Victimization Act I

This section of the paper will analyze *Freeway*, the “modern” *Little Red Ridinghood* adaptation, starring Brook Shields, Reese Witherspoon, and Keifer Sutherland. It aims to explore Reese Witherspoon’s character, Vanessa, and the dissonance created when she embodies both victim and survivor. Tami Spry conjectures in “In the Absence of Word and Body: Hegemonic Implications of ‘Victim’ and ‘Survivor’ in Women’s Narratives of Sexual Violence,” that patriarchal narrations focus and confine subjects’ understanding of self only in relation to male centrality. This confining narrative does little to truly delineate the actual and diverse experiences of the individual women who experience rape or sexual assault. She writes, “Survivor/victim categories perpetuate and reify the powerful symbol of the powerless woman” (Spry 3). Thus, Vanessa as Little Red Riding hood becomes the powerless woman as she is “victimized” by various individuals, including the wolf (here: Keifer Sutherland’s character, Bob Wolverton). Accordingly, I will argue that Vanessa is victimized by the guidance and the perception of others.

Vanessa assumes the identity of the victim because others guide her to believe she is a victim. For her to be a victim, she must accept that the androcentric view of sexual assault and violence is the correct perception in which to understand an experience. More specifically, “males” or those who hold the “phallus” possess the power to read cultural scripts. Spry suggests that the body/mind split in the Western or European framework renders the body feminized and illiterate. She writes, “What is revealed to [the victimized woman] and her culture is the sexually assaulted body as the site of illiteracy. Any claims made from this site are thus viewed as illiterate, easily dismissed or denied” (Spry 3). As such, the opening scene is no coincidence. In the film sixteen-year-old Vanessa is shown attempting to read the sentence “A cat drinks milk” as her teacher helps with “me-ow” and “think s.” Her literal illiteracy necessitates direction to read a myriad of other texts, including her body, experiences, and self-perceptions. Juvenile therapist Bob Wolverton befriends Vanessa and encourages her to avoid keeping traumas “bottled up inside.” What Bob wants to know are the details of the sexual abuse by Vanessa’s stepfather and how they made her feel. Bob strongly encourages Vanessa to express her feelings about the molestations out loud. Thus, Bob as a vehicle for translation, influences Vanessa’s conceptualization of the sexual encounters and moves the focal point of inquiry to the stepfather’s power and her powerlessness. Sex, as a tool of victimization, is further centralized on the phallus or penis and principally what it did or could do to the victim. When Bob asks Vanessa if when her stepfather ejaculated into her mouth she felt like she had been transformed into a human urinal, Vanessa initially resists this understanding, but Bob forces her to say: “I felt like I had been transformed into a human urinal.” That is, Bob as a symbol of cultural power resituates Vanessa’s understanding of experiences and assists in reading her body as a victim. And so, Vanessa’s illiteracy is transmitted to her entire body that demands guidance and is thereby read as a victim by others.

Labeling can be done by the self or by others. Vanessa is also a victim because others in the diegesis of *Freeway* read her as a victim. Vanessa's illiteracy fosters an opportunity for outside opinions to achieve and be maintained as valid interpretations of subjectivity. Spry writes, "When the body is erased or used as a symbol to silence itself, knowledge situated within the body is unavailable to the self, or if discovered, ridiculed as base or profane" (Spry 3). Knowledge must come from outside the body because the body, particularly the female body, is silenced through its cultural illiteracy. Specifically, Bob's paternalistic manner helps Vanessa recognize how her stepfather began the sexual abuse. Bob says, "So you became the woman of the house." Bob's clarification and insight is followed by Vanessa's nodding acknowledgement. "Yeah. Yeah," she says. Moreover, Vanessa's body becomes incomprehensible to her mind and the mind/body split is thus integrated on the individual level. That is, the body becomes foreign, confusing, and separate from the mind. Additionally, as Vanessa recounts and emphasizes her innocence, Bob guides her to think of herself as he sees her: a victim. He says, "Make no mistake about it. You are the victim." Bob colonizes Vanessa's understanding of her experience by centralizing his interpretation as the correct and authoritative version of events. Thus, Vanessa is a victim because others perceive her as such.

Survivor Act II

Naming experience is one tool that feminists have suggested empowers and resituates narratives in women's lives. Feminist movements like *V-Day*, *Take Back the Night*, *Abortion Speak Outs*, and *Consciousness Raising* cultivate moments of repositioning women as the survivors and *knowers* of their encounter. Spry suggests that the victim/survivor dichotomy negates the possibility for women to have self agency because their position is always in reference to the phallus. She writes: "[s]he is already and always held in relation to the phallus; she is victim to it or survivor of it," (Spry 1). Like the victim, the survivor is a two-fold or positive-feedback system and always in relation to the transmitted knowledge of the phallus. The survivor must have perceived agency from others and she must believe she has agency; she must have one to have the other. I will argue that Vanessa is a survivor because the system of incarceration views Vanessa as having agency and she in turn comes to recognize this agency.

A survivor is one with perceived agency or ability to fight off the assailant, attacker, or phallus. Vanessa is perceived by the institutions of law, discipline and punishment as a survivor of not only sexual assault but also "the system." Taking into account her upbringing (Vanessa's mother and stepfather have been imprisoned repetitively) administrators of "the system" render Vanessa as an inevitable subject of an inherited conduit. Essentially, in this episteme it is the officials' moral duty to intercede on behalf of the greater public and promote Vanessa's permanent incarceration. At the age of sixteen, Vanessa has already been arrested and convicted eleven times: seven for shoplifting, three for arson, and once for soliciting. Accordingly, Spry proposes that the female body evokes the ideology that it is "always and already overpowered by the "phallus or the threat of the powerful (violent) phallus" (Spry 3). In order for the institutions of patriarchy to remain intact, representatives of the law must overpower the female body and thereby reinstate the correct position of that body. Spry further articulates this:

...her survived or victimized body is evidence for the appropriateness of the predominant discursive acts used to describe her experience. The emblem of her overpowered body reifies the images created by the linguistic categories – evidence for the existence of patriarchy. (Spry 3)

As such, Vanessa's prior victimization and incarceration is used as "evidence" to support the claim that the young female body once abused was itself producing the abuse. It is her body that is always about to illicit and produce this assault. And more specifically, she is the imminent threat and is therefore responsible for all sexual and criminal advances she received. Hence, when the African American cop remarks, "just doing what came natural," on the soliciting arrest, he is insisting that her sexual criminality is the innate means by which she maneuvers, utilizes, and profits for herself in exchange for the losses of (read: male) others. Moreover, when the executive case worker in the juvenile detention center inscribes Vanessa as one with "anti-social personality disorder" and as a "sophisticated criminal," she further marks Vanessa as one who will always survive the almightily and powerful phallus (institutions) and never be broken by it (them). According to this sexist framework, she is incarcerated for the sexual and delinquent activity she never enacted, but which she is, by virtue of her female body, always about to enact. Thus, Vanessa is a survivor because others believe and read her subjectivity as one that enacts agency.

A survivor is also one who believes they possess agency. Vanessa had, as Spry articulates, "fought the phallus and won" (Spry 1). Vanessa is a survivor because in each instance she is confronted by the phallus, she disallows re-victimization to occur. When Bob attempts to sexually degrade and violate her, she physically attacks him and pulls out her gun. She renegotiates the situations and forbids Bob to take advantage of her. She says, "You want to get shot a whole bunch of times." And later, Vanessa continually reinstates her survivor status by demonstrating her ability to articulate what her agency did to Bob when he threatened to "do sex to my dead body." She says to Bob in the courtroom, "Look who got hit with the ugly stick... I hope you think of me every time you empty [your shit bag], mother fucker." As noted before, Vanessa's incarceration does not impede her ability to perform and assert her agency to those who attempt to deprive her of it. Further, inside the juvenile center she employs skills (here: a toothbrush knife) her parents taught her to escape. As an agent of her own goals (here: to get to grandma's house), Vanessa subverts the various institutions that wish to contain her. And so, Vanessa is a survivor because she enacts her own agency.

Conclusion

Throughout this paper I have considered Madonna's video *What it Feels Like for a Girl* and the character Vanessa in the film *Freeway*. Each analysis delineates instances of rupture in the phallogocentric episteme and provides opportunities for extensive exploration. I will conclude with a brief articulation on how these instances help to write new tales that diverge from androcentric stories of femininity and female embodiment.

In this inquiry of *What it Feels Like for a Girl*, I have explored Russo and Rowe's idea of the grotesque and unruly. This examination has illustrated how in this video Madonna quite intentionally embodies these ideals as expressed by Russo and Rowe. This said, I would like to take this theorizing one step farther. Russo suggests, "...carnival and the carnivalesque suggest a redeployment or counterproduction of culture, knowledge, and pleasure" (218). In this context, Madonna is producing an alternative to maleness and consumer culture by parodying the aspects of "women" that are repulsive and taking on the aspects of "men" that are valued. Hence, throughout the video Madonna redeploys and centralizes the grotesque and unruly woman as the "woman" to titillate the MTV guided male point of view, rather than traditional ideologies of femininity promulgated by the media. Accordingly, the ending is no surprise. This hag is laughing.

In the critique of *Freeway*, I have employed Spry's theory on the bifurcated terms survivor and victim. This analysis has demonstrated how in this film, Vanessa embodies qualities of both victim and survivor and thus is neither and both. Spry suggests that for women to break from this dichotomy, they must begin to write from the body and create what she calls a "liberatory epistemology" (Spry 4). Her assertion is that women should tell and perform their stories in a Judith Butler manner of "performativity." She writes that the body "is not dislocated or erased from her thoughts; rather it is seen as a site where diverse and intimate truths are inscribed within, upon, and around it" (Spry 4). Vanessa must recognize that her body is a text that she can read and the illiteracy is only a fragmentation forced by patriarchal institutions. More specifically, it is in this moment of non-truth that Vanessa disregards authority because, as she indicates in the film, she "told the truth and truth is eternity." As such, as Vanessa restarts her trek to grandma's house, she beats men at their own game. She says: "I'm pissed off and the whole world owes me." Her actions create continual instances of subversion and work to decompose patriarchal institutions of punishment and privileged male arenas of female sexualized objectification. And so, her behavior reconstructs a place that disallows the bifurcated labels victim and survivor.

What is remarkable in both of these texts is their ability to narrate possible instances of subversion in the androcentric story. In each text, women embody labels and identities that operate in patriarchal culture to alienate and deprive them of agency. Strikingly, when one seizes upon the grotesque and unruly, the survivor and victim, this system of female containment and naming ruptures. Hence, the phallogentric tale is eradicated and a new story is written. However, it is important to note the contextual place of these texts in popular culture. The Madonna video was aired only once and then banned from both MTV and VH1 due to its violent content. The film *Freeway* was slotted straight for cable, but after a Siskel and Ebert "two thumbs up," did make a short circuit of theaters in some larger cities. Thus, both texts had a limited and time dependent audience viewing. Rather, these texts are a glitch in a system that permits only certain types of stories to be told. Accordingly, other stories can be told, but will not remain mainstreamed.

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Notes

- ¹ Early versions of this essay were presented at New Directions in Critical Theory: The Borders, Territories, Frontier's Conference in April 2004 and Theory Matters Graduate Conference in April 2003.

A Jakobsonian Approach to Film Adaptations of Hugo's *Les Misérables*.

By Corinne Lhermitte

Film adaptation is a research area that remains surprisingly under-theorized, and motion pictures inspired from literary works are still primarily evaluated in terms of fidelity to the “sacred” originals. Scant attention is given to filmmakers’ innovative techniques, and no goals or aesthetic criteria have been clearly set for film adaptation. Yet, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, Jacques Derrida and others have clearly demonstrated that an “original” work is an abstract notion hard to define and virtually impossible to duplicate in film. Since it is always possible to make a film out of a novel, the controversy at the basis of film adaptation is not feasibility. The debate rests essentially on a misconception of the objectives of film adaptation and on a misunderstanding of the transformation process. What is film adaptation expected to achieve? What happens during the process of transformation? In fact, few scholars and critics have attempted to determine the criteria used to define a successful adaptation.

In 1992, in an article titled “Film (Adaptation) as Translation: Some Methodological Proposals”, Patrick Cattrysse urged scholars worldwide to expand the field of translation claiming that: “although some theoreticians try to broaden the concept of translation studies, this does not apparently happen without difficulties” (68). He concluded by adding: “there seems to be no valuable argument to keep reducing the concept of translation to mere cross-linguistic transfer processes. The scope has to be extended to a contextualistic semiotic perspective” (68). Seven years later, in an article published in the Romance Languages Annual, Millicent Marcus echoed Cattrysse’s call, arguing that: “because high-tech adaptations complicate the process of cultural recycling by moving to a different order of language –that of audio-visual spectacle—we would do well to invoke another paradigm –that of translation paradigm– to help us theorize this shift (xx). Both researchers emphasized the need to open the way to a new field of research involving inter-disciplinary studies and taking into account the common transformational process at the core of translation and film adaptation. However, to this date, there have been only few isolated attempts to link cinematic adaptation to translation theory.

The first part on of this article examines film adaptation in light of translation and semiotic theories, and

explores similarities and differences inherent in both processes as an attempt to lay the foundations of an aesthetics of adaptation derived from the theory of translation. The second part of this article proposes a new approach to film adaptation and applies Jakobson's translation theory to various cinematic adaptations of *Les Misérables*.

Translation is generally seen as a binary system involving a relationship between two distinct languages. It is associated with bilingualism. Foreign language teachers, translators, interpreters and bilingual speakers readily come to our mind when we think of translation. Foreignness, difference, fear, cultural mores and customs are all imbedded in the term. Yet, the main purpose of translation is to get across a message previously not understood by a target audience, using a comprehensible language. Communication is a major factor at the origin of translation. It stems from a desire to interact with other people for a variety of reasons; economic, political, humanitarian or pedagogical. Roman Jakobson has taught us that translation can take place between distinct languages (inter-translation), between two systems of signs (intersemiotic translation) and even within the same language (intra-translation). Human beings resort to the latter type of translation when they feel the need to explain or clarify a concept, reword a complex sentence or if they want to be better understood by children, students etc. All instructors, parents, administrators, technicians, politicians, and ordinary citizens use this strategy on a daily basis to improve the communication of a message. Teachers, without exception, practice intra-lingual translation for pedagogical reasons. English, mathematics, physics and foreign language teachers alike have to use a simpler terminology to explain new vocabulary and sophisticated words. Intralingual translation is probably the most widely used type of translation worldwide.

In 1963, Jakobson defined a third type of translation—particularly relevant to film adaptation—as intersemiotic translation. This type of translation is of particular interest to us, for it involves the conversion of a particular system of signs into a different configuration. Musical, artistic and cinematic adaptations, as well as computer programming hinging on the relationship between two distinct modes of representation, all enter into this category. Intersemiotic translation may involve the conversion of a literary text into an opera (*Carmen*), a musical (*Les Misérables*), a painting (representation of scenes taken from the Bible), or most commonly a film (*Madame Bovary*). Unfortunately, these artistic representations are typically viewed as finished products and the process of transformation, which is an essential part of their production, is often overlooked. As for film adaptations, critics frequently brand them as derivative, inaccurate and unfaithful, and little attention is given to aesthetic and innovative techniques.¹ Yet, if more studies would focus on the intermediary phase separating a literary work from its offspring as well as on the emotional, political, social and cultural environment surrounding them, we might be able to better comprehend the successive changes occurring during the process of transformation.

The great number of literary works adapted to the screen by international film directors is a testimony of the obvious mingling of literature and cinema, as well as the influence of literary works on narrative strategies of motion pictures. We should not overlook that, as soon as cinema evolved from an erratic and loosely controlled flow of life images as it was for the Lumière Brothers' films, to become sheer narrative in the mid 1900s, it often borrowed its plots from literary sources in an attempt to translate and recreate

them on screen. The ambivalent nature of film adaptations that “can be seen as a kind of multileveled negotiation of intertexts” (Naremore 67) seems an appropriate point of departure toward laying the foundations of an aesthetics based on a dialectical exchange between literature and cinema. It seems that one of the major misunderstandings about motion pictures stems from their heterogeneous nature. They are made of diverse components—films are altogether written text, speech, sound, music, performance and images—and evaluating their aesthetic properties is a major challenge. Given that the term “adaptation” was first used to describe a particular mode of translation long before it was applied to cinema, we can assume that the long tradition of translation studies, spanning from Plato to Derrida, provides a helpful background for the building of a film adaptation theory.

Translation and adaptation share many common characteristics, but the main focus of this article is on the etymological, cultural and textual aspects of adaptation.

The first similarity that comes to mind, when comparing adaptation with translation, is semantics. Used during the Middle Ages to define a specific practice of translation, adaptation was considered as a sub-genre of translation, which became very fashionable during the century with *Les Belles Infidèles*.² The same term was later applied to cinema, in 1912, to qualify the transfer from written material to visual images.

Defined by Webster as: “the act or process of adapting, fitting or modifying” as well as “the state or condition of being adapted or adjusted” (23), adaptation, like translation, is viewed both as a state and a process of transformation epitomizing a subtle blending of sameness and difference. Inspired by a literary work, but not quite equivalent to it, adaptation, whose main purpose is to bring across and to modify, claims its “differing” status from the start. As many scholars such as Douglas Kelly, Roger Zuber and Hendrick Van Gorp have demonstrated, adaptations have been very influential in the evolution of genres as well as in the renewal or recycling of previous literary works. Therefore, it would be more fruitful to view them as hybrid products containing traces of a source text rather than plain clones. Paradoxically, since adaptation suggests the existence of primary texts, it is the favorite target of a moralist discourse in search of fidelity of the film to the “original work.” Consequently, both processes are often considered as a lower form of creation that cannot escape what Barbara Folkart names the “entropy effect” or, slow degradation of an “original” work. They are hardly evaluated in terms of aesthetic creativity and originality. Their task, however, is rather significant since adaptation not only replicates a primary text but, as Walter Benjamin stressed it, they also ensure the afterlife of the original and the propagation of cultural elements contained in it.

The second significant feature shared by translation and film adaptation is at the level of a cultural transfer. As we know, adaptation or translation is more than a sheer linguistic shift since it entails the transmission and communication of “cultural capital.” In *Constructing Cultures*, André Lefevere stresses the major role played by translation in the dissemination of literary works and claims that: “cultural capital is transmitted, distributed, and regulated by means of translation, among other factors, not only between cultures, but also within one given culture” (41). As a process of encoding and decoding, film adaptation, much

like translation, fulfills a similar task. By taking literary works to the screen, film adaptations widen the scope of their readership, offering them greater visibility. Metaphors are changed into more comprehensible images, idiomatic expressions are replaced by explicit phrases and cultural rites are explained or transposed in an effort to make them more accessible to the reader. In the process, adaptors cannot ignore the cultural background of the target culture and must “negotiate” the interaction of the audience with the source text. The trade-off between two elements—two historical periods, two cultures, two media and/or two languages—is at the core of film adaptation. Whether the transfer takes place within the same culture or between different cultures—displacement in time and/or space occurs.

Cultural references and metaphors are sometimes difficult to transfer to the screen, and they undergo significant changes during the conversion of a novel into a screenplay—first transformational step leading to the production of a film. The linguistic transfer occurring during the rewriting phase is a critical step involving a number of arbitrary decisions. The inevitable textual shift resulting from the transformation of a novel into a script is another common feature shared by cinematic adaptation and translation. Evidently, there are obvious differences between the single-track translation of a novel, which only deals with words, and the multi-track medium of cinema, which not only combines words (written and spoken), but also actors’ performance, music, sound effects and moving images. However, although translation or film adaptation deals with different media, they both involve the transformation of a source text into a target text. This can be either a text translated into a foreign language (interlinguistic translation), the rewording of a text within the same language (intralinguistic translation) or the intralinguistic or interlinguistic writing of a script. In the case of film adaptation, the process is more complex as the target text is later translated into visual images (intersemiotic translation). In some instances, such as in the Luchino Visconti’s and Harold Pinter’s ambitious adaptations of a Proust’s novel, some scripts never reach the last stage of completion and do not always undergo an intersemiotic translation. These transcripts, that were never produced, bear witness to the textual transformation at play in the process of adaptation, as they constitute the first necessary stage in cinematic adaptation.

The kinship between film adaptation and literary translation is best illustrated through detailed analyses of films inspired from novels. In this section, several adaptations and transpositions of *Les Misérables*, produced by French and foreign directors, are used to exemplify the intralingual, interlingual and intersemiotic transfers at play in film adaptation. Victor Hugo’s novel, which has been translated in more than thirty languages, and adapted to the screen some thirty eight times, was chosen for its worldwide visibility and the broad array of adaptations ranging from French adaptations faithful to the time and space to Japanese transpositions taking place during the Second World War. Hugo’s novel is used to support the assumption that film adaptation should not be reduced to “intersemiotic translation” but also ought to be assessed in terms of “intralingual” and “interlingual” transfers. The analysis of various adaptations and transpositions of *Les Misérables* reveals how the contrastive filmic techniques deployed by the filmmakers often coincide with specific translation techniques such as the “visibility” or “invisibility” of the translator developed by Lawrence Venuti, as well as censorship. It must be noted that the term *transposition* is used here to refer to a cinematic version displaced in time and/or space, while the generic term *adaptation* designates an adaptation faithful to time and space. When the transposition takes place within the same

culture but in a time frame different from that of the source text, the process of transformation becomes equivalent to an “intralingual translation” and assumes that the writing of a classic novel script is done in the language used in the source text. For instance, a French cinematic version of *Les Misérables* is considered as an “intralingual translation” whereas a Japanese or Russian adaptation of the novel is considered as an “interlingual translation.”

One striking example of a successful intralingual transfer is well illustrated by Claude Lelouch’s adaptation of *Les Misérables*. In this intralingual adaptation of Hugo’s novel, Lelouch draws parallels between 19th- and 20th- century societies, and shows how history repeats itself. He goes further than any other director as he reconciles fiction and reality using a distinctive narrative technique, mixing literature and cinema. Transposing *Les Misérables* to an anti-Semitic context in France during the Second World War, the filmmaker builds his motion picture on the concatenation of sequences showing a live reading of Hugo’s novel, often followed by verbatim scenes taken from the source text. Lelouch’s modernist approach to film adaptation makes the process of transformation visible to the audience and suggests a pedagogical approach to literary reading, consisting in comparing literature and cinema. In the various scenes where Mr. Ziman reads *Les Misérables* to Jean Fortin, who is illiterate, Lelouch displays an intralingual translation in the making as M. Ziman retells the story in simple words easily understood by Jean Fortin. This way, the French director highlights the hermeneutical process at the core of film adaptation by breaking the process into fragmented scenes belonging to different time periods. He also incorporates other cinematic versions of *Les Misérables* in the film. Two excerpts of adaptations produced respectively by French directors Raymond Bernard and Paul Le Chanois in 1934 and 1958 are integral parts of the diegesis. This technique enables Lelouch to achieve a dialectical exchange between literature and cinema, showing that: “to interpret a text is not to give it (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it” (Barthes 5). The dialectics at play between different media appearing in the film fosters the active participation of the audience, who must reconstruct the story of Jean Fortin, using bits and pieces from various sources. The filmmaker challenges spectators to decode the adaptive process through their active participation. By making the process of adaptation visible, Lelouch illustrates Lawrence Venuti’s claim that: “translation can be studied and practiced as a locus of difference, instead of the homogeneity that widely characterizes it today” (42). The conceptualization of translation or film adaptation emphasizing their differences is a significant step toward acknowledging film adaptations as autonomous works of art whose purpose is to communicate a message in a code understandable by the targeted audience.

Problems associated with the reception of a text by a foreign audience (interlingual translation) complicate the process of adaptation, as they relate to the transfer of cultural elements unknown to the targeted audience. Many questions arise and critical choices are made. The philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher summarized interlingual translation as follows: “either the translator leaves the writer alone as much as possible and moves the reader toward the writer, or he leaves the reader alone as much as possible and moves the writer toward the reader” (Biguenet 42). The first strategy focuses on the target audience and its ability to absorb a foreign culture while, in the second instance, the translator brings the reader to the text and the emphasis is no longer on the target culture but on preserving the source text. Until recently, these

one-way street strategies denying any critical interaction between reader and text have often reflected the directors' choices. They either chose to keep the story in its original context (sometimes with a few omissions) or to transpose the story to a different time or culture. Hugo's canonical work *Les Misérables* has undergone significant changes when adapted to foreign cultures. Just like "Interlingual translation" which, in the conventional sense, implies a transfer between two languages, adaptation resorts to finding equivalencies in an effort to accommodate the receiver. In a film released in 1944, by Kamâl Selim, the story is transposed to the Egyptian context of the 1940s and the main protagonist, Jean Valjean, is represented dressed in national costume in a poor Moorish café. In this appropriation of Hugo's story, the French character, whose name is orientalized, is immersed in Egyptian culture in an attempt to blend with it. If we take a look at what is happening in the field of translation at the time, we observe a similar pattern in the appropriation of Western culture in general. In an Article titled: *Translation and Cultural Hegemony: The Case of French –Arabic Translation*, Richard Jacquemond notes that during the same period, literary translation "consisted most frequently in a very free transposition of the French narrative and actually was not called 'translation' (tarjama), but 'adaptation' (iqtibas), 'arabization' (tari'ib), or even 'egyptianization' (tamsir)" (141). He also remarks that sometimes the translator neglected to mention the French author and even modified the title. Jacquemond proposes two apparently contradictory reasons for the egyptianization of French narratives: "cultural independence from the West" and "elevation of Arabic narrative to the level of its Western counterparts" (142). It seems that Egyptian translators chose to achieve their independence through the acculturation and adaptation of French literature, and this attitude coincides with film adaptation of foreign novels. There are many other examples of the sort. In 1949, a Japanese filmmaker, Daisuke Ito, transposed *Les Misérables* to 19th- century Japan. In this version of *Les Misérables*, Jean Valjean is seen wearing a kimono holding a Japanese candlestick near a sleeping Buddhist monk. At this level, interlingual translation often becomes closely interwoven with intersemiotic translation through immediate visual signs such as dress and décor. These cultural transfers, often achieved through actor's costumes, tend to render the translation invisible and, to borrow a term from Lawrence Venuti, to "domesticate" the source text in order to: "give the reader unobstructed 'access to great thoughts', to what is 'present in the original'" (5). The purpose of the invisible translation is to maintain a natural effect: "producing the illusory effect of transparency that simultaneously masks its status as an illusion: the translated text seems 'natural,' i.e. not translated" (Venuti 5). But the invisible translation also deprives the targeted audience of its cultural abilities since the new text or film is presented as a domestic product. In the case of *Les Misérables*, the domestication of a foreign text entails the recycling of Western ideals such as liberty, equality and solidarity in tune with the moral or religious beliefs of the target culture.

Once we are aware of kinship between translation and adaptation, we can more easily perceive how the long tradition of translation studies constitutes a valuable tool in the aesthetic evaluation of film adaptations. The ever-growing and diversified research being conducted in the field of translation, as well as its inter-disciplinary trend encompassing cultural, post-colonial, historical studies and many others, bring us layered insights. Film adaptation should be studied as a hybrid product resulting from the blending of two or more authors, cultures and audience, since it is, by definition, a dynamic and interactive process. Millicent Marcus claims that "the successful adaptation performs the process of its transit, makes explicit the way in which the literary work is passed through the filmmaker's imagination, the new cultural context,

and the technology of the medium, to emerge as a full-fledged, autonomous retelling of the tale” (xx).

If we want to better understand film adaptation, we should recognize it as a separate sub-genre of cinema that fulfills specific characteristics of aesthetics shared by translation. We should ask simple questions such as: what makes a successful adaptation? How do we define this genre? What are the main criteria? Should fidelity be invoked and to what extent? The preexistence of a source text, suggested in the idea of adaptation, leads me to consider the final product as a palimpsest in which a dialogue takes place between what is seen and unseen. Film adaptations are visible remains of an invisible process. In fact, film adaptations can be viewed as archeological artifacts, resulting from complex and intermingled transactions.

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Notes

¹ In 1965, in *La Nouvelle Revue des Deux Mondes*, Henri de Bonnechose wrote an article warning against unfaithful adaptations of Laclos' *Les Liaisons dangereuses* and Hugo's *Les Misérables*. In 1993, Judith Roof deliberately chose to include the word betrayal in the title of her article "The Betrayal of Facts: Pinter and Duras beyond Adaptation." Recently, Pascal Ifri severely criticized Raoul Ruiz' adaptation of Proust's novel in "Le temps retrouvé de Raoul Ruiz ou le temps perdu au cinéma."

² The expression *belles infidèles* was coined by the French writer Ménage who ironically used these words to qualify the "unfaithful" translations of M. d'Ablancourt, a famous translator of the time.

Information Security – What *you need to know.*

By Andrew Ockrim

In this current first world climate of burgeoning technology trends and the “internet age”, the security of your personal information is more important than it has ever been.

Not since the rise of the internet age has it been more important to the average consumer to ensure the information that constitutes “their person” be secure. We are seeing more frequent media reports of identity theft and fraud and the numbers of victims are increasing exponentially. In America alone, online identity theft complaints to the Federal Trade Commission rose by 87.7% in 2002 against the previous year. A US Federal Trade Commission survey (of September 3, 2003) found that **27.3 million Americans were victims of identity theft in the last five years**, including 9.9 million people in 2002 alone. According to the survey, identity theft losses to businesses and financial institutions totalled nearly \$48 billion while consumer victims reported \$5 billion in out-of-pocket expenses.² Research by Harris Interactive and Gartner in the summer of 2003 found that approximately 7 million people were victims of identity theft in the previous year. That breaks down to more than 13 identity thefts every minute. As many as 85 percent of all identity theft victims only find out about the crime when they are denied credit or employment, contacted by the police, or have to deal with collection agencies, credit cards, and unexpected bills. A study on the aftermath of an identity theft by the non-profit Identity Theft Resource Center found that victims spend 600 hours (75 work days) recovering from the crime because they must contact and work with credit card providers, banks, credit bureaus, solicitors and law enforcement agencies. The time can add up to more than \$25,000+ in lost wages or income and \$10,000+ in out of pocket and legal expenses.

Identity theft doesn't stop at the US border. ID theft and fraud levels are now quite high in Canada, Australia, and Britain, and are developing even more rapidly in south east Asia, China, India and Japan, with quite similar costs to victims. Businesses can almost triple the cost per individual. The difference between identity theft and identity fraud are quite simple – identity fraud is basically someone charging goods to your credit card, whilst identity theft involves someone acting as you (driver's licence, credit cards and more). A test conducted recently by an American newspaper and IT security consultants¹ showed that a PC connected to the Internet without adequate protection was hijacked in around 4 minutes. Windows PCs make up roughly 80% of the computers connected to the Internet, and the vast majority of automated attacks are designed to locate and exploit known security weaknesses. However, users of other operating systems should not be lulled into a false sense of security. Mac and linux/unix attacks are increasing with

more specialised attacks. A hijacked PC will give the attacker full access to everything on your computer as well as the use of your computer to achieve other objectives such as attacking companies and websites. If like most people you store your passwords in a file on your computer – you may have already been compromised.

Here is an interesting scenario: In February 2003, Derek Bond, a 72-year-old retiree from Bristol, England, spent three weeks sleeping on the concrete floor of a South African gaol after his name and passport number showed up on an FBI wanted list as he arrived in the country for a vacation. In vain, he protested that not only was he ignorant of any supposed crimes he'd committed in America, but he'd never even been to the country. Release didn't come until the publicity surrounding his fate prompted an informant to point the FBI to the "Derek Bond" whom they did want to talk to—comfortably holed up in Las Vegas, after purloining the identity of the real Mr. Bond some 14 years before. Bond's misfortune illustrates—to the extreme—the menace of identity theft. But it's not gaol time that worries people so much as impaired credit records and fraud. Armed with just a few pieces of information—information readily available from garbage or stolen documents—identity thieves can take advantage of lax security at financial institutions to enrich themselves.

Lets start with the Internet

The web pages you visit to find information, do your banking, find recipes, and check your email, etc. are often a complicated mix of technologies and programming. The truth is the web pages you visit on a regular basis may be hiding some very nasty little surprises and so many of the emails you receive might also be hiding these surprises. The web pages you visit are made up of computer code, which tells your browser how to display the page and what to do if you click on a certain link. There are mixed technologies at work here and the effects they can have on your PC and even personal life range from benign to catastrophic. Every time you visit a web page, information about where you have come from, where you are going to and even your user id and password are stored on your pc (and in some circumstances tracked by other people, shared amongst webmasters, marketeers and others). Technologies such as Java, ActiveX, Perl, even html itself can be used by people with questionable morals to gain access to the information you hold dear. Most of these higher level scripting and application languages can be used to deploy malicious payloads and commands. They (malicious website owners) can track your surfing habits, abuse your Internet connection by sending this data to a third party, profile your shopping preferences, hijack your browser start page or pages, alter important system files, and can do this without your knowledge or permission. The security and privacy implications of these exploits should be quite obvious and undesirable on any system or network.

Know thy enemy

I'm sure you have all heard about the "dark side" of the Internet, the part that seems to spawn the virii, worms, trojans and all the perceptible evil on the Internet. The term hacker has been used by uninformed media hacks for years to label these people, incorrectly. Hackers are people who explore computer systems and networks to learn and not for financial gain. They are a vanishing breed and in the past tended to instigate positive change by reporting and sharing what they found and how they did things to the respective system owners. They are being replaced by a generation of underground criminals called correctly "crackers". These are a different species altogether.

Some crackers destroy people's files or entire hard drives; these are called vandals. Some novice crackers don't even bother learning the technology, but simply download tools or programs to break into computer systems; they're called 'script kiddies'. More experienced crackers with programming skills develop programs and post them to the Web and to bulletin board systems to share them with other people on their level. And then there are individuals who have no interest in the technology, but use the computer merely as a tool to aid them in stealing money, goods, or services – we can call them criminals. This last group generally leans more towards organized crime and tends to operate accordingly.

The next group is a little more difficult to describe. 'Spammers', they are the people that send literally millions of junk (or unsolicited bulk) emails on a daily basis that ask us to buy a product/service or direct us to a website where potentially more vindictive activities may take place. Think of spam as the flyers in your mailbox or the people selling goods out of the back of a truck at traffic lights. Some of these promotions may be genuine, however the vast majority of them are not. The easy tell for this is the sender's email address. If you are being offered Microsoft products at a vast discount to the retail pricing or the email itself does not contain a genuine reply-to address or an opt out option with address and contact details, there is a fair chance it's not a Microsoft promotion or even the genuine product. Alternatively the makers of Viagra (Pfizer) distribute their products to be sold over the counter at pharmacies, not in conjunction with organ enlargement scams, sent from `jills@qwerty.com` or other such obviously non-legitimate email address. This is a very basic round up of the Internet, now we move on to the lesser-known threats to your private information. Below is a brief account of some of the ways identity theft can be actualised.

Social Engineering uses influence and persuasion to deceive people by convincing them that the social engineer is someone he/she is not, or by manipulation. As a result, the social engineer is able to take advantage of people to obtain information with or without the use of technology. Most social engineering attacks are perpetrated via telephone or more rarely, person-to-person contact with you.

Card Skimming uses a very small hand held device, similar to a mobile phone in size, to read the contents of the magnetic strip on your credit card. These readers can log hundreds of cards and are easily carried in trouser pockets. The ID thief simply swipes your card thru the skimmer to glean the information on your magnetic strip – that's it – its over in less than 3 seconds.

A **Key-logger** is a parasitic software program designed to sit on a person's computer clandestinely. The logger watches what you type (and where) and sends it to a location on the internet. Key loggers can assist

crackers in getting hold of your bank accounts and other personal information. At work you are generally protected to a degree by corporate firewalls – at home you may not be. Install Antivirus and Anti-spyware software and update it weekly; install a firewall and update it regularly too.

Spyware/Malware (Malicious Software) is programming that is put in someone's computer (via visiting a website or a downloaded/emailed program) to secretly gather information about the user and relay it to advertisers or other interested parties. As such, spyware is a major cause for concern about privacy on the Internet. It can be blocked, stopped or removed with spyware removal tools; most antivirus products do not effectively handle spyware or malware.

Phishing is the act of sending e-mails to a user, falsely claiming to be an established legitimate enterprise (banks, eBay, paypal, credit providers, holiday & competition draws, etc), in an attempt to scam the user into surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft. The e-mail directs the user to visit a Web site where they are asked to update personal information, such as passwords and credit cards, drivers' licence, and bank account numbers, that the legitimate organisation already has. The Web site, however professional it may seem, is bogus and set up only to steal the user's information. Some are very professional and have fooled many IT experts (refer to the tools section below for help on combating this type of scam).

A **Virus** is a parasitic program designed to enter a person's computer clandestinely. The virus attaches itself to files, pictures, documents, and other "attachments" such as zip files and screensavers and once on your system they are self-replicating. A virus will do everything it can to keep copying itself, and in certain circumstances will mutate just like real virii.

A **Trojan** is a malicious program that pretends to be a benign application or tool. It is designed to cause your computer to do something that is unexpected. Since it does not spread (not self-replicating) it is not really a virus, but has the same potential to do damage to your system and you. Trojans are normally like the myth, a cunning back door into your pc. They can open a communication channel with a cracker and the cracker can then use your pc against other targets, or just take all of your information (without you knowing).

A **Worm** is a parasitic program designed to replicate itself on your computer and then spread to other computers via email or a chat program. Worms were originally designed by crackers, to gain lists of legitimate email addresses for use in mass marketing (Spam).

A **Virus Hoax** is an intentionally deceptive warning circulating via email about an alleged computer virus threat. Some widely circulated email alerts, warning users of an alleged security threat from the "Budweiser Frogs Screen Saver", "Good Times email virus" and other hoax and chain letters such as "urgent Cancer donations for little boy", etc. are some of the best-known examples of *hoaxes*. The hoax achieves its goal of deception when users forward these on to their friends who may then act upon the false information contained within, or again send them on – increasing the load of mail servers around the world

and simultaneously stroking the egos of their creators. Some chain letters / hoaxes have been circulation for over 10 years – which is more than can be said for most marketing campaigns. **NEVER** blindly obey computer security advice provided by a news anchor or a sales person. Always obtain expert advice from experts and challenge the credentials of anyone offering you advice. There have been many instances of overzealous reporters reporting hoaxes as fact.

Ok, So what do I do with all this information??

Here are some simple guides for you to follow to help reduce the potential of you having your personal information compromised or stolen.

Protecting your PC:

You have heard this all before but as a bare minimum you need to secure your PC using both an Antivirus product and a firewall. If you are unsure as to how to configure these products refer to the (reputable) vendor that sold them to you or ask the software makers via their website or phone support. Update both your software packages regularly – at a very minimum - weekly. Your antivirus and firewall should come with an up-dater application or instructions on how to do it. Master this skill, it's the first step.

Install an anti spyware program and update it regularly. (Very similar to antivirus but more specialised and equally important.)

Even if you have to call a security consultant in for an hour or two to help you set it all up, this price is far less than the cost of trying to recover money stolen from bank accounts and claiming insurance, or worse. Choose your resources carefully and be prepared to pay for professional help, it is worth it in the long run. Look for a professional who has real experience in information security and not a friend/neighbours' daughter/son who is “computer savvy”. If something happens, are you genuinely prepared to gamble your entire bank balance(s), credit card balances, your house, credit rating and your identity on the friend/neighbours' daughter/son?

You will also want to update or patch your operating system regularly. Normally for windows users it's a very simple process of checking for updates and installing them automatically. These will help reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited by unscrupulous crackers. You may want to refer to your consultant for this as well if you are unsure how to do this.

If you are concerned about security whilst surfing the web you may want to switch browsers. 2 very good browser alternatives are Firefox and Opera. Both are far more configurable than the default windows browser and neither uses ActiveX, which is a scripting language that the owners of many malicious websites use (amongst many other technologies) to gather information about you, from your pc. The level of

customization you can achieve with these alternatives far outweigh the learning curve of the new browser.

Change your passwords regularly – if you are not changing your personal passwords for your internet, email, online banking and other sensitive information sources regularly – then it is only a matter of time before someone else will get in.

Passwords:

Your passwords should be secure. That means that you should use a combination of letters, numbers and special characters (the number keys with shift). I suggest you use a pass- phrase rather than a password; such as “all alone” or “a11a10n#” - which is the same with the letter L swapped for 1’s and the E a shift 3, and a Zero for a “O”. Just remember your character substitution rules. Your passwords should always be 6 or more characters in length.

Never use common names, family names or a word that could be found in a dictionary, even if you are going to spell it backwards – this is one of the most common ways of breaking into accounts and it’s called a dictionary attack. Another common attack is called brute force and it uses an incremental approach. Never use a date of birth – they are useless against most brute force attacks as pure numbers are very easy to crack. Even if you just put two normal words together, it increases the complexity; and adding special characters makes it even harder. I suggest that you should change your passwords on a monthly basis. If you think that you have come up with a good one you may want to stick with it a little longer, but never more than 3 months.

Do NOT use your User Name(s) or home/work email address(s) in any online forums or discussion groups, use a completely different ID instead and use a ‘disposable’ web based email address (such as Hotmail or Yahoo)

Do NOT use the same password for more than one site. This is very dangerous, if for example, you had used the same password for eBay *and* Paypal, then it would take the fraudster a few seconds to completely hijack your auctions and accounts. Same story if you use the same password for your hotmail and internet banking.

NEVER, and I do mean *never click on any link, or complete any form in any email whatsoever!* That applies whether it is genuine or not, and this is because any link can be disguised with a little knowledge of HTML code. Emails (unless encrypted) are not secure and hence should be treated as public information. Almost all companies monitor emails on their infrastructure to some extent, unless you want the boss reading your party plans...

Phishing:

Do not respond to any emails from your bank, eBay, paypal or any other institution asking for your

personal information. They do not request such information via email, this is called Phishing. If you have any doubts call the institution using a number from the phone book or your statements and check with them the validity of the email first. For those concerned about Phishing you can try the Netcraft toolbar for IE (& Firefox soon). <http://toolbar.netcraft.com>. This is a free Internet Explorer toolbar, which protects users against phishing sites. Whether a Phishing site is reported via the toolbar or through some other channel, Netcraft blocks access to known sites for everyone using the Netcraft toolbar. Refer to the tool section at the end of this article for vendor references.

Spam:

We'll see about 35 billion messages traverse the Internet daily in 2005. MX Logic, a US based anti-spam vendor measured spam as accounting for 77 percent of all Internet email traffic. Do not respond to spam emails. Firstly it confirms your email address as valid and hence will put you on more lists (they share these lists of email addresses – especially the responders). Secondly, would you purchase a product or service from someone who approached you out of nowhere on the street, or knocked on your car window whilst you are stopped at traffic lights? It's ok to buy a newspaper at lights as you generally don't require any post sales support for a paper, but would you buy stocks, prescription medications, foodstuffs, wines, cameras, DVDs or software from the same guy? Most of us wouldn't – but you would be surprised by how many people actually give over their credit card details to these unknown advertisers via Spam or from pop-under advertising on web sites; only to regret that decision later. If the product or service sounds very cheap, it may be because it is pirated or probably not the genuine article but is a 'Gray-Market' product. Gray-market products are products, either used or new, that are offered for sale by unauthorized third parties and not supported or warranted by the manufacturer/creator and generally of substandard production quality and more often than not stolen.

Protecting your Information

Whenever you divulge personal information be extra wary. If you are unsure whether the email or phone call is legitimate, ask for the person's full name then call the organization back on a phone number from a statement or white pages to confirm.

Recent studies indicate that more than seven million people in the US alone have been the victim of identity theft. Most people do not realize just how easily criminals can obtain their personal data without having to break into their homes.

Using techniques as simple as shoulder surfing, dumpster diving (going through people garbage), mail skimming (checking your mail before you get a chance) and eavesdropping, it's very difficult unless you are vigilant, to keep your personal information private.

To help, just remember the word **SCAM**.

S—be Stingy about giving out personal information unless you have a reason to trust them, regardless of where you are;

C—Check your financial information regularly, and look for what should be there and what shouldn't;

A—Ask periodically for a copy of your credit report, most research suggests at least once a year;

M—Maintain careful records of your banking / financial accounts.

Destroy all personal information before disposing of it and be wary of any requests for information.

Card Skimming When you hand over your credit/debit card in a restaurant or retail situation, how often do you ensure you can see what is happening to your card at all times? This is when skimming is most likely to occur. Police reports around the world report the most common targets for skimming is retail or restaurant customers. You are distracted by the purchasing experience and may not be taking as much notice as you think. By the time you get home, your credit card has been reproduced either in your home country or overseas and there are now 10-1000 copies of your card ready to be sold on the black market. It takes all of 3 seconds to skim and one email to shatter your life. A hint would be to go to the cashier and supervise the transaction from start to finish, if they swipe the card more than once, question the activity and ensure the cashier only swipes your card in the Eft-pos (electronic funds transfer at point of sale) device.

If someone asks you for personal information such as date of birth, driver's licence number, or address, instead of answering, ask yourself these questions first:

Why do they need that information?

What are they going to do with that information?

Is that information necessary to carry out the transaction you are involved in?

Will the person asking me, volunteer the same information to me?

If you are not comfortable providing this information, don't – it's your right not to provide it.

If you divulge personal information be as sure as you can that the recipient is who they say they are. If you are transacting online, be sure that you have spoken to your bank/credit provider about what levels of insurance you have for online transactions and understand their policies on protection of funds.

If you are purchasing from Ebay, use escrow / safeharbour if possible. Direct deposits into personal accounts are almost impossible to recover if you don't receive your goods. Ebay is a haven for fraudsters, always check the referrals of a seller and make the effort to contact some of the previous purchasers to establish the credibility of the seller (if the purchase amount is more than you are prepared to gamble). I personally always try to communicate with sellers via email before I will bid on an item – that way I have a starting point of contact, especially if goods arrive damaged.

Social Engineering

Social engineering and other forms of interpersonal information theft are reliant on your empathy and unconformability with situations of conflict. In most cases, successful social engineers have strong people skills. They're charming, polite, and easy to like - social traits needed for establishing rapid rapport and trust. An experienced social engineer is able to gain access to virtually any targeted information by using the strategies and tactics of his/her craft.

We know that not all people are kind and honest, but too often we live as if they were. This idealistic innocence has become the fabric of the lives of most western societies and it's painful to give it up. We have built into our concept of freedom that the best places to live are those where locks and keys are the least necessary. Most people go on the assumption that they will not be deceived by others, based upon a belief that the probability of being deceived is very low; the attacker, understanding this common belief, makes their request sound so reasonable or attractive or innocuous that it raises no suspicion, all the while exploiting the victim's trust and achieving their goals, at your expense.

The best locks in the world are useless if you open the door.

The last place you'd want to look

Your garbage is a goldmine for those wishing to get a little dirty. Most of us are happy to throw out junk mail with our names, addresses and other personal details printed on them. I even know of a few people who used to throw out their bank statements unopened.

When disposing of paper documents and junk mail, here are a few tips:

1. Destroy the name/address/account section of the document
2. Destroy any personal details on the document (DOB, etc)

3. Do not throw away (in the same load of garbage) the destroyed sections of documents with the other parts.
4. Don't assume for a second that just because you have put last week's spaghetti leftovers on top of a document containing personal information, that a criminal won't get their hands dirty to get to your money/identity.

When I say destroy I mean don't just rip off the top of the document – I mean destroy it and dispose of in a separate load of garbage or even a different bin altogether. I personally take the confidential stuff, shred them and dispose of them in security paper recycling bins. If you don't have this facility look for an alternate disposal point, such as paper recycling points.

Protecting your family

We have all seen on the media recently, stories of older men seducing younger children and adolescents into compromising situations. How does this happen? I can speculate using some knowledge of my own from working with corporations as well as families. When children frequent 'chat rooms', it is very similar, in their perception to hanging out with friends. They, like most of us, assume everyone in there is who they say they are. This is obviously not the case, and the level of the sophistication of the predators is growing every day. There is no way to stop them except banning a child from 'chatting', which we know will only serve to heighten the child's desire to chat. The one thing I have found that worked for my clients is the following.

Monitor the Internet activities of your kids. You can purchase software that will screen the websites they surf to; and you can even get commercial keystroke loggers that track the movements, user id's and passwords of your kids. (The general reference is guardian software). Note the hours they are online and the levels of resistance when you try and drag them away at certain times. Predators generally rely on always being there for the victims when they "get online". If you have the time, sit with your kids while they are online. Another thing to check is the recent address list (the drop down bar next to where the internet address is typed. This should show you approximately, the last 20 sites that were visited manually (typed in).

Tools to help

For those concerned about Phishing you can try the Netcraft toolbar for IE & Firefox (soon). <http://toolbar.netcraft.com> provides an Internet Explorer toolbar, which protects users against phishing sites. Whether a Phishing site is reported via the toolbar or through some other channel, Netcraft blocks access for everyone

using the Netcraft toolbar.

Below is a list of a few of the more common packages in each category. Some do multiple tasks, including antivirus and firewall. Most of the integrated packages do not effectively remove spyware or manage the surfing habits for parental control.

Antivirus (and some firewall):

F-secure:	http://www.f-secure.com
Sophos:	http://www.sophos.com
Trend Micro:	http://www.trendmicro.com
Symantec:	http://www.symantec.com
Panda:	http://www.pandasoftware.com
McAfee:	http://www.mcafee.com
Computer Assoc:	http://www.cai.com
Central Command:	http://www.centralcommand.com
Kaspersky Lab:	http://www.kaspersky.com/

Firewall

Tiny Software:	http://www.tinysoftware.com
Zone Labs:	http://www.zonelabs.com
Black Ice:	http://www.blackice.com/

Spyware Removers:

Spyware Eliminator:	http://www.aluriasoftware.com
Spy Sweeper:	http://www.webroot.com
AntiSpy:	http://www.omniquad.com
SpySubtract:	http://www.intermute.com

SpyRemover:	http://www.itcompany.com
SpyHunter:	http://www.enigmasoftware.com
Ad-aware Pro:	http://www.lavasoft.com/
Spyware Doctor	http://www.pctools.com/spyware-doctor/
Spybot Search-Destroy	http://www.safer-networking.org/en/index.html

Parental Control Software

Cyber Patrol:	http://www.cyberpatrol.com
Net Nanny:	http://www.netnanny.com
CyberSitter:	http://www.cybersitter.com

I suggest a one of each approach for people who may not be the most computer savvy. You may save a little money by purchasing an antivirus and firewall combined package, then I suggest you will also need a spyware remover. If you have children under 15, parental control software is a “must have” if you cannot provide supervision for the long term. I cannot stress enough for you to take the time and read the literature that comes with these packages, so you can understand a little of how they work. As well as know if the kids have turned them off/disabled them to access sites that may be blocked.

Having all the right protective software installed and regularly updated is the best insurance policy to protect your privacy online. Your own common sense is the best way to avoid a security incident in the first instance. However, having said that, with the increasing speed at which crackers and vandals are exploiting vulnerabilities in our operating systems and applications, there are no guarantees. We can do our (proactive) best and take steps to minimise the impact of security breaches. The Internet is an unregulated environment, and hence will always be an easy target for the unscrupulous and ethically challenged to try and exploit the untrained, uninformed or apathetic.

It may sound like a lot of extra work and it may well take an extra 2-3 mins a day. However, this amount of time is nothing compared to the effort required to restore your financial records if you happen to fall victim of identity theft.

This article is not intended to scare you out of ever leaving the house, it is intended to be a resource to help arm you with an understanding of just how sophisticated high-tech and low tech crime is becoming; as well as giving you some starting points to help you protect yourself. Naturally, seek more assistance from specialist sources of information if you want to learn more and be proactive about the security of your personal information and identity.

Notes:

¹ http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2004-11-29-honeypot_x.htm

² “FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in U.S. 27.3 Million Victims in Past 5 Years, Billions in Losses for Businesses and Consumers”, Press Release, September 3, 2003.

Dwelling as a Border.

By Karen Kachra

You can be a citizen or you can be stateless, but it is difficult to imagine being a border.ⁱ

It is difficult, but we have to imagine this sort of being, this sort of dwelling that I will call living *as* a border. Two questions follow immediately. What *is* this kind of living we are said to have trouble imagining? And why do I say that we *must* persevere in imagining it, in bringing it into our social imaginary?

Let me start with the first question by turning to an essay written by Arundhati Roy, which is titled “the greater common good.”ⁱⁱ Roy tells the story of the great Narmada River, one of India’s largest. The Narmada is under construction, but as you might know, it has been a struggle. Although India has over 3600 major dams, the gradual damming of the Narmada and its 41 tributaries is the largest such project to date. The state’s plan is to build 3200 dams that will reconstitute the Narmada valley into step reservoirs. Thirty are to be major dams, 135 medium and the rest small. Four thousand square kilometers of natural deciduous forest are slated for submergence. In the end, twenty-five *million* people will be affected; many thousands of *them* are also slated for submergence. “We will request you to move from your houses after the dam comes up. If you move it will be good. Otherwise we shall release the waters and drown you all.”ⁱⁱⁱ

My hypothesis is that, today, the Narmada is a border. By this I mean that the families who have lived by its rhythmical, tropical bounty, and whose fates, as peoples, are intertwined with the health of the river basin—they are collectively dwelling as a border.

Roy argues that Big Dams like the Sardar Sarovar on the Narmada have costs that far outweigh their purported benefits. Incredibly, this is the case even *without* factoring in the human and environmental costs. According to studies, the Sardar Sarovar will end up *consuming* more electricity than it will produce!^{iv} Factoring in loan repayments and futures loans for the drainage of inevitably “waterlogged” land, Big Dams like Sarovar are, financially speaking, bottomless pits. But whether or not you agree that damming is a mistake, the fact remains that the mostly Adivasi and Dalit villagers who would be displaced by the technology are living as borders. And that is what I want to explore.

The Narmada is obviously not a border in the ordinary sense of the term: notably, it does not divide one nation-state from another. In a very different context, Étienne Balibar has written about the need to re-conceive what borders are and how they work.^v He suggests that borders are often no longer territorial dividers; rather, they can be found wherever states exert selective controls on populations. Could this be the case for the cyborg ribbon of life that is called the river Narmada, part wild and part tamed?

Consider the functions of borders as Balibar describes them in the postmodern globalized world. Traditionally borders have helped to establish identities. *This* is us, *that* is them; *this* is me, *that* is you. These identity-boundaries have histories, thus so must the us/thems and the me/yous. “Every discussion of borders relates, precisely, to the establishment of definite identities, national or otherwise.”^{vi} Further, according to Balibar, the state uses borders to reduce the complexity of identifying; it seeks to “fix” identities that are, in practice, not very well defined. For instance, the Indian government counts on its citizens to see the installation of its long linked dam-borders as a matter of (re-)establishing national identity. If you are *for* India, you must be for her development, for her modernization, *for* “the greater common good.”

In India it appears that dam building has historically been so strongly associated with nation building that very few people have asked whether dams actually *do* provide fresh water and enable agricultural production like they are thought to. The government has sponsored *not a single* post-project study of any of its dams. Regardless, Roy tells us that “every schoolchild is taught that Big Dams will deliver the people of India from hunger and poverty.”^{vii} Nehru’s famous ‘Dams are the Temples of Modern India’ speech is preached in all languages on the sub-continent. Big Dams have been something of a unifying mantra. Of course, in practice, Indian identity is hardly well defined. As Roy puts it: “Every single Indian citizen could, if he or she wants to, claim to belong to some minority or the other. The fissures, if you look for them, run vertically, horizontally, and are layered, whorled, circular, spiral, inside out and outside in.”^{viii} Given this reality, all of its hectic dam-building (India has 40% of all the Big Dams in the world) begins to seem like a strenuous effort to stitch up dangerous helter-skelter belongings into a single overriding allegiance. Like most other places, India threatens to spill over its own banks.

The unprecedented struggle over the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam might then be seen as a token of the fact that borders are, in Balibar’s terms, becoming ever more prone to “vacillation.” As a border, the Narmada is less like a *line* and more like a *zone*. The scale and the sweep of who it affects and how they will be affected is changeable. Indeed, as Roy points out, consistent numbers that chart the people who are to be displaced, or the acreage to be submerged, have never actually been agreed upon by the local governments involved. The people who dwell along the Narmada are living in a kind of shadow zone. The specter of their future displacement is uncertain—are they inside or outside the bounds of the water’s future reach? Will they know when they will no longer be able to live in the valley? (In the past, some villagers have gotten no warning when reservoirs were dammed and flood waters swallowed their homes.) What will “resettlement” bring?

These families who dwell as borders are neither this nor that. They are caught between two worlds—of the river life they once knew and the nameless shanty towns that are their future. Their being is ambivalent because they are forced to live without a sense of the future. They do not make plans because any day now their land might be taken or their crops flooded or their neighbors flushed out of their houses. These people are refugees in their own ancestral homeland. Like many other poor people who exist as borders, waiting to move on or be moved, these villagers spend their time negotiating their presence. And also, negotiating their presents—how many moments does one have left?

Balibar draws an interesting conclusion from the thickening of borders into zones where people indefinitely dwell. He states that the quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted. “This means that borders are becoming the object of protest and contestation as well as of an unremitting reinforcement...”^{ix} Borders have stopped functioning as a limit to the political (marking where the political community ends) and started functioning as political entities themselves. The fight is on. Somehow, unlike the millions of invisible people who have already been displaced in duplicate, triplicate, quadruplicate—by dams and power centers and again by artillery ranges and uranium mines—the people who live along the Narmada are attempting to have a say in who they are and how they will live. *This* border is a contested one. As Roy illustrates, the contest is imminently political. The struggle has involved, on the one hand, stand-offs, protests, petitions, court cases, independent scientific reviews, marches, hunger strikes and resettlement; on the other, arrests, beatings, surveyors, bulldozers, money, loans, land enclosures, stonewalling, policy-making and -breaking, bad math, bad faith, and resettlement. In sum, the border Narmada has itself become realized for what it is: a political, indeed internationally political, institution. What this means for those living on it, is that their very lives have become a political wrangle. They are negotiating for their lives. Mostly they lose, though, like Ram Bai, who now lives in a slum outside Jalalabur. “Why didn’t they just poison us?” she asked, “then we wouldn’t have to live in this shit-hole and the Government could have survived along with its precious dam all to itself.”^x

It is worth stressing the idealized and violent nature of borders. For ideals and violence go hand in hand.^{xi} Borders must be conceived of as capable of marking lines that people are willing, in their patriotic faith, to kill or be killed over. “[T]hey would not be idealized, conceived of as the support of the universal, if they were not imagined as the point at which ‘world-views’, and thus also views of man, were at stake: the point at which one must choose, and choose *oneself*,” writes Balibar.^{xii} So we should not be surprised that in the “development” of the Narmada, among so many others, there continues to be a lot of violence. Primarily, this violence is directed against those who are displaced by Big Dams, who are sometimes considered, in the state’s terminology, “project affected” persons (PAPs).^{xiii} The Narmada has become a place where one must choose, and the state chooses itself. Itself? The vast majority of rural river dwellers are untouchables (Dalits) and aboriginal peoples (like the Adivasi). They are the racially, ethnically, socially other—the *them*. In Roy’s words: “The ethnic ‘otherness’ of their victims takes some of the pressure off the Nation Builders. It’s like having an expense account. Someone *else* pays the bills. People from another country. Another world.”^{xiv}

Thus, in another sense, the people who dwell along the Narmada are borders because they are *neither* citizens *nor* stateless. “You can be a citizen or you can be stateless...” wrote Green. And in this case? It seems fairly obvious that the aboriginal peasants who live in these wild remotes do not *really* count as members of the nation. Routinely, their lives simply fail to be factored into the public planning of the dams’ development, let alone given consideration. Of the ones who actually try to get some consideration from “their” government, things like this happen.... In 1999, three thousand of them came to Delhi to protest their situation to a Grievance Redressal Committee. They traveled overnight by train and slept on the streets. The President would not meet them because he had an eye infection. The Minister for Social Justice and Empowerment would not meet them either. She asked for a written representation. When the

representation was handed to her, she scolded the delegation for not having written it in English.

But if the border-dwellers are not, in fact, citizens, neither are they truly stateless. After all it is the state (represented by the President and the Minister) that sanctions and pursues their displacement; the nation-state, in turn within a network of global capital, has rendered their homeland a border zone. It is precisely because these villagers cannot escape the state (even when it provides them no services or rights,) that they are living in a predicament. We might describe this predicament, along with Balibar, as a matter of being simultaneously included and excluded. Or what he calls “the internal exclusion of the poor.”^{xv} One way to characterize this new kind of exclusion is as a kind of superfluity:

[T]he most massive form of poverty in today’s world is the one we see in *underdeveloped* countries, where the combination of the destruction of traditional activities, the domination of foreign financial institutions, the establishment of a so-called New World Order, and so on, leads to a situation—which, of course, nobody either wanted or anticipated—in which millions of human beings are *superfluous*. Nobody needs them—they are, so to speak, disposable people...^{xvi}

The ‘disposable human being’ is indeed a social phenomenon, but it tends to look, at least in some cases, like a ‘natural’ phenomenon, or a phenomenon of violence in which the boundaries between what is human and what is natural, or what is post-human and what is post-natural, tend to become blurred...^{xvii}

Undoubtedly it is not always the case that those who live as borders wind up as disposable people. It just so happens that the border Narmada is being constructed according to the logic that makes traditional life superfluous, indeed an obstacle, for Development. Balibar’s insight is that this exclusion begins to look ‘natural,’ as if those who get excluded are simply and inevitably the chaff of the scythe that clears the path to “the greater common good.” Their suffering is inevitable. Nothing can be done, a sad fact of life. In 1948, at this time, Nehru let the cat out of the bag (perhaps it wasn’t yet quite in), when he spoke to the very people who were to lose their homes for progress. “If you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country,” he told them.^{xviii} Nowadays the state speaks through the courts and the courts do not speak of (apparently inevitable) suffering, but rather of numbers.

Returning to this matter of exclusion through inclusion, of being left out from the inside...How does this work? Perhaps it is also apt to say, taking off from Balibar, that the border Narmada functions as a condition of possibility for institutions.^{xix} The violent inscribing and maintenance of the border by the state has to do essentially with the way that enforcing borders provides a protected *atmosphere* (recall Nietzsche’s second untimely meditation) in which to nurture the practices, for example, of democratic community.

If the border was defined fictively in a simple, simplistic way and if...that simplicity was *forced*—that is to say, subjected to forcing by the state—it was precisely for this reason. But the consequence has been that the borders within which the conditions for a relative democracy have in some cases been won have themselves always been absolutely anti-democratic institutions, beyond the reach of any political purchase or practice.^{xx}

It is unclear whether the Sardar Sarovar dam, or any of the other dams making up the overhaul of the Narmada are beyond the reach of political purchase. They have certainly been sites of quintessentially democratic political practices such as popular protests. However, it is equally obvious that the implementation of the dams, the very instituting of the border, continues to occur in a completely undemocratic fashion. Villagers are not consulted, nor are they even warned when their homes will be washed away by rising water levels. In India, the state's only legal requirement for compensation for the loss of one's land and one's way of life is a small cash payment. (In reality, this often comes late, and only to men.) Have the claims of the Adivasi villagers and their supporters gone unheard by the state?^{xxi}

If it is correct to think of the Narmada as a condition for democracy, what institutions does it condition? Most obviously, it conditions economic relations that plug India in to a global economy: from agricultural exports and golf courses^{xxii} to the regulation and sale of water itself.^{xxiii} The dammed Narmada also offers governments greater purchase on "their" citizenry: if the state controls the water basin, it in turn has a hand in power production, agricultural production, in the creation of public heritage parks, in the better maintenance of the utilities of its cities, and ultimately in the health and well-being of its population. Then there is the function of re-inscribing the identity of the nation-state.

These interventions are not necessarily misguided (provided, of course, that we leave to one side the very real question of the efficacy of Big Dams in meeting their stated aims.) But we have already seen how the border functions to *actively differentiate groups*. This point could be approached via Foucault's analysis of biopower—the way modern states regulate their populations.^{xxiv} Keyword: "their." The thing that enables is the same thing that excludes: in our case, a river-border.

Foucault argues that the regulation of the nation as a population is an essentially positive mode of government. Meaning that state power works, in a biopolitical regime, to produce and protect the welfare of its citizens, rather than primarily to repress or reduce individual liberties. In modernity, the nation-state *makes* live and (merely) *lets* die. ("Why didn't they just poison us?" *is* indeed the question, Ram Bai.) If the state aims to assert what is an essentially sovereign right to *kill*, it cannot avail itself of the discourse of biopolitics. Unless, that is, it plays a race card. In his Collège de France lectures of 1976, Foucault suggests that race, in a racist context, plays the role of fracturing the biological spectrum of the population so that political distinctions can be made. The logic: by exterminating the racial other, the social underclass, the weirdos, the uncivilized, the dirty savages, the state can actually *enhance* the well-being of its population! To the degree to which the state cleans up its mess, so to speak, to this degree the unity, the purity, the vitality of the nation grows. Indeed, its very *health* is *at stake*. Dams *must* be built!

"People say the Sardar Sarovar dam is an expensive project. But it is bringing drinking water to millions. This is our lifeline. Can you put a price on this? Does the air we breathe have a price? We will live. We will drink. We will bring glory to the state of Gujarat."^{xxv} No doubt the chief minister's wife is not intending to remind us of the ecological, historical and human costs of the project. These "prices" are like echoes behind her words; they are invisible creatures, disposable nothings. They are excluded from the vision of "we will live." Not because they are *beyond* the scope of Gujarat's regulatory power but precisely because

they are *caught up in it*.

The extermination of the Adivasi and Dalit and millions of other people and their cultures is well in hand throughout the world.^{xxvi} A few of these sites have become border zones that are being contested by people who are, these days, neither this nor that. One could highlight the parallels (and the differences) to colonial genocides. Roy uses images of fascist purges. The squalid camps to which the Adivasi are resettled, where they tend to be conscripted for cheap manual labor, are queasily similar to concentration camps. Is this pushing it? Even if I haven't seen these places, others have. Certainly, we have trouble imagining it. But don't democratic states have borders too?

The need to persevere in imagining what it is like to dwell-as-a-border is an ethical obligation. If we are not reflective about the ways in which the dissolution of some people(s) actually conditions "our" ways of life, then we are simply not alive to the consequences of our collective action and/or inaction. The being of those who dwell as borders, in the sense that I have tried to evoke here using Roy and Balibar, is one of fatally serious consequence. And the fact is that it is not an inevitable or 'natural' one.

Perseverance is involved for those of us who are not living in border zones like the Narmada precisely because—despite the international political intrigue, juicy betrayals and police crackdowns, the horror of families up-ended and torn apart and the pathos of pristine wilderness being crushed for uncertain gain, the quiet sorrow of ancient ways of life being extinguished—border life is somehow so easily forgotten. The Sardar Sarovar, for example, is not news anymore. For those who are living as borders, however, life does not just "go on," as we like to say. Life has not gone on for decades; and for how many more?

Relatively speaking, the Narmada is a success story. There the extermination and the devastation has been spun out and dragged on long enough for ordinary people to wake up to the fact of its happening. The people who live without futures have called us (however briefly) into their world.^{xxvii} Is it *easier* or *harder* to persevere in questioning the mindset and the practices that produce border zones than it is to persevere in living as a border for as long you can still struggle? I do not know. There is no end in sight. No closure. No glamour, no fireworks, no tidy ledger of accomplishments or condemnations. Just an in-between, where, at best, how we *all* live is thrown into question.

Notes

ⁱ André Green, *La Folie Privée: psychanalyse des cas-limites*. Paris: Gallimard, 1990: 107, cited in Étienne Balibar, "What is a Border?" in *Politics and the Other Scene*. Trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson and Chris Turner. London: Verso, 2002: 75.

ⁱⁱ Arudhati Roy, "the greater common good," in *The Algebra of Infinite Justice*. London: Flamingo, 2002:

ⁱⁱⁱ 43-126. She has a second essay in the same volume that also refers to the Narmada Valley dam project. See “power politics”: 129-163.

^{iv} Morarji Desai, speaking at a public meeting in the submergence zone of the Pong Dam, 1961. Roy illustrates that, despite a changed rhetorical strategy, the government still practices essentially the same tactic. Roy, “the greater common good,” 75. She cites a study by S. Dharmadhikary, “Hydropower at Sardar Sarovar: Is It Necessary, Justified, Affordable?” in W. F. Fisher, ed. *Towards Sustainable Development? Struggling Over India’s Narmada River*. New York: M.F. Sharpe, 1995: 141.

^v See several papers that are now collected in English in the volume Étienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*. New York: Verso, 2002. In particular I draw upon “Ambiguous Identities,” “What is a Border?,” “The Borders of Europe,” and “Violence, Ideality and Cruelty.”

^{vi} Balibar, “What is a Border?,” 76.

^{vii} Roy, “the greater common good,” 51.

^{viii} Roy, “the greater common good,” 27.

^{ix} Balibar, “The Borders of Europe,” 92.

^x She is cited in Roy, “the greater common good,” 50.

^{xi} For example see Balibar, “Violence, Ideality and Cruelty,” in *Politics and the Other Scene*. New York: Verso, 2002: 129-145.

^{xii} Balibar, “The Borders of Europe,” 94.

^{xiii} I stress that many people who are in fact affected by the development are not counted as “project affected,” and thus are not even included in this unsavory category.

^{xiv} Roy, “the greater common good,” 56.

^{xv} Balibar, “Violence, Ideality, and Cruelty,” 141.

^{xvi} Balibar, “Violence, Ideality, and Cruelty,” 142. Bernard Ogilvie coined the term “disposable person.” See also Bernard Ogilvie, “Violence et Representation: la production de l’homme jetable,” *Lignes* 26 October 1995.

^{xvii} Balibar, “Violence, Ideality, and Cruelty,” 143. ^{xviii} Cited in Roy, “the greater common good,” 43. ^{xix} Balibar, “What is a Border?” 84.

^{xx} Balibar, “What is a Border?” 84.

^{xxi} On October 18, 2000 a three-judge bench of India’s Supreme Court ruled against the public interest litigation introduced by the public advocacy group the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). Notably, one dissenting judge who made it clear that he disagreed with everything in the majority opinion report. On March 29, 2001, the NBA’s review petition of the report was dismissed in chambers without a hearing. Dams continue to be built by various governmental authorities who have consistently failed to live up to guidelines for water treatment and resettlement. The judgment (laughably) stated that there was no reason to “assume that the authorities will not function properly.” See Roy, “the greater common good” for a heartbreaking summary of this matter, pp 124-126.

^{xxii} Planners of the Sardar Sarovar envisage a series of five star hotels, golf courses and water parks. These luxuries are justified as the only way to raise money to complete the “Wonder Canal” that is the backbone of the project.

^{xxiii} Planners of Sardar Sarovar irrigation also dream of an electronic irrigation scheme in which a “single authority” will manage all groundwater and surface water supplies. This “authority” will, apparently, *own and then sell water* to farmers (who can afford it). It will also, effectively, decide who grows what and where. It has already done this, however, making promises to numerous major sugar mills along the river basin, whose CEO’s, incidentally, all have interesting connections to the “single authority” developing the Narmada.

^{xxiv} Michel Foucault, *‘Society Must be Defended’: lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976*. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003; Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: an introduction*. Volume One. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1978.

^{xxv} Urmilaben Patel, wife of Gujarat Chief Minister Chimanbhai Patel, speaking at a public rally in Delhi in 1993. Cited in Roy, “the greater common good,” 50.

^{xxvi} The many enlightening books of ethnobotanist Wade Davis explore the on-going extinction of indigenous languages as unique ways of life.

^{xxvii} On the other hand, who has heard from or even about the hundreds of thousands of peasants being replaced by Three Gorges Dam in China? We did just hear from Merrill Lynch that the Yangtse Electric Power stock—the company funding the project—had a massive initial public offering. “Chinese energy stocks are a hot topic, not only domestically but internationally as well,” a representative said. See BBC News, “Huge Appetite for Chinese Dams,” November 6, 2003.

Plato's Women: Postmodern Pitfalls.

By Katerina Baitinger

The Socratic philosophic corpus champions two principal ideas: (1) virtue is knowledge, and (2) the dialectical method of attaining knowledge is argument-counter-argument-resolution. Plato, through his writings, upholds a triadic structure of knowledge: (1) *epistémē* (encompassing facts through the knowledge of *Forms*); (2) *áгноia* (including false belief and ignorance); and (3) *doxa* (neither fact nor figment but rather pure knowledge). That is to say, in the heart of the *Theory of Forms* lies absolute and true meaning, and certainly absolute and true knowledge. According to Plato, only the *Philosopher-Ruler* is able to lead his followers to true meaning, absolute knowledge, and, ultimately, authenticity. In addition, only the *Philosopher-Ruler* is able to combine just political power and true wisdom. The consequence is not only that philosophers would make the best leaders based on the aforementioned ideas, but also that men or women who are inclined by nature to study and understand philosophy, including the *Theory of Forms*, may join the ranks of *Philosopher-Rulers*. In other words, in Plato's ideal society, women would flourish based on their nature rather than their sex (see *Republic*, Book V, 453b-458e).

Plato begins the *Republic* with a complex question: "What Is Justice?" The unfolding of a theoretical ideal political system, community, and proper education for its citizens then follows. The theory of knowledge, as it develops in the *Republic*, is offered by Plato in the form of an allegory: the *Allegory of the Cave* (*Republic*, Book VII, 514a-519b). Plato maintains that there are two levels of awareness and very clearly distinguishes between the two: mere opinion and pure knowledge. Claims or assertions about the physical or visible world, including both common sense observations and scientific theories are only opinions. Some of these opinions may be well founded; some may be faulty. Neither, however, is to be considered pure knowledge. Only *Reason* which exists in higher levels of awareness yields pure knowledge; only *Reason* when suitably realized may result in undeniable intellectual insight. This is where the abiding universals lie and shape the eternal *Forms* that constitute the real world. Consequently, it is no coincidence that the *Allegory of the Cave* appears in the very work that proclaims female equality. In the unfolding of the Allegory both "men and women are chained, and both must find their way into the light of true Being and true knowledge" (Bluestone, 1987, 146).

The *Allegory of the Cave* is also used to demonstrate Socrates's *Theory of Forms* (*Republic*, Book VI, 509d-511e): the notion that the whole being is made up of a visible and an intelligible "realm" (not what we conceive as our world). As a result, the allegory delineates the process by which we are inspired to

rise from obscure knowledge (not well defined knowledge) of the visible realm through our senses, to the clearer knowledge of the intelligible realm through the use of reason (syllogismós).

Plato, in Book VII of the *Republic*, prompts the reader to imagine how life would be in a dark cave, where men and women have been confined since childhood, cut off from the outside world. Within the confines of that cave, men and women are chained by the legs and neck in such a way that they cannot see in any other direction but straight ahead. The only visual stimulus for the prisoners in the cave unfolds on a short wall situated directly in front of them. On that wall which assumes the function of a screen, a projected “show” takes place; it is similar to a puppet show—Shadow Theater. There are people involved whose job is to cast certain images on the wall of the cave that appear to the prisoners in the form of shadows. There is a fire burning in the back of the cave that the prisoners are not able to see. This accentuates the effect of the dark shadows in front of them. Plato prompts his readers to imagine that this is all the men and women, who are the prisoners and inhabitants of the cave, understand and experience as reality. They know nothing else (*Republic*, Book VII, 514a-b).

Suddenly, one of the prisoners is freed from the chains and forced, having been grabbed by the neck, exits the cave and sees the outside world, for the first time (what we consider the “real” world). At first, the prisoner is obviously confused; then there is a certain manifestation of disbelief. It is difficult, to say the least, for the ex-prisoner to accept that life inside the cave was an illusion and that the artificial images which were thought of as the real thing were, in fact, untrue and unreal. In other words, what appears to be true, is clearly not so (*Republic*, Book VII, 515c-d).

It is not surprising that Plato’s ex-prisoner returns to the cave and tries to enlighten the rest of the prisoners by acquainting them with his newly acquired knowledge pertaining to the “real” world outside of the cave. Certainly, this jeopardizes the ex-prisoner’s security and may even put her life in danger (*Republic*, Book VII, 517a). This is precisely because the people in the cave have not previously been introduced to the *Theory of Forms*; as a result, they have a very skewed interpretation of reality, based only on their personal observations. For instance, suppose that one of the shadows passing in front of the prisoners is that of a scroll. If the prisoners were allowed to communicate, one might say to another, “I see a scroll marching in front of me.” The question is, however, does she see a scroll or an image of a scroll as it appears in its shadowy form? Regardless of the answer, she did use the word scroll. Why did she do that? The explanation lies in Book VII of the *Republic*. In 515b (*Republic*, Book VII), Socrates raises a valid question and perhaps an analysis of the *Theory of Forms* as related to the *Allegory of the Cave*. “If they could converse with each other, do you not think that they would consider that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?” Hence if a prisoner says, “That is a scroll,” she thinks that the word “scroll” refers to the very thing appearing straightforward. Obviously, what Plato attempts to establish is that the prisoner will be wrong in assuming this because she is looking at the mere shadow of the item. The prisoner cannot see the real referent of the word “scroll.” In order to see it, she must turn to face the item itself, and that is not possible. According to Plato, and various linguists, general terms in language models are not names (signifiers) of the physical objects (signified) that we see. They are actually names of things that we cannot see, things that we can only grasp with the mind, hence the arbitrary nature of assigning names

to items living or not. (The words dog or cat, for example, come to mind. What is it about dog quality or dogness incorporated in the word dog that gives its name to the four-legged creature?)

Consequently, in both Plato and Aristotle, mimesis is the relationship between reality and representation. Aristotle, on the one hand, conveys the positive notion of mimesis, whereas Plato, on the other hand, conveys the negative notion of mimesis. In fact, Serena Anderlini-Onofrio explains,

Plato established an essentialist, negative notion of mimesis which presupposes that universals pre-exist particulars (the general precedes the specific, as we moderns would say). For Plato, cultural endeavors that imitate what is sensible were copies; hence they were one more step removed from perennial essences than the sensible world. Therefore, for Plato, mimesis, which is the art of making likeness of the objects that nature offers for observation, only threatens the purity of the perennial essences—the immutable ideas of which the shadows in the cave are a mere reflection. (Anderlini-Onofrio 1999, 160)

If and when the prisoners are released, after much pain and resistance, they are able to turn their heads and see the real objects. Socrates creates an analogy based on the prisoners' newly acquired ability to turn their heads and see the originators of the shadows: this action simply enables them to grasp the *Theory of Forms* with their minds. To put it in contemporary terms, we may acquire conceptual ideas because of our perceptual experience of physical objects, but we would be mistaken if we would think that the concepts we grasp are on the same level as the things we perceive.

Thus far, the majority of Feminist Literary Theorists have concluded that Plato uses the *Allegory of the Cave* as a metaphor for the womb. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, for one thing, in their acclaimed book, *The Madwoman in the Attic*, maintain that Plato's cave is "a female place, a womb-shaped enclosure, a house of earth, secret and often sacred" (1979, 93). "To this shrine," they continue, "the initiate comes to hear the voices of darkness, the wisdom of inwardness" (1979, 93). They go on to say that "the womb-shaped cave is also the place of female power, the *umbilicus mundi*, one of the great antechambers of the mysteries of transformation and that women trapped in the cave might seem to have metaphorical access to the dark knowledge buried in there" (1979, 95).

Additionally, Luce Irigaray, in her book, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, also prompts her reader to look at the *Allegory of the Cave* as "a metaphor of inner space, of the den, the womb or *hystera*, sometimes of the earth . . ." (1985, 243). She goes on to admit, however, that to look at it as such is "strictly speaking, impossible" (1985, 243). She claims that all the words used by Plato to describe and identify the cave can be seen in the light of the word *hystera*. In other words, she says that the cave where men (she insists that the prisoners are men) with unspecified sex, live, is shaped like a cave or a womb (1987, 243). However, the noun *anthropos*, in Greek does not refer to "man, sex unspecified" as Irigaray would like us to believe. The word actually means neither man nor woman, but rather human being. Irigaray goes on to say,

The entrance to the cave takes the form of a long passage, corridor, neck, conduit, leading upward, toward the light or the *sight of day*, and the whole of the cave is oriented in relation to this opening. Upward—this

notation indicates from the very start that the Platonic cave functions as an attempt to give an orientation to the reproduction and representation of something that is always already there in the den. The orientation functions by turning everything over, by reversing, and by pivoting around axes of symmetry. From high to low, from low to high, from back to front, from anterior to opposite, but in all cases from a point of view in front of or behind something in this cave, situated in the back. *Symmetry plays a decisive part here*—as projection, reflection, inversion, retroversion—and you will always already have lost your bearings as soon as you set foot in the cave; it will turn your head, set you walking on your hands, though Socrates never breathes a word about the whole mystification, of course. This theatrical trick is unavoidable if you are to enter into the functioning of representation. (1985, 244)

Irigaray emphasizes that the most important aspect of Plato's allegory has to do with the passage from the cave upward as a "phallic progression" (1985, 247). She claims that the "neck, passage, conduit, that has been obliterated and forgotten, can be nothing but the one, the same, penis. Simply *turned inside out* . . ." (1985, 248). Note that the occupants of the cave are "always already," to borrow Irigaray's term, men. After she goes on to say that the function of the cave is a copy of a copy, she concludes that the entire Socratic dialectic is contained in the following idea: "Nothing can be named as 'beings' except those same things which all the same men see in the same way in a setup that does not allow them to see other things and which they will designate by the same names, on the basis of the conversation between them" (1985, 263). This idea is overreaching, especially if it were held up to the light of the former analysis based on the Platonic idea of the *Allegory of the Cave*.

There is something to be said, however, about Irigaray's insistence that the occupants of the cave are male, "sex unknown," for she claims that inevitably they must be linked to the mother. "It is only after resistance and pain that the man be set on his feet in the cave and will begin to walk around it . . ." (1985, 258). On the one hand, one cannot help but wonder what happened to women in Irigaray's cave, and, on the other, it doesn't come as a surprise that she likens the coming out of the cave to the birthing process. According to her, when the man is, finally, out of the cave, he symbolically exits the womb. Perhaps what Irigaray is trying to say may be that women simply are the cave. Although Plato clearly explains that the ex-cave inhabitant returns to the cave, Irigaray believes that the ex-cave inhabitant's departure is a oneway path with no return. Hence, the men will not be able to "turn back toward the mother." However, they will act "as if it were possible to turn the scene of the womb or at least *its representation* back/over. As one might turn a purse, or a pocket, or a string bag, or even a wallet inside out" (1985, 284). Clearly, these are negative connotations to daylight, unconcealment, and truth. That is to say, since Irigaray associates daylight, unconcealment, and truth with men, ideas traditionally positive and good become negative and, as a result, wrong. As far as Irigaray is concerned, this move is an "effective way to prevent anything from remaining concealed, buried, shrouded, to stop its hiding, lurking, staying under wraps, in reserve" (1985, 284). In order that one may learn the wisdom of the philosopher and be introduced to "views that are fairer, loftier, and more precise," one must "cut off any remaining empirical relation with the womb" (1985, 293). This will make men "orphans of a simple, pure—and Identical—Origin. At best, hybrids" (1985, 293). Certainly, according to Irigaray, Plato espouses a misogynist, sexist idea: "[h]e who has never dwelled within the mother will always already have seen the light of day" (1985, 295).

According to Socrates, when certain truths are concealed, pure knowledge is suppressed and censorship is imposed. Philosophers do not flourish in such societies. After all, one cannot be a carpenter without hammer and nails. When all that human beings know comes to them in the form of a shadow theater, as impressions of spoon-fed knowledge on an imaginary wall, always concealed from the truth, how can they seek pure knowledge? Furthermore, even though some may find their way out of the cave because it may be increasingly difficult for them to live the lie, it is impossible to convince the rest of the cave occupants to “see the light.” As a result, the enlightened find themselves back in the cave trying, to their dismay, to convince the others that their lives are an illusion.

Likewise, Simone De Beauvoir terms the *Myth of the Cave*, “The myth of the Androgynes (a man-woman, hermaphrodite)” (Liddell and Scott, 1987, 58). De Beauvoir claims that in Plato’s *Myth of the Cave*, “The organism of the male supposes that of the female. Man discovers woman in discovering his own sex, even if she is present neither in flesh and blood nor in imagery; and inversely it is in so far as she incarnates sexuality that woman is redoubtable” (1989, 161). Be that as it may, Plato’s *Myth of the Cave* has nothing to do with sexuality. Yet when, De Beauvoir restricts woman to her sex, she limits and categorizes feminist notions of equity. Moreover, her attempt to reterritorialize the term woman without first taking it through the concept of deterritorialization results in stereotyping. It may be true that men fear women’s sexuality, but that has nothing to do with Plato’s *Allegory of the Cave*. Michel Foucault, in fact, maintains,

For a long time they tried to pin women to their sex. For centuries they were told: “You are nothing but your sex.” And this sex, doctors added, is fragile, almost always sick and always inducing illness. “You are man’s sickness.” And towards the 18th Century this ancient movement ran wild, ending in a pathologization of woman: the female body became a medical object *par excellence*. . . . (1988, 115)

Moreover, Plato’s *Allegory of the Cave* is “[a]bout the seductiveness of appearances,” according to Susan Bordo and very befitting to today’s societal ideology. Bordo goes on to say,

For Plato, the artificial images cast on the wall of the cave are a metaphor for the world of sense perception. The illusion of the cave is not mistaking that the world—what we see, hear, taste, feel—for the Reality of enduring ideas, which can only be “seen” with the mind’s eye. For us, bedazzlement by created images is no metaphor; it is the actual condition of our lives. If we do not wish to remain prisoners of these images, we must recognize that they are not reality. But instead of moving closer to this recognition, we seem to be moving farther away from it, going deeper and deeper into the cave of illusion. (1997, 2)

Undeniably, the *Allegory of the Cave* has to do with human perception, and it is certainly not antifeminist propaganda. Reaching inward for truth and wisdom is up to each and every human being. In fact, according to Plato, everyone has the capability to attain true knowledge regardless of his or her gender. Thus, through the use of the original texts, relying on authentic translations, one can easily decipher a deeper meaning in Plato’s words. Was it all in jest? We may never know. Be it as it may, the Platonic corpus indicates that women should be treated with respect and given the same opportunities as men based on nature and not gender. Clearly Plato, in his *Republic*, argues that women ought to gain membership

in the *philosopher-ruler* class and be chosen based on ability (nature) and not gender (Book V, 458c-e). Additionally, women in Plato's utopian polis may partake in what is considered traditionally male pursuits, such as education (music) and exercise (gymnastics), for he believes that there is an innate need in men and women to coexist happily, in a fortunate, prosperous (eudemon) city (Book V, 458d). After all, Plato manifestly proclaims: "Is there anything better for the city than to have the best possible man and women citizens" (Book V, 456e)? That is to say, encouraging men and women to pursue that in which they are able to excel, based on nature and not gender, will positively contribute to a thriving, flourishing society.

NOTES

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

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